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My dissertation explores the expansion of social insurance, specifically medical 
insurance, for migrants, who are neither urban nor rural residents, in urban China.  I 
investigate the factors that account for the expansion of medical insurance to this group in 
some localities but not others.   
Building upon the literature on social welfare and the logic of social welfare 
provision in authoritarian states, I argue that the recent adoption of urban migrant medical 
insurance is primarily a state centered story about leaders’ political and fiscal incentives.  
Migrant medical insurance programs have been adopted as a result of three factors: 
policy legacy, political structure, and political and fiscal incentives.  Using an inductive 
approach to derive theory from case studies in Shanghai and Guangzhou, I argue that 
policy legacies matter because past policies of the command economy, the danwei system 
and the hukou system have created a social welfare system based on employer 
contributions where there are two options for expanding social welfare to migrant 
workers, hukou conversion and ad hoc social program expansion.  Moreover, the political 
structure, characterized by bureaucratic negotiation between central and local 
governments, has created a space for variation in local policy and promoted competition 
between local governments.  However, these first two variables are static across all 
localities.  While they explain the broad context of social insurance expansion in China, 
they cannot alone explain the variation at the local level.  In this regard, I argue that the 
cadre evaluation system and the fiscal system have created political and fiscal incentives 
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that motivated the expansion of medical insurance to migrants as a development and 
revenue raising strategy.    
I hypothesize that local governments have used medical insurance as a way to 
attract skilled labor to develop their local economies because government officials have 
been evaluated on their ability to generate economic growth.  Additionally, fiscal deficit, 
not fiscal surplus, has been a key factor in social policy expansion because overstretched 
local governments can use migrant insurance funds as extrabudgetary revenue to meet 
current fiscal commitments.  These hypotheses are tested in a dataset of 285 prefecture-
level and provincial-level cities.  
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What are the factors driving the expansion of social programs in developing 
countries?  What accounts for local variation in social policy implementation within a 
country?  
My dissertation explores the expansion of medical insurance for migrants, who 
are neither urban nor rural residents, in urban China.  I focus on the health care system 
for the following reasons.  Firstly, health care affects the whole population, regardless of 
age, employment status or gender.  Secondly, while social welfare entitlements such as 
unemployment insurance, education, and pensions are important, health care is 
particularly integral to sustained economic development because health care can build 
human capital, affect individual life opportunities, and affect our normal functioning as 
free and independent individuals (Deaton 2003; Alleyne 2000; Daniels 2007).  Thirdly, 
although it is widely acknowledged that poverty causes poor health, poor health can 
cause income inequality and poverty by disrupting people’s ability to work and throwing 
families into debt.  Finally, access to quality health care has become a cause for social 
unrest in China as patients are routinely denied care if they cannot pay for it in advance 
(Wall Street Journal 2005, 2006; NY Times 2006; Economist 2008).   
My research expands our current understanding of the development of welfare 
states in five ways.  First, by conducting an analysis of China’s social welfare system, I 
am expanding our understanding of social policy in both developing countries and 
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authoritarian regimes.  One of the most significant achievements of the modern state is 
the ability to protect citizens from poverty in the event of sickness, old age and 
unemployment through a social welfare system.  While we know a great deal about the 
causes and effects of social policies in developed countries, especially in democratic 
regimes, our understanding of social protection in developing countries, especially in 
authoritarian regimes, is limited.  Given that more than 82% of the world’s population 
lives in developing countries (World Bank 2012), this is a vitally important area of 
research.  
Second, since social welfare theory is premised on democratic regimes, societal 
pressures are perceived as vitally important for the development of social welfare 
programs (Korpi 1983; Esping Andersen 1990; Stephens 1979; Therborn 1984; Garrett 
1998).  However, in my investigation, I find that demands from social groups are not 
necessary for the development of social programs in authoritarian regimes. Instead, the 
political logic of the state is the main driver of the development of these programs.  
Political and fiscal incentives of local leaders drive the implementation of medical 
insurance programs for migrant workers.  Moreover, democratization and external shocks 
are not essential for social policy expansion.  In China, I find that social policy is 
expanding to outside groups without political liberalization and with limited social 
pressures. 
Third, examining the literature on authoritarian regimes, coopting social groups 
through social benefits is the most common explanation for the provision of social 
welfare in authoritarian regimes (Wintrobe 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Olson 1993; Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; 
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Svolik 2012).  Yet this is an incomplete explanation in the Chinese context with regards 
to migrant workers.  This literature assumes that the authoritarian state is a unitary actor. 
Instead, in China’s case, the state is made up of different actors with different policy 
preferences and incentives.  Further, public goods and private goods are not clearly 
separated in this case.  In authoritarian regimes, public goods can be private goods.  In 
China, social insurance programs, commonly viewed as public goods, can be a source of 
private goods because this extrabudgetary revenue can be accrued to government officials 
within the system.  Thus, this research augments our current understanding of 
authoritarian regimes and public goods provision. 
Fourth, my analysis of the local variation in policy expansion in China allows us 
to understand the linkages between economic development and social policy (Wilensky 
1975; Flora & Alber 1981; Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Collier & Messick 1975; 
Adsera & Boix 2002; Haggard & Kaufman 2008).  In my case studies, I find that two 
Chinese cities, which had similar levels of economic growth and development, differed in 
their provision of medical insurance to migrants. Thus, I hypothesize that economic 
factors alone do not explain the development of social welfare programs in China.  
Instead of economic growth being the driver of social programs, I argue that social 
programs have been used as a means to accelerate economic development.  Chinese local 
governments have used social policies, as a way to attract much needed skilled labor to 
develop their local economies because government officials have been evaluated on their 
ability to generate economic growth.  Moreover, fiscal deficit, not fiscal surplus, is a key 
factor in social policy expansion because overstretched local governments have used 
migrant insurance funds as extrabudgetary revenue to meet current fiscal commitments. 
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Finally, many quantitative studies in the welfare literature have been conducted 
(Castles 1993; Flora and Alber 1981; Couglin 1979; Jackman 1975; Collier and Messick 
1975; Hewitt 1977; Myles 1984; Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975; Schneider 1982; 
Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Mares 2003; Weyland 2005).  However, most of these 
studies are flawed because they undertake cross-country comparisons but do not 
sufficiently control for differences between systems.  It is necessary to control for the 
diversity in political, economic, and social structures between countries, but large 
measurement problems prevent these studies from doing so.  Since there is significant 
variation in urban migrant medical insurance adoption within China, this project can 
study the factors that drive social policy expansion, while keeping these structures 
constant because the cities under examination operate under the same political, economic 
and social system.    
Data and Methods 
 
To understand the current policy preferences and options, I conduct a historical 
analysis of China’s social policy, covering China’s transition from a command to a 
market economy, and focusing on the evolution and endurance of the danwei system and 
the hukou system.  To understand the variation in policy adoption by local governments, I 
inductively derive my argument and hypotheses by conducting two city case studies and 
testing them in a multi-city data analysis.  
My analysis uses these case studies, an original dataset on city migrant medical 
insurance, and interviews.  For my cases, I select two cases: Shanghai as the leader case 
and Guangzhou as the laggard case.  For my city dataset, I collect and code urban migrant 
medical insurance policies from 1997-2010 for all 285 prefecture-level and provincial 
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level cities.  My data, gathered during eighteen months of fieldwork in Beijing, Shanghai 
and Guangzhou in 2009-2010, includes data from local policy documents, media reports, 
plus provincial and city statistical yearbooks.  My interviews with migrant workers, 
health care professionals, NGOs, firm managers, local officials and scholars on migrants’ 
social insurance and health policy are used to highlight the key issues and arguments in 
my analysis.  Additional information on my methodologies and data are available at the 
end of this dissertation.  
The Puzzle of Social Policy in China  
  
Since China began its transition to a market economy in the late 1970s, it has 
experienced increasing pressure to transform its welfare system.  Since the 1990s, it has 
introduced social protection programs at a speed that is unprecedented internationally. 
These include: pension and health insurance programs for urban and rural populations; 
unemployment, occupational injury and maternity insurance for urban formal sector 
workers; and a national social assistance scheme which now covers around 70 million 
people (World Bank 2012).  During the last two decades, China has put in place a social 
welfare system that took OECD countries close to half a century to build, and many other 
developing countries have yet to develop. 
 Between 1990 and 2007, China set up three types of medical insurance, Urban 
Employee Medical Insurance (UEMI), Urban Resident Medical Insurance (URMI), and 
the New Rural Medical Cooperative (NRMC).  In 2009, China committed to spending an 
additional ¥850 billion (about US$125 billion) in the ensuing 3 years, with the goal of 
providing affordable and equitable basic health care for all by 2020.  By 2011, these three 
medical insurance programs covered around 92% of its population (Yip et al 2012).   In 
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August 2012, China’s National Audit Office declared that the country’s social security 
system was “basically” in place (Economist 2012).  
These reforms culminated into the Social Insurance Law of 2010.  The law came 
into effect in July 2011.  The law guarantees the provision of pension, medical, 
occupational injury, unemployment and maternity benefits.  It also increases the 
portability of these insurance programs between localities.  Additionally, the law places 
stronger obligations on urban employers to enroll migrants in urban employee insurance 
schemes.  
Comparing China with Other Countries 
 
China’s socialist social policy shared distinctive features of Soviet and Eastern 
European states, where social policy was not based on the accommodation of the labor 
and the left, but rather the interests of labor and peasantry were subordinated to the 
political, economic and organizational logic of the command economy (Haggard and 
Kaufman 2008).  However, unlike those countries, China had a much lower level of 
industrialization and urbanization and has not yet caught up.  By 1990, 80% of Russia’s 
labor was engaged in non-agricultural sectors as compared with 40% in China (UN 
2002).   By 2000, the Eastern European and Russian urbanization rates were close to 70% 
(UN 2002).  In 2011, China’s urbanization rate was 50%, and 37% of its labor force was 
still engaged in agricultural production (China Statistical Yearbook 2012).  As a result, 
China’s social welfare state never achieved the wide and deep coverage of Russia and 
Eastern Europe, where citizens were incorporated into a dense network of social 
entitlements, and where scaling back benefits could pose serious political risks (Frazier 
2010, Haggard and Kaufman 2008).  Moreover, as a consequence of the potential fiscal 
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crises imposed by welfare expenditures, governments in Eastern Europe and other former 
Soviet states tended to undertake radical reforms, such as pension privatization.  China, in 
contrast, transferred the welfare function previously performed by enterprises to local 
governments and set up a social insurance system, but it did not engage in privatization 
(Croll 1999; Frazier 2010).  While the 1990s were largely considered a period of welfare 
retrenchment, where the danwei based social welfare system collapsed, this retrenchment 
did not last long as waves of urban labor unrest forced the Chinese government to quickly 
implement a series of government managed labor insurance programs in the urban areas.  
Thus, China did not permanently transition to a retrenched post-socialist welfare regime.   
Additionally, social policy reforms in Eastern European and Russia took place under 
democratization.  In contrast, China remains under the single party rule of the Chinese 
Communist Party, and there are few signs of political democratization.  
In East Asia, formerly lean welfare regimes are expanding but this expansion has 
largely been attributed to external shocks and democratization.  Prior to the 1997 crisis, 
East Asia’s welfare states were premised on two sets of ideas: “welfare 
developmentalism” where social policy was viewed principally as an instrument for 
economic growth, and “Confucian familism,” which only required a limited role for the 
government because the family was the main source of welfare provision (Peng and 
Wong 2010). The weakness of this type of social protection system, based on a growth-
focused state system combined with a heavy reliance on family support networks, was 
painfully exposed during the regional economic crisis of 1997-98 when a large segment 
of the population came under economic hardship.   After the crisis, East Asian countries 
started expanding their social welfare systems rapidly (Cook 2009). In contrast, China 
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survived the regional crisis relatively unscathed, but it has also been rapidly expanding its 
social welfare system.   
Moreover, researchers argue that governments in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan were 
compelled to enlarge social welfare provision throughout the postwar period because of 
bottom up democratic political pressure (Peng and Wong 2010).  In Japan, in order to 
maintain its political dominance, the governing Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) needed 
to facilitate both growth and a relatively equitable income distribution in cities and the 
countryside (Calder 1986).  Similarly, democratic reform and the political incentives of 
electoral competition prompted the universalization of formerly limited social insurance 
schemes, such as healthcare, in both Korea and Taiwan (Wong 2004). The introduction of 
new opposition parties prompted these governments to expand social welfare to win 
electoral support. Again, China, is different because no opposition party exists. Moreover, 
social pressure for social welfare among migrants is limited (see Chapter 3).  
In Latin America, three variables are important to social policy, industrialization 
under populist regimes (Argentina), democratization (Chile, Uruguay), and the presence 
of a powerful left party or coalition (Costa Rica).  Economic development and pressure 
group politics are offered as the key explanation for these social security regimes (Mesa-
-Lago 1978; Malloy 1979).  Extensions of social security protection are not always a 
response to direct pressure from organized groups but the state’s attempts to coopt 
potential threats or power bases to the regime (Mesa--Lago 1978; Spalding 1977).   For 
example, Argentina, under a military junta in 1943, initiated pensions, public health, 
social assistance, housing financing and unemployment insurance to coopt labor (Huber 
and Bogliaccini 2010).   Moreover, while the 1945 Law of Professional Associations 
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limited the independence of labor unions and their rights to strike in Argentina, this law 
also assured labor union bargaining rights and recognized monopoly unions in each 
industrial sector, thereby enhancing the power of the left (Collier and Collier 1992).   
Leftist governments are associated with generous social benefits and the expansion of 
social coverage (Pribbles 2011). In tandem with economic development, given the debt 
crisis experienced by many Latin American countries, researchers also attribute the 
reforms of social welfare regimes to World Bank influence (Huber and Stephens 2001; 
Teichman 2001).  In China’s case, while urban workers were given substantial benefits 
during its command economy phase, and still receive the best social benefits today, 
Chinese labor never had the kind of political leverage that existed in Latin American 
countries.  Again, democratization as a pathway for social welfare expansion is not 
relevant in China.  
China and Migrants 
 
China is building and deepening its welfare system in the absence of 
democratization and external shocks with limited social pressures. Moreover, China is 
expanding medical insurance to migrant workers, a population that is least likely to 
mount a challenge to the regime.  Why? 
China’s migrant problem can be traced back to its hukou (household registration) 
system, which was first implemented in the 1950s to restrict rural migration into cities. 
Rural population pressures, given the shortage of arable land, and urban demand for 
cheap labor, stemming from market reforms in the 1980s, have led to the relaxation of the 
hukou system (Mallee 2003).  As a result, large migrant communities have formed in 
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urban areas.  Currently, there are 220 million rural migrants residing in Chinese cities 
(Peng 2011).  China is experiencing the largest migration in human history.   
While large-scale urbanization is nothing unusual in the history of the world, the 
experiences of other countries suggest that urban ills and rapid urbanization go hand in 
hand.  If the urban sector cannot absorb the additional labor, urban unemployment rises 
and urban slums form leading to increases in crime rates, traffic congestion, and pollution. 
The number of migrants in China has doubled in the last ten years. In the 11th Five Year 
Plan for 2006-2010, the Chinese government had expected the level of urbanization to 
increase from 43% to 47% by 2010.  In 2012, the urbanization rate was 50%.  If current 
trends hold, the urban population will grow from 665 million to 926 million by 2025 and 
hit 1 billion by 2030 (Peng 2011), which translates to an additional 335 million people in 
the next 20 years.  Of the new urban residents, 240-260 million will be rural migrants 
(Peng 2011).  Thus, by 2025, the migrant population is expected to grow to 460-480 
million.  
Until recently, the migration pattern in China has been largely circular, where 
migrants move between their place of origin and host city.  Surveys on migrants’ 
intention to stay in their host city ranged from 14% to 64% (Fan 2011).   The large range 
in responses is mostly reflective of the different questions used to inquire about the 
settlement issue in different surveys.  For example, Cai and Xu (2009) show that 77% of 
migrants want to continue to work in their city but only 19% desire to live there during 
their old age.  It seems that over time, the intention of migrants to settle in their host city 
has increased.  For example, based on similar surveys in Fujian conducted in 2002 and 
2006, Zhu and Chen (2010) find that migrants’ intention to stay in their host city had 
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increased from 21% to 36%.  In a 2008 Beijing study, Fan (2011) finds similar results, 
having worked in Beijing for an average of 6.9 years, around 38% of migrants would stay 
in the city permanently.  
 Recent studies highlight that the new generation of migrants, those born in the 
1980s and 1990s, which make up 60% of the migrant population, is more educated than 
earlier migrants and has little farming experience and thus has less intention to return to 
the countryside (Murphy 2002; Fan 2008).  These people are between a rock and a hard 
place because on the one hand, returning to the country is not realistic because they 
cannot farm, but on the other hand, staying in the city is not realistic either because living 
costs are too high.” (不会种地，回到农村对我来说已不现实，我在这座城市生活了
多年，有了很深的感情，但城市商品房太贵，想要扎根下来同样不现实).1  Overall, 
as this young generation of migrants increases in size, urban governments will need to 
start addressing this population’s desire to stay in the host city despite many barriers and 
difficulties. 
While the hukou system no longer precludes migration, it still plays an important 
role in determining claims on public resources (Solinger 1999a; Solinger 1999b; Solinger 
2006; Zhang 2002; Zhu 2007; Zhang 2008).  Even though migrant laborers contribute to 
economic development and pay consumption taxes equal to that of the local work force, 
health care is usually not extended to migrants.  While cities are better situated to provide 
health care to migrants, many choose not to do so.  Instead, many cities with large 
migrant populations enjoy the benefits of cheap labor without taking the responsibility to 





provide health services to them.  Due to the deterioration of the rural health care system 
and because migrants do not pay taxes in their home provinces, local governments at 
migrants’ home provinces also lack the financial resources to provide adequate health 
care to migrants. 
Given rapid urbanization and migrants’ second-class status in urban areas, the 
Chinese government faces an enormous challenge in trying to integrate migrants into 
urban society.   Migrants’ health problems were described as a national priority at the 
Communist Party Congress in Beijing in March 2002, where it was acknowledged that 
unless their problems were addressed, they could present a threat to public health, 
sustained economic growth, and social stability. City governments were urged to 
determine migrants’ needs and ensure that they had rights equal to those of the local 
population, particularly in terms of access to health care (China Daily 2006). In May 
2006, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security ordered prefecture and 
large/medium cities to cover migrants under regular urban employee medical insurance 
or a separate urban medical insurance scheme that would have “a low contribution rate 
that covers major illness with financing from employer contributions to be used while 
migrants are in the city (低费率、保大病、保当期、以用人单位缴费为主).’’  The 
response of local governments to this order has been varied.  While some cities have been 
early adopters in incorporating migrants into their social insurance schemes as early as 
1997, some cities have yet to cover migrants under any insurance scheme despite this 
central government order.  For example, in 2002, Shanghai pioneered a medical 
insurance program for migrants that include free vaccinations for children and low cost 
maternity care.  In contrast, Guangzhou, did not adopt medical insurance for migrants 
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until 2009.  Given that both cities are wealthy and growing quickly, pure economic 
factors do not explain the difference in their policies toward the same population.  Given 
this scenario, why have some Chinese cities chosen to provide medical insurance to their 
migrant population, a politically inconsequential group? What accounts for the local 
variation?  
Social Welfare Theories 
 
In the social welfare literature, three theoretical approaches are used to explain the 
emergence, expansion (retrenchment) and variation among welfare states.  They are the 
logic of industrialism (a variant of modernization theory), power resource theory, and 
state centered theory.  Although recent scholarship on developing countries has made 
amendments to these approaches, they remain the dominant explanations of social policy.  
These three approaches differ in their view of convergence versus divergence among 
welfare states and the salient factors that explain the origin, expansion and retrenchment 
of welfare programs.  I examine each approach to see what types of observable 
implications are relevant in the Chinese context to explain the incorporation of migrants 
into the current medical insurance system.  
Logic of Industrialism  
 
Based on modernization theory, the logic of industrialism theory assumes that 
“economic growth is the ultimate cause of welfare state development” (Wilensky 1975, 
24).  Social changes stemming from economic development will lead to the creation of 
welfare states.  As countries develop economically, industrialization and urbanization 
will bring about similar experiences across different populations.   Regardless of 
ideologies and political regimes, once people move from an agrarian to an industrial 
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society, they can no longer rely on their own resources and local communities to cope 
with social contingencies such as sickness, injuries, and unemployment (Skocpol & 
Amenta 1986).   As a result, social groups make demands on the state for social programs.  
With fiscal surplus stemming from economic growth, states are able to respond to these 
social needs by implementing social programs.  Thus, while economic development 
engenders social problems, the same growth creates the necessary resource surplus to 
deal with these issues (Quadagno 1987).  
In this approach, urbanization and government resources are preconditions for the 
emergence of welfare policies. Over time, all states converge to similar social welfare 
policies and spending through economic development.  While few scholars dispute the 
importance of economic surplus in the development of welfare states, this approach does 
not consider the effect of uneven development within a country.  In China, economic 
development and fiscal surplus exist, but economic growth is not evenly distributed.  
While the central government has a fiscal surplus, many local governments are deep in 
fiscal debt. Moreover, since social welfare is mostly provided at the local level without 
adequate central government transfers, local governments are not providing social 
welfare as a result of economic surplus. 
Moreover, this theory posits that economic and demographic variables such as 
GDP, urbanization rates, and the percentage of the population over 65, are strong 
predictors of the timing and level of public spending of welfare regimes. While this 
theory fares well in large, cross-sectional, multi-national studies using broad social 
expenditure categories and policy areas from the 1940-1960s, it fails in longitudinal and 
more nuanced studies of social policies (Skocpol & Amenta 1986).  Using levels of 
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industrialization, this theory fails to predict the timing of the adoption of social programs 
(Flora & Alber 1981; Collier & Messick 1975).  Studies on OECD countries conclude 
that countries’ public expenditures have diverged rather than converged since the 1960s, 
and neither economic level nor growth can account for the divergence (Collier & Messick 
1975).  Moreover, recent studies that look at both OECD and non-OECD countries find a 
very weak correlation between economic development and social spending (Adsera and 
Boix 2002; Mares 2005). Additionally, Collier and Messick’s study (1975) find that less 
developed countries with little economic surplus and a young workforce have initiated 
social welfare programs.  In China’s case, its social welfare program can be traced back 
to 1951, when the first labor insurance regulation was introduced to cover industrial 
workers in state owned and collectively owned enterprises (Tang and Ngan 2001, Dixon 
1981).  Having just been through a civil war, China at the time, was poor, rural and 
undeveloped, but it did implement pension, medical and occupational injury insurance 
with relatively generous welfare benefits that included subsidized housing, healthcare and 
transport for industrial workers.  Thus, economic factors do not provide a complete 
explanation in China and in many other developing countries.   
Recently, globalization has become a new area of inquiry in the logic of 
industrialism school of thought, especially in the study of developing countries.  Besides 
domestic factors, external economic factors have been found to affect the development of 
social programs.  Depending on the country’s factor endowment, free trade can distribute 
gains and losses to capital-intensive and labor-intensive sectors; thus, to encourage trade 
liberalization, states need to provide social protection to losing sectors (Alt et al 1996).  
In studies by Cameron (1978) and Katzenstein (1985), they find that small open 
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economies with strong labor unions tend to provide a variety of social protections 
including unemployment benefits, health insurance, job training and employment 
subsidies to firms.  Rodrik (1998) and Quinn (1997) also find that exposure to trade and 
capital mobility is associated with more welfare spending and bigger government in both 
OECD and developing countries.   
Several studies have argued that large aggregate shocks experienced by Asian 
economies during the 1997 Asian financial crisis have contributed to the increase in 
public spending (Wong 1994; Cook 2009; Haggard and Kaufman 2008).  As mentioned 
previously, the Asian financial crisis created losers that the previous minimalist systems 
could not address.  In contrast, with its massive foreign reserves, China survived the 1997 
Asian financial crisis relatively unscathed.  Even faced with the 2008 US financial crisis 
and the 2012 Eurozone sovereignty debt crisis, the Chinese economy grew by 7.4% in 
2012 (BBC 2012).  However, in the absence of being adversely affected by these 
exogenous economic shocks, China is expanding its social welfare programs.  Thus, the 
simple explanation that globalization and exogenous economic shocks create losers that 
need to be compensated with social benefits does not explain social policy in China.  
Power Resources   
 
While economic development is important for the development of welfare states, 
it takes politics to turn resources into policy.  The single modernization approach cannot 
adequately explain the variation among welfare nations, and empirical evidence suggests 
that convergence is not occurring.  Furthermore, a major gap in the logic of industrialism 
thesis is its inability to specify the mechanism by which benefit programs get enacted.   
The power resource approach does not dispute the importance of economic surplus to 
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welfare state development.  Power resource theorists attribute the development of welfare 
states to the political power of different groups in society. Both industrialization and 
deindustrialization are explanations for the development of welfare states not because of 
the economic surplus generated from these processes but because sectoral shifts in 
occupational structure create large numbers of losers whose grievances can only be 
addressed through governmental expansion of social programs (Iversen and Cusack 
2000).   
Rather than looking at comparative welfare regimes as converging to a single 
state model, power resource theorists stress the divergent nature of welfare states.  In 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) three worlds of welfare capitalism, he describes three distinct 
welfare types, liberal, corporatist, and social democratic.  Liberal regimes in the US and 
UK provide means tested assistance with modest universal transfers emphasizing 
individual self-reliance and the primacy of the market.  Corporatist regimes in Germany 
provide social insurance tied to occupational status based on historical legacies of 
corporatism.  Social democratic regimes in Scandinavia provide universal welfare based 
on the principle of equality. In all three welfare regime types, the political strength of the 
working class is essential for the development of social programs (Korpi 1983; Epsing-
Anderson 1990; Stephens 1979).  Empirically, researchers have found that the scope of 
welfare programs and the level of social program spending are highly correlated with the 
strength of labor (Therborn 1984; Garrett 1998).  In the Chinese case, labor’s needs are 
subservient to the development objectives of the communist state.  While politically 
important workers, those working for state owned enterprises (SOE) and the public sector, 
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were rewarded with access to social welfare through their employers, and labor demands 
were not necessary for social policy enactment in China.  
A recent emphasis in the literature that studies the power struggle between 
different classes in society is cross class alliances.  In Peter Baldwin’s (1990) 
examination of the historical origins of social insurance programs in five European 
nations, he notes that Denmark and Sweden enacted universal, tax financed social 
policies before the social democratic parties enjoyed an overwhelming political 
advantage.  Moreover, the strongest promoters of universal programs were political 
parties representing both farmers and the middle class, and they supported these 
programs because they were able to shift the tax burden to a broader population.  Hence 
cross class alliances are key to social program expansion.  However, cross class alliances 
do not apply in China because it is an authoritarian state where social groups lack the 
political resources and access to the government.  More importantly, social organizations, 
those not registered with the state, are not permitted in China (Saich 2000).  
Borrowing insights from the varieties of capitalism literature, recent research in 
this field has concentrated on employer preferences towards social policy.  Instead of 
assuming that employers are naturally opposed to social policy, researchers have 
demonstrated that employers’ organizations have sometimes initiated social benefit 
programs (Quadagno 1987, Swenson 2004, Mares 2003, Hall and Sockice 2001; Thelen 
2001).  Social protection can have a capacity building rather than a redistributive effect in 
an economy. Estevez-Abe et al (1999) contend that social protection can help economic 
actors overcome market failures in skill formation.  Since people are less likely to invest 
in specific skills if the risk of unemployment is high, employers who rely on specific 
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skills need to insure workers against the potential risk of unemployment. However, 
employers’ promises are not credible, thus governmental policies are crucial.  Therefore, 
the preferences of employers, once thought to be uniformly opposed to social legislation, 
can be critical in explaining how similar states evolve to have different welfare policies.  
Thus, the required skill profile, firm size, and sector can be predictive of a firm’s 
preferences (Mares 2003; Estevez-Abe et al 1999; Swenson 1999; Thelen 2001).   
Since social protection can tie workers to a workplace and create employee 
dependency on firms, the types of skills needed in an economy can be a main determinant 
on the type of social protection that will emerge (Mares 2001).  In an economy where 
firm specific skills are needed, employment protection will be preferred because both 
firms and workers want guarantees that trained workers will remain at the firm for a long 
time.  In an economy where industry skills are needed, unemployment protection will be 
preferred because workers can seek employment within industry and will be protected 
during spells of unemployment.  In an economy where general skills are needed, low 
unemployment or employment protection will be preferred because workers will have a 
big incentive to invest in general skills which are portable as opposed to firm specific and 
industry specific skills because they do not have any guarantees that their investment will 
pay off. So, in economies where a combination of firm and industry specific skills are 
required, a strong alliance between skilled workers and their employers in favor of social 
protection is likely to emerge (Mares 2001).  In contrast, firms will have no interest in 
lobbying for any form of social protection when they require workers with general skills 
(Mares 2001).  
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Additionally, in Swenson’s (1991) study of Denmark and Sweden, he argues that 
large export-oriented firms support a highly centralized wage-bargaining system and 
social protection as a means of preventing sheltered producers from attracting workers by 
offering higher wages.  Moreover, in Kathleen Thelen’s (2001) study, she finds that firm 
size matters.  While large manufacturing employers favors the German wage bargaining 
system because they are most vulnerable to overt labor conflict, small and medium-size 
firms are dissatisfied with the system.  As a result of these firm’s preferences, 
complementary welfare programs and policies will emerge to reduce employers’ labor 
costs and ensure the optimal supply of skilled workers (Hall and Soskice 2001).  Thus, 
social policy is correlated with different development strategies to reshapes the local 
labor force (Wibbels and Ahlquist 2007).    
Drawing insights from the existing literature and findings in my own research, 
given the mobile nature of migrant workers in China, firms requiring skill specific 
workers would prefer to invest in localities where workers’ welfare needs are met by the 
state because these areas would be able to attract a steady supply of migrant workers who 
would stay for longer time periods.  Thus firm type and labor composition would matter 
in the Chinese context.  In this case, the employers’ preferences may be aligned with the 
state to provide workers with social benefits, which would makes it easier for the state to 
implement such programs.  In Frazier’s (2010) pension study, he finds that SOEs prefer 
the state to take over social provision because they are then relieved of those welfare 
responsibilities.  Moreover, depending on the strength of local governments, local 
employers can also bargain with the state on social contributions.  
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 In sum, the power resource theory has limited explanatory power in China 
because the basic assumption is that social groups can press their demands against the 
state through an electoral process.  Being an authoritarian state, social groups have few 
avenues to express their demands. Moreover, most migrant workers are not demanding 
social insurance from the state (examined in detail in Chapter 3).  Yet, despite limited 
demand from migrants, some Chinese cities are expanding medical insurance to this 
population.  An explanation for this can be found in the variety of capitalism thesis on 
employer preferences; though Chinese employers view social insurance as an added labor 
cost, they are not opposed to paying for occupational injury and medical insurance 
because they can spread the risk among many employers. As put forth in the existing 
literature, this preference among employers makes it easier for the government to 
implement social programs.  
State Centered 
  
In contrast to the logic of industrialism and power resource approaches, state 
centered theorists contend that political structure and policymaking are the primary 
sources of differences in welfare policy.  According to this theory, politics between 
bureaucrats, sheltered from societal pressures, is the key determinant in explaining the 
variation in welfare policy over time (Heclo 1974).  Social policy should be seen not as a 
result of economic growth or a reflection of political power of various groups but as a 
result of state structure and individual bureaucracies. The organizational structure of the 
state influences politicians’ incentives and the collective action of social groups.  Case 
studies on the US Social Security administration and Medicaid/Medicare programs find 
that state bureaucracies have a high degree of administrative autonomy in establishing 
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and implementing priorities (Derthick 1979).  Castles (1981) and DeViney (1983) find 
that administratively or fiscally centralized states are more conducive to generous social 
expenditures than decentralized states.  In Immergut’s (1992) comparative study of health 
insurance systems in France, Sweden, and Switzerland, she argues that political 
institutions shape interest groups’ access to government to influence health insurance 
policies.  In Wong’s (1994) examination of Taiwan and South Korea’s expansionary 
healthcare policy, he argues that democratization reshapes the political structure and 
creates new stakeholders in the new system.  In China’s case, its political structure deeply 
influences policy preferences and outcomes.  However, institutions such as electoral rules 
outlined by this research have little relevance in China because expansionary social 
policy is done outside of democratization.   
Besides political structure, policy legacy is very important in this approach.  
Policy makers do not base their agendas primarily on external demands but rather on 
prior state actions that shape future goals.  In the case of the American welfare state, 
policy legacy was crucial in its development. The prior existence of state-level initiatives 
in unemployment insurance, old age pensions, and mothers’ pensions prevented the 
Social Security Act of 1935 from being legislated as a single national program (Skocpol 
& Ikenberry 1983; Skocpol 1992).  Moreover, Skocpol and Weir (1985) attribute the 
unwillingness of the United Kingdom to enact expansionary fiscal policies during the 
Great Depression to its experience with unemployment insurance policy in 1911.  From 
this experience, British civil servants were unwilling to experiment with large-scale 
public programs.  Hence, policy is not a reflection of preferences expressed by organized 
groups but is bounded by a historical process.  
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Moreover, past and existing policies can change public agendas and shape group 
interests (Skocpol 1992; Skocpol & Amenta 1986; Pierson 1994). Haggard and Kaufman 
(2004, 2008) argue that fiscal commitments and expectations from welfare legacies can 
become path dependent.  They find that Asian governments, which inherited less fiscal 
constraints, have more options with respect to the expansion of public insurance and 
services as they become more democratic and more integrated into international markets. 
In contrast, Latin American and Eastern European countries have fewer policy options 
because they have inherited large fiscal commitments.  Even as these states democratize, 
they find it difficult to respond to pressures for welfare expansion.  Building upon this 
theoretical framework, policy legacies are examined in detail to explain the current policy 
options available in China.  
Besides policy legacy, policy diffusion also plays a key role in social policy 
making because external forces influence policymakers.  The process entails the 
“adoption of the same policy framework in varied national settings, [and] produces 
commonality in diversity” (Weyland 2005, 265).  Researchers have identified four causal 
factors for this occurrence: coercion, competition, emulation, and learning (Simmons et al 
2006).  In examining the downsizing of OECD public spending in the 1980s, researchers 
found that emulation and learning dynamics were at work in the policy diffusion process 
(Simmons et al 2006).  Similarly, Skocpol argues that state bureaucracies learn from each 
other in policy making.  New Deal reformers were strongly influenced by Wisconsin 
policy makers, who were opposed to open-ended government handouts and committed to 
separating public assistance programs for the poor and social insurance programs for 
workers who would earn the entitlement as a right (Skocpol & Ikenberry 1983).  
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Subsequent states adopted the Wisconsin model in keeping these two programs separate.  
In addition to competition and learning, policy diffusion can also work through a regional 
effect where “bold changes that happen next door are immediately available and thus 
grab the attention of the decision maker” (Weyland 2005, 294). In the US policy 
literature, we see that policies spread from neighbor to neighbor and across similar states 
in different public policy areas (Case et al 1993; Mooney and Lee 1995).  Shipan and 
Volden (2006) find that, conditional upon local political characteristics, city policies have 
led to state-wide adoption in their examination of anti-smoking laws across fifty US 
states.  Similarly, in the case of social security reform, nine Latin American countries 
have followed Chile’s 1981 pension privatization plans (Weyland 2005).    In China, 
cities do learn from each other, especially since certain cities are designated as pilot sites 
for policy innovation prior to a national policy roll out.  In the case of medical insurance, 
the central government designated Zhenjiang (Jiangsu Province) and JiuJjiang (Jiangxi 
Province) as experimental sites for urban employee medical insurance in 1994 (Duckett 
2003).  Learning from these two cities was later incorporated in the medical insurance 
reform of 1998.  Thus, while internal city characteristics are important, a process of 
learning over time is also occurring in regards to migrant medical insurance.  
In sum, the state centered approach provides the best analytical tool to examine 
the Chinese welfare state, but given that the literature is based overwhelmingly on 
developed countries with democratic institutions, it cannot adequately explain the current 
development and variation in social insurance expansion without incorporating the 
literature on social policy in authoritarian regimes.  
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Political Logic of Social Policy in Authoritarian Regimes 
 
 While some scholars argue that regime type is epiphenomenal or that it does not 
matter as much as economic institutions (Wibbels & Ahlquist 2007; Haggard & Kaufman 
2008; Kitschelt et al 1999; Hall & Sockice 2001), I argue that whether or not a country is 
democratic or autocratic is very important for social policy. Authoritarian regimes may 
have political motives, unrelated to structural economic conditions that determine their 
social program agenda and spending.  In this section, the literature on authoritarian 
governments is examined to explore the political logic of social policy in authoritarian 
regimes.  
The origins of this literature go back to Tullock (1987), who argues that all 
autocrats share the same primary goal: to hold on to office.  However, autocrats are 
inherently insecure because they do not know who supports them and who does not. Thus 
autocrats face two types of threats to their rule: those that come from outsiders within 
society and those that emerge from within the ruling elite (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).  
First, let us examine the threat posed by the masses.  As Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) 
note, "the major constraint that faces those controlling political power in a  
nondemocracy is a danger that those excluded from political power might attempt to gain 
political power or to overthrow those who are in control" (120).  In authoritarian regimes, 
leaders face threats from the majority by the virtue of their size.  This threat becomes real 
when a society is highly unequal and the masses can overcome the collective action 
problems inherent in coordinating participation in revolutionary activities (Olson 1965; 
Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003).  Thus, to stay in power, authoritarian leaders 
can use repression and/or make a number of concessions such as cutting taxes and 
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redistributing assets (Wintrobe 2000; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). Faced with a 
potential revolution, an authoritarian regime will want to make policy concessions to 
avoid being ejected from power.  To gain support for his rule, the autocrat can gain 
cooperation and thwart threats of rebellion through policy concessions and the provision 
of private goods.  Autocrats who need more cooperation and face greater threats to their 
rule must make more extensive concessions in terms of private goods and policies 
(Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).  Yet autocrats do more than just avert rebellion. Even if 
rulers act merely in self-interest, given a sufficient time horizon, they will benefit from a 
well functioning economy and thus do, under certain conditions, provide broad public 
goods (Olson 1993).  
From this framework, we can deduce that an authoritarian regime, such as the one 
operating in China, has incentives to provide social policies for its populace.  The 
Chinese Communist Party has around 80 million members, and it governs a population of 
1.3 billion (Li 2012).  The leadership can potentially be overwhelmed by the 
“disenfranchised” masses.  In 2010, there were about 180,000 mass incidents relating to 
corruption, environmental problems and labor protection.2  In late 2011, the party 
conceded to a democratic grass roots election in Wukan village (Guangdong province) 
where residents rose and seized control of their village in protest of land grabs and 
corruption by local officials.   Thus the Chinese government has made policy concessions 
in the face of threats posed by the masses.  However, in the case of rural migrants, the 
Chinese government has less to fear from this population, as these people have greatly 






benefited from economic reforms.  Migrants have seen vast improvements in their 
livelihoods since the reforms.  While their existence may be miserable in the city, their 
economic rewards in the city are many times greater than in the countryside.  Migrants  
also do not constitute a politically important population for urban governments because 
they are officially the responsibility of rural governments.  Moreover, migrants have less 
organizing capacity than rural villagers or public sector workers due to their diversity and 
high mobility.  
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) depart from earlier scholars by assuming that 
dictators do not face a general threat from the rest of society, but instead face a threat 
from a subset of society, the selectorate.   Their encompassing theory covers both 
democratic and authoritarian regimes.  In addition to assuming that all leaders seek 
political survival, they assume that a leader's survival depends on the creation and 
maintenance of a winning coalition within the selectorate.  The selectorate may exercise 
this power as a voting electorate or through other institutions, depending on whether the 
society is under democratic or authoritarian rule.  To stay in power, the leader will have 
to cultivate loyalty among the winning coalition by rewarding this group with a 
combination of public and private goods.   The cost of delivering private goods versus 
public goods is proportional to the size of the winning coalition.  In a democracy, the size 
of the winning coalition proportional to the selectorate is large, and thus public goods are 
used to reward this group because it is cheaper than providing private goods.  In an 
autocracy, the size of the winning coalition proportional to the selectorate is small, thus 
private goods are used to reward to this group.  Bueno de Mesquita et al. find that larger 
winning coalitions are associated with higher levels of public spending on education and 
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health care, higher rates of childhood immunizations, lower rates of illiteracy, higher life 
expectancy, greater access to clean water, and faster rates of economic growth.    
The predicted outcome for China, a country with a small winning coalition, is few 
public goods.  However, this is not the case. From 1980 onward, the size of the winning 
coalition and selectorate has been identical and unchanging for China, but the amount of 
public goods has increased (Gallagher and Hanson 2009).  Since the late 1990s, China 
has developed and expanded its social insurance systems and enacted encompassing 
social assistance programs such as dibao.  As Gallagher and Hanson (2009) argue, the 
composition of the winning coalition matters more than the size of the wining coalition.  
Deng Xiaoping’s reformist strategy shifted the “composition of the selectorate to reflect 
those who benefited from reform and globalization” (Gallagher and Hanson 2009, 21).  
By building reformist goals into the cadre evaluation system and nomenclature system of 
the elite appointment system, the preferences of ruling elites changed.  Thus, the 
selectorate theory is limited in its ability to explain the logic behind the expansion of 
migrant medical insurance in China because it fails to theorize how a ruling party’s rules 
manage and incentivize actors within the system.  The proportional size of the coalition 
to selectorate is too simplistic to explain the evolution of the welfare state in China.  
Additionally, the selectorate theory does not account for the fact that some public 
goods can be private goods.  The authors contend that leaders stay in power by raising 
government revenue through taxation and then spending that revenue, dividing it between 
public goods that benefit everyone in the society and private rewards that go only to 
members of the winning coalition. While they acknowledge that most public goods are 
often private in their production (Aranson and Ordeshook 1985) - for example, defense 
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policy can contain aspects of both public and private rewards - this nuance is not factored 
into their theory of political survival.   In the case of social insurance programs in China, 
these programs function as both a public good and private good.  On the one hand, a 
migrant medical insurance fund can be a public good used to cover migrants and other 
social groups.  On the other hand, a migrant medical insurance fund can be a source of 
extrabudgetary revenue for local governments, making it a private good.  Extrabudgetary 
funds are officially recognized and accepted as funding sources that localities can use to 
overcome their fiscal shortfalls (Jia & Zhao, 2008; Oi & Zhao 2007). These funds 
enhance a local state’s extractive capacity, and can be seen as state building through 
welfare expansion (Grzymala-busse 2008).  Oftentimes, extrabudgetary funds are used at 
the discretion of local officials without oversight and have bred corrupt practices and 
popular discontent (Bernstein Lu 2003; Zhan 2009; Li 2007; Liu 2004).  Thus, migrant 
medical insurance is not necessarily a public good in this case but a private good 
extracted by local officials, and the provision of public goods is secondary to the primary 
goal of raising revenue.  
As mentioned earlier, besides encountering threats from the masses, authoritarian 
governments also encounter threats from within the ruling elite.  Svolik (2012) argues 
that this is a more important and dangerous threat than those of the masses. In his study 
of 316 authoritarian leaders who held office for at least a day between 1946 and 2008, 
more than two third were removed from office by regime insiders, individuals from the 
dictator’s inner circle, government or the repressive apparatus, only one fifth were 
removed by the masses through popular uprisings and pressure to democratize.  
Moreover, while the average time in power of an authoritarian leader is 16 years, the 
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median is 8 years, no longer than a two term American president (Svolik 2012).  
Moreover, the dictator also faces a commitment problem with his allies and thus 
institutions are used as a means to reduce the commitment and monitoring problem 
among ruling elites and not as a means to co-opt oppositions (Svolik 2012; Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006, Gandhi 2008).  
Additionally, scholars have noted that single party states are less likely to break 
down and democratize than other authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999; Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2007; Slater 2003; Brownlee 2007).  Svolik (2012) argues that a single party 
is more resilient due to the organizational features of authoritarian parties.  He identifies 
three organizational features, the “hierarchical assignment of service and benefits, the 
political control over appointments, and the selective recruitment and repression” as the 
key instruments to co-opt the masses and elites (163). These features not only distribute 
rewards according to a party member’s allegiance but they also function as “sunk 
political investment,” where only by remaining in the organization will they be able to 
capitalize on their investment and advance their careers (Svolik 2012, 163).  
Svolik’s argument comes closest to explaining the case of China as a conflict 
between the ruler and the ruling elite.  However, this literature continues to view the state 
as a single unit and sees the conflict as between the ruler and the masses and the ruler and 
ruling elite. However, even among the ruling elite, actors do not operate as a unitary unit 
with a single preference. But rather, the state is a complex collection of actors that have 
incentives and constraints that may be in conflict with each other.  Although the Chinese 
government is a unitary state ruled by the Chinese Communist Party, the decentralized 
political and fiscal system make the ruling elite a collection of actors with competing 
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interests.  Moreover, while the cadre evaluation system does allow central officials to 
monitor local officials, this system also creates a set of incentives that are, at times, at 
odds with the general direction of central government leaders.  Most specifically, the 
emphasis on economic growth in the evaluation system has led local officials to pursue 
investment and development at all costs. While the central government has called for 
more balanced growth, many local governments have not heeded this directive.  In the 
case of social welfare, while the central government is concerned about inequality and 
wants to build a social safety net for fear of the masses, local governments are more 
concerned about developing the economy.  Thus, social policy such as social insurance 
programs can be used to develop the economy and line the pockets of officials but not 
necessarily to coopt the masses.  
To review, there are three major shortcomings in the current social welfare 
literature in explaining social welfare expansion to migrants in China.   One, the country 
is used as the unit of analysis in most studies, and local variation in policy formation and 
implementation are ignored.  Despite being a unitary government, China has a 
decentralized political system that has created large local variation in policy adoption.  
Even in the literature that speaks about the variations across policy areas within the same 
country, few have examined policy variation within one policy area in the same country.  
Two, society based explanations cannot explain the social welfare expansion to migrant 
workers, a politically weak group in China.  Moreover, as described in Chapter 3, there is 
limited demand from migrants for social insurance.  Three, the social welfare expansion 
in developing countries has largely been attributed to democratization and exogenous 
shocks such as financial crises.  China has remained authoritarian and has weathered the 
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1997 Asian financial crisis, the 2008 US financial crisis and the current Eurozone crisis 
without large repercussions.  According to the latest statistics, China’s economy is still 
growing at 7.4% (BBC 2012).  Despite this, China is expanding its social welfare system. 
 While the authoritarian regime literature provides a framework for the logic of 
social welfare provision based on political survival through cooptation, these theories are 
limited in explaining the China case for three reasons. First, the state is not a unitary actor. 
It is a collection of actors with different and sometime conflicting preferences and 
incentives. Second, the selectorate theory deals solely with the size of the winning 
coalition and the selectorate without regards to the changing preferences within the 
winning coalition. Thus, China is an anomaly because it has expanded public goods 
provision without changes to the size of the winning coalition or the selectorate.  Three, 
public goods and private goods are clearly defined and divided in this literature. In 
China’s case, social insurance funds, commonly viewed as a public good, can also be 
used as a private good to coopt individuals within the system because these funds have 
state building capacity as extrabudgetary revenue.  
My Argument 
 
Building upon these two literatures, I lay out my argument in this section by 
expanding on the internal incentives of the state.  At heart, my explanation is a state 
centered story about policy legacies, the political structure, and the political and 
economic incentives of local governments.  While policy legacies shape the policy 
choices available to policymakers, the political structure promotes competition between 
local governments where social policy can be used as a development strategy.   
Additionally, local leaders are incentivized to promote the local economy and raise fiscal 
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revenue.  Thus, whether or not medical insurance is expanded depends on a locality’s 
economic structure, labor endowment and fiscal constraints.  In sum, I argue that local 
governments are using medical insurance expansion to rural migrants as an economic 
strategy to reshape their labor force and as a revenue generation tool to meet their current 
fiscal commitments.  
Policy Legacies 
 
My argument begins with an observation about how policy legacies have shaped 
current policy choices.  Policy feedbacks are immensely important in explaining current 
policy development because new policies are not created in a vacuum.  Past policies 
shape and influence the formulation and implementation of current policies (Pierson 1994; 
Skocpol 1985).   On the one hand, past policies create beneficiary groups and shape the 
expectations of these groups.  They also shape the debate around social groups that are 
considered deserving of social benefits (Schneider and Ingram 1993).  On the other hand, 
past policies also shape the capacity and structure of government agencies.   In sum, 
policymakers do not start from a blank slate; rather, “they usually labor in the shadow of 
an extensive framework of existing policies that critically shape the types of the problems 
they perceive, the policy lessons they learn, the political conditions they face, and the 
types of policy instruments they have at their disposal” (Hacker 1998, 83).   
In China’s case, the command economy coupled with the hukou system, created a 
social welfare system that systematically favored the urban population over the rural 
population.  In this system, the state delegated the responsibilities of social welfare 
functions to work units (danwei in the urban areas and collectives in the rural areas), 
which meant that employers played a major role in social welfare.  Moreover, it also 
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meant that a “national” social welfare system did not exist.   In the current social policy 
environment, Chinese policymakers need to contend with these policy legacies.  One, 
because local governments have taken over the role of social welfare provision, the social 
welfare system remains localized.  Two, employers continue to play a large role in the 
social insurance system.  Three, the hukou system has created a new social group, rural 
migrants, and policymakers can choose to deliver social benefits to this group through 
hukou conversion or individual social insurance expansion.  
Political Structure  
 
Next, my argument is embedded in the political structure.  The organizational 
structure of the state influences politicians’ incentives.   The key determinant of social 
policy is the politics between bureaucracies (Heclo 1974). Thus, social policy is a result 
of state structure and individual bureaucracies.  
The complex state structure is a significant determinant of political processes and 
policy outcomes in China.  China has a “fragmented bureaucratic structure of authority” 
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 22).  The local government is made up of cadres with 
competing agendas and objectives depending on whether they are vertically (bumen) or 
horizontally linked (zhengfu). While vertical cadres enjoy political and budgetary support 
from higher levels, horizontal cadres generally rely on local resources (Baum and 
Shevchenko 1999).  Despite being a unitary government, this state structure means that 
whether local governments can create and implement policy depends on their own 
resource constraints and regional concerns.  Additionally, economic and fiscal 
decentralization have encouraged localities to promote their local economies at their own 
discretion.  Along with regional growth comes regional competition; and product wars 
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and competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) were common in the 1980s (Baum 
and Shevchenko 1999).   Local governments are still competing for FDI.  Local 
governments are also the architects and providers of social welfare.  Thus, in this 
competition for labor and capital resources, local governments can use social policy as a 
development strategy.  
Political and Fiscal Incentives of Local Leaders 
 
However, the first two variables are static across all localities.  While they explain 
the broad context of social insurance expansion in China, they cannot alone explain the 
variation at the local level.  In this regard, the role of self-interested bureaucrats is the 
focus of this explanation.  It is important to examine the political and fiscal incentives of 
local government officials.  In the end, all political leaders want to stay in power.  It is no 
different in China except Chinese leaders are not put into power by popular elections but 
by the Chinese Communist Party’s nomenklatura system (Manion 1985; Burns 1994; 
Lam and Chan 1996).  The career prospects of government officials are largely 
determined by a cadre evaluation system based on a set of performance targets.  In this 
system, cadre promotion is heavily weighted towards fostering local economic growth 
and generating local revenue (Edin 2003; Landry 2003, 2008; Li and Zhou 2005).   Since 
each locality has a different economic structure and resource endowment, local leaders 
need to pursue different strategies to grow their economy.  For some leaders, this means 
expanding medical insurance to attract a certain type of migrant workers to complement 
their local economy.     
To get ahead in the political game, local officials need to pursue development 
strategies that will grow their local economies.  However, at the basic level, local 
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officials also need to fulfill their obligations in governance, which include meeting 
existing fiscal commitments for their constituencies, such as paying current pensioners.  
Unless they meet this basic requirement, they run the risk of removal from office because 
not meeting these fiscal commitments can spell social upheaval from important social 
groups, thus risking the party’s political legitimacy.  Hence, in cash strapped local 
governments, local officials need to find alternative revenue sources to fulfill these fiscal 
obligations.  Additionally, in  a recent study by Shih, Adolph, and Liu (2012), they find 
that local revenue is a more important factor in cadre promotion than local economic 




The rest of my dissertation is organized as follows:  
Chapter 2 applies my argument in detail to China’s social welfare system and the 
plight of migrant workers.   
Chapter 3 describes the limited demand for medical insurance among migrants.  
In the welfare literature, popular demands for social benefits are an important factor 
contributing to the development of social policy. Yet, I find that many rural migrants are 
not demanding medical insurance.  A common trend that emerged from my interviews 
with migrants is that they do not attach importance to acquiring medical insurance.  Thus, 
migrant medical insurance policies are formulated and implemented in cities, but the 
push is not coming from the migrants themselves.  Hence, this is not a story about the 
migrants but a story about state building. 
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Chapter 4 presents case studies of Shanghai and Guangzhou.  The hypotheses 
drawn from these two cases are: cities with a high demand for high skilled workers and 
cities with a high budget deficit are more likely to adopt medical insurance programs for 
migrant workers. Shanghai is a leader in migrant medical insurance adoption. Shanghai 
may have adopted migrant medical insurance because the city needs to attract migrants 
who are complementary to its aging urban labor force.  Moreover, this insurance fund is 
an opportunity to generate additional revenue from a low risk population who is young, 
healthy and mobile, and thereby less likely to use this fund.  Thus, this medical insurance 
expansion can potentially help close the impending gap in local pension and medical 
insurance programs for Shanghai’s urban residents, who are politically more 
consequential.  In contrast, Guangzhou is a laggard in migrant medical insurance 
adoption and did not implement migrant medical insurance until 2009.  Guangzhou’s 
lesser demand for higher skilled workers and more favorable demographic structure may 
have contributed to the city’s less willingness to adopt migrant medical insurance. 
Moreover, Guangzhou’s fiscal balance is better than Shanghai’s.  Compared to 
Shanghai’s fiscal deficit of ¥43 billion ($6.6 billion) in 2010, which was 2.5% of local 
GDP, Guangzhou’s fiscal deficit was ¥9 billion ($138 million) in 2010, which was 0.8% 
of local GDP, and Guangzhou actually had a budget surplus of ¥5 billion ($77 million) in 
2009.  
Chapter 5 tests the hypotheses drawn from my case studies in the 285 prefecture-
level and provincial-level cities in China.  Contrary to the literature on economic growth 
and social policy, this analysis shows that a city’s economic resources have little 
association with the probability that it adopted a migrant medical insurance program.  
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Rather, cities are more likely to offer medical insurance to migrants as a response to local 
labor demand and fiscal needs.  Hence, a city with a high proportion of high skilled 
service workers is correlated with an increased likelihood of adopting medical insurance 
for migrants.  Similarly, a city with a high proportion of heavy industry is also more 
likely to offer medical insurance to migrants. However, while economic growth is not 
linked to medical insurance adoption, it is linked to the political survival of local leaders.  
Thus, a city may adopt favorable migrant policies when it serves local economic needs.  
Additionally, cities have a higher likelihood of adopting medical insurance for migrants 
when they are running a budget deficit because medical insurance funds can finance 
fiscal shortfalls.  Medical insurance funds for migrant workers are cash generating 
programs for local governments because very few young and healthy migrants access 
these funds.  Thus, cities with high fiscal deficits are more likely to offer medical 
insurance to migrant workers.  
 Chapter 6 concludes with my major findings, major contributions to the field, and 
the limitations of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2  
 
THEORY ON SOCIAL WELFARE FOR MIGRANTS IN CHINA 
 
Recently, there have been a growing number of social policy studies in Eastern 
European, Latin American and East Asian countries.  While some studies have been done 
in East Asia touting an “East Asian welfare model,” this model has largely been viewed 
as an amendment to Western welfare development models following the democratization 
in Taiwan and South Korea (Frazier 2006). While studies have been done in developing 
economies in Eastern Europe and Latin America, these countries have largely undergone 
economic and political liberalization.  Building upon this literature, my research on 
China’s social welfare system explains the political and economic factors that drive the 
emergence of a welfare state in a developing, yet authoritarian society.  Since China 
began market transition in the late 1970s, it has experienced increasing pressure to 
transform its welfare system.  Despite retrenchment in the 1990s, the Chinese welfare 
state is expanding.   Moreover, medical insurance has been expanded to cover migrant 
workers, a politically inconsequential group.  For an authoritarian government, what is 
the motivation behind social welfare expansion? When do autocratic regimes expand 
social welfare to outside groups? 
Building upon the literature on social welfare states and authoritarian regimes, I 
argue that migrant medical insurance programs have been adopted as a result of three 
factors: policy legacy, political structure, and political and fiscal incentives.    Policy 
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legacies shape the policy choices available to policymakers.  The political structure 
promotes competition between local governments where social policy can be used as a 
development strategy.  Moreover, local leaders are incentivized to use social policy to 
promote the local economy and raise fiscal revenue. In sum, I argue that local 
governments are using medical insurance expansion to migrants as an economic strategy 
to reshape their labor force and as a revenue generation tool to meet their current fiscal 
commitments.   
In this chapter, I examine each piece of my argument in detail.  The study begins 
with a historical analysis of China’s social welfare system from the Maoist era to the 
present day, paying close attention to the hukou and danwei systems.  Next, I look at the 
political structure by describing the relationship between central and local governments.  
I then lay out the political incentives in the cadre evaluation system and the fiscal 
incentives in the recentralized fiscal system with hypotheses generated from my case 
studies (Chapter 4).  
Political Legacy  
 
 The institutional legacy from the Maoist welfare system, characterized by the 
command economy, the hukou system and the danwei system severely limits the ways in 
which the current government can provide social services.  
Maoist Welfare System 
 
During Maoist China, the command economy channeled surpluses from the 
agricultural sector into the industrial sector.  In the process, two welfare systems were set 
up: one for the rural areas and one for the urban areas.  Chinese welfare goods were 
allocated as rewards to job statuses and those favored by the government.  Since the 
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private market was closed, most social services were state monopolies (Davis 1989).  
While the leadership endorsed the ideals of universalizing primary education, bringing 
health care to underserved areas and protecting all citizens against destitution in old age, 
social services were not distributed according to the need of individuals but according to 
the worthiness of their job status (Davis 1989; Walder 1986).  Social welfare goods such 
as education, hospital care and pensions were rationed based on the value that the 
government placed on the rural and urban residents (Davis 1989).  
The welfare policy consistently favored urban residents over rural residents, 
workers in state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the public sector over workers in 
cooperatives and collectives, and workers in heavy industries over workers in other 
industries because the former was “members of the most advanced class working in 
vanguard sectors, [thus] deserved higher rewards” (Davis 1989, 578).  The welfare 
system was based both on inherited birthplace and workplace, where the former was 
dictated by the hukou system and the latter by the danwei system.  Effectively, the 
bifurcated welfare system created two separate social identities and expectations from the 
state among the urban and rural populations. 
Hukou System and Urban/Rural Divide 
 
The hukou system, modeled after the Soviet Union’s propiska, an internal 
passport system, was set up between 1951 and 1958 to control rural-urban and intra-
urban migration.  In 1951, urban registration was implemented as a way to collect data on 
individuals for resource allocation under a command economy, and not as a way to 
restrict movement (Solinger 1999).  By 1953, household registration was extended to the 
countryside, and registration booklets were distributed in the urban areas (Solinger 1999). 
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While the regulation did not prohibit migration, complex procedures were put in place to 
discourage migration.  In 1955, grain rationing was only given to urban residents, and a 
clear demarcation of urban and rural areas appeared (Solinger 1999).  By 1958, the 
“Regulations on Household Registration,” required that all residents to have legal 
documents for a stay longer than three days in the cities (Solinger 1999).  The same 
regulation still governs the movement of people today in terms of requiring legal 
registration (Chan and Zhang 1999).  
To this day, the hukou system is vastly important in determining eligibility to state 
resources such as education, health and pension benefits. This registration system has two 
elements, socio-economic and residential location (Chan and Buckingham 2008).  The 
socio-economic component classifies a person as “agricultural” (rural) or “non-
agricultural” (urban), and is also known as the hukou type.   This hukou type distinction 
originated from occupational divisions in the 1950s and does not necessarily bear any 
relationship to the actual occupation of hukou holders today.  The government also uses 
this separation to allocate social welfare entitlements for different population.   For 
example, a Shanghai rural and a Shanghai urban hukou holder can draw on entitlements 
from the Shanghai government, but the rural hukou holder is only entitled to rural 
benefits and the urban hukou holder is only entitled to urban benefits.   
In addition to hukou type, all individuals are categorized according to the location 
of the hukou registration. This is one’s official or ‘‘permanent’’ residence.  Under hukou 
regulation, each citizen is required to register in one and only one place of permanent 
residence.  In other words, in addition to the agricultural and non-agricultural 
classification, everyone is also distinguished by whether or not they have a local hukou 
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with respect to an administrative unit (such as a city or town).   This residential hukou 
status separates the “locals” from the “outsiders.”  The local hukou registration defines a 
person’s rights to many activities in a specified locality, such as employment and medical 
care (Chan and Buckingham 2008).   
This dual classification system means that it is extremely difficult to change one’s 
hukou.  It requires a dual approval process: changing the locality of the hukou registration 
and converting the hukou status from agricultural (rural) to non-agricultural (urban).  The 
latter is the more important process known as nongzhuanfei.  In other words, formal 
rural-urban migration usually involves both a geographical change in residence place and 
a conversion of entitlement status. To change the place of a hukou registration, applicants 
need to present the appropriate documents to public security authorities and obtain a 
migration permit.  In the case of nongzhuanfei, it is necessary to satisfy the qualifications 
stipulated by the central government and enforced by the local hukou police (Wang 
2005).  The granting of full urban residence status is often contingent on the successful 
completion of nongzhuanfei, which is the core of the conversion process (Chan and 
Zhang 1999).  Until 2001, the central government set the annual quota for these 
nongzhuanfei hukou.  Between 1960 and 1978, it was virtually impossible to change from 
rural to urban hukou, except in cases where the state had initiated this transfer (Mallee 
2003).   Since 1980, the quota has been set around “0.2 to 0.5% of the total agricultural 
population” (Wang 2005, 90).   
Moreover, hukou is hereditary.  Prior to 1998, the hukou was inherited through the 
mother.  If the mother has a Beijing rural hukou, it does not matter if the father has a 
Beijing urban hukou, that child will have a Beijing rural hukou and is only entitled to 
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social benefits defined for the agricultural population in Beijing.  Since 1998, the child 
can inherit his mother or father’s hukou location and type (CECC 2005; Chan and Zhang 
1999).  The following is a migrant community activist’s story on gaining a Beijing urban 
hukou for her thirteen-year old son.  “I came to the city [Beijing] in 1982.  I worked as a 
live-in aiyi (housekeeper).  Back in 1996, your child's hukou follows the mother. Now, a 
couple can choose if you want your child to have the mom or dad's hukou…I had my son 
in Beijing back in 1996.  My husband has a Beijing urban hukou…[so] to change my 
son's hukou, [her son has her Jiangsu rural hukou] I moved and worked in Shenzhen 
factories for six years because I heard it was easier to get a Shenzhen urban hukou and 
then switch to Beijing urban hukou.”  At the same time, though a hukou can be inherited 
through either the mother or father, a child still cannot gain the hukou of his birthplace.    
Urban Social Welfare  
 
The hukou system has established a society that divided people into rural and 
urban classes with different treatments by the state.  As Solinger (1999) argues, the hukou 
system has created a new class system where residence status has become “an ascribed, 
inherited one, determining an individual’s entire livelihood and welfare simply on the 
basis of where the registration [is] located” (35). The hukou system does this by 
delineating the benefits that are available to rural and urban hukou holders and assigning 
a specific local government to be responsible for this population.  In essence, the hukou 
system regulates many social entitlements of citizens, including education, housing, and 
social protection, and also affects the ease of accessing formal sector jobs.  During the 
Maoist era, the result was that an individual’s benefits depended largely on his status in 
 45 
the urban workforce and his hukou status, with full employees in SOEs at the top of the 
benefit ladder and peasants at the bottom.  
This distinction between rural and urban hukou basically defines one’s 
relationship with the state and the eligibility for an array of state-provided socio-
economic benefits.  In the command economy, the designation of urban status entitled the 
bearer to state-provided housing, employment, grain rations, education and access to 
medical care as well as other social welfare benefits (Chan and Buckingham 2008, 
Solinger 1999).  Until the 1980s, those with urban status, regardless of their physical 
location and whether they resided in a town, small city or large city, were automatically 
entitled to these benefits because they were distributed and funded by the central 
government (Wang 2005).  
Danwei System and Social Welfare  
 
In addition to the hukou system, China’s welfare system was also structured 
according to one’s work unit (danwei).  Since the state guaranteed employment in urban 
areas, China’s urban workplaces were organized in a danwei system, a hierarchy of state-
owned workplace units such as schools, factories, hospitals, and government agencies 
(Lu and Perry 1997).  The danwei had both political and social functions.  Politically, the 
danwei operated as a tool of the state for organizing and controlling urban society (Lu 
and Perry 1997).  The state also used the danwei to mobilize workers for political 
participation.  In addition to political functions, the danwei provided permanent 
employment and social benefits such as healthcare, retirement benefits, and childcare 
(Walder 1986; Hussain 2000).  In the command economy, the danwei system provided 
such comprehensive social services that these work units operated as “self-sufficient and 
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multi-functional social communities” (Lu and Perry 1997, 9).  The danwei was 
instrumental in reducing the pressure of urban unemployment by absorbing new working 
population internally.  It also provided benefits to retirees.   The danwei operated both as 
a production unit and as a social community.  Moreover, the danwei monopolized the 
provision of social welfare by eliminating the private market for social services, which 
was a defining feature of the socialist firm (Naughton 1997).  While this factory 
community organization also appeared in Soviet factories, the encompassing political and 
welfare function of the danwei system was unique to China.  Unlike the Soviet system, 
which sought to tie and attract laborers to the work unit due to labor shortages, the 
Chinese danwei was a tool used to restrict access to urban factories in a labor surplus 
environment (Straus 1997).  
Since social welfare provision was delivered through the danwei, urban residence 
committees and rural collectives, it was very important the type of enterprise at which 
one worked.   In the urban sector, workers were segmented according to the ownership 
status of the danwei (state/collective).  Firms were divided into primary and secondary 
sectors.  The primary sector was made up of large, capital intensive and modern 
enterprises, mostly SOEs, that produced the bulk of industrial output, and the secondary 
sector was made up of small, labor-intensive industries, mostly urban collectives, that 
produced consumer goods for urban residents (Walder 1986).  Urban collectives were an 
effort to absorb surplus laborers, mainly unemployed youth and family members of SOE 
employees (Walder 1986).  As a result, government and SOE employees had the most 
generous social benefits, with subsidized housing and comprehensive labor insurance that 
provided pensions, occupational injury benefits, maternity care, and medical care 
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(Hussain 2000, Walder 1986).  Since 1986, unemployment benefits were added because 
previously, lifetime employment was guaranteed (Hussain 2000).  Urban collective 
enterprises also had labor insurance, though with less generous benefits. Workers who 
were unemployed or handicapped received social benefits through their urban residence 
committees.  Finally, rural collectives were under rural governments with separate 
entitlements.    
Within enterprise types, workers were divided and prioritized into different 
segments, and the hukou system contributed to this segmentation and prioritization of 
social benefits to workers.  Urban laborers were divided into permanent state sector 
workers, urban collective workers, urban temporary workers and rural temporary workers 
(Walder 1986).  Permanent state sector workers, which accounted for 42% of the 
industrial workforce, were the only segment entitled to participate in the welfare system, 
including pension, medical and disability insurance, housing and childcare subsidies 
(Walder 1986).  Urban collective workers usually received a fraction of these social 
welfare benefits, and this varied depending on the size of the collective.  Urban 
temporary workers received labor insurance when they were employed, and these 
benefits ended once their contracts ended.  Pensions were usually unavailable to these 
workers.  They enjoyed the use of the enterprise’s meal hall and medical clinic while 
employed but they were not allowed to take advantage of the enterprise’s apartments, 
nurseries and daycare centers (Walder 1986).  Rural temporary workers were rural hukou 
holders hired on a contract basis through rural cooperatives with approvals from both 
rural and urban governments through a “labor contract system” (Walder 1986).  In 
contrast to urban temporary workers who would find jobs through personal inquiries and 
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register at neighborhood “labor service stations” and were allocated through local urban 
labor bureaus, rural temporary workers were hired out through rural village brigades, and 
these village brigades would take a fixed proportion of these workers’ wages (Walder 
1986).  While there were no wage differences between urban temporary workers and 
rural temporary workers, the fixed payment to village brigades effectively lowered their 
earnings.  As a result, this labor system combined with the hukou system effectively 
allowed the state to keep unemployment low and maintain a steady labor supply for urban 
enterprises, but it also perpetuated the inequalities between urban and rural residents. 
Rural Social Welfare  
 
In contrast to urban residents, the rural population was expected to be largely self-
sufficient, receiving very limited, if any, state benefits. Egalitarian land reform in 1947-
53 eliminated property-based income inequality within each rural community and 
collective (Selden and You 1997).  In its place, the state guaranteed full employment and 
subsistence.  However, there were glaring inequalities between urban and rural areas 
because rural welfare was premised on community self-reliance (Selden and You 1997).  
Each rural community was responsible for itself with little help from the central 
government.  As the state insisted that rural communities should depend on self-reliance, 
frugality, and mutual help in welfare matters, there was little redistribution between 
regions to alleviate the inherent resource inequalities.  Moreover, since most rural surplus 
was channeled to finance urban industries, rural population could only afford amenities 
that were inferior in range and quality to urban provision (Wong 1994).  For example, 
while 85% of rural residents had some type of health insurance, cooperative healthcare (
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合作医疗), and access to barefoot doctors in 1976, the quality of healthcare was greatly 
inferior to that of urban areas (Davis 1989; Zhang and Unschuld 2008; Ma et al 2008).  
Additionally, social welfare provision in rural areas was sparse and highly 
variable. As mentioned earlier, labor insurance was limited to urban workers and not 
extended to rural workers, who constituted between 12% and 24% of the total rural labor 
force in the 1970s (Hussain 1994).  Whereas urban social welfare provision was an 
entitlement based on urban workers’ lifetime labor contributions, social security 
provision in rural areas was a charity based on poverty relief (Selden & You 1997).  
Village based social welfare provided grain, clothing and housing only to those who 
lacked familial networks to provide them.  The “five guarantee households," which 
included food, clothing, housing, medical care and burial expenses, were heavily 
dependent on the resources and good will of rural communities, and thus obtaining this 
status frequently entailed humiliating requests for support (Selden and You 1997).  State 
assistance from the central and provincial governments consisted primarily of special 
assistance to poor areas and natural-disaster relief (Hussain 1994).  
In sum, rural social welfare provision had rested on the assumption that rural 
residents were self-employed and were able to insure themselves against deprivation 
because they had farming rights to land.  So while the state provided few benefits to this 
population, land was supposed to be the social safety net that the urban population 
lacked.  With this assumption, those with rural hukou had no legal means by which to 
obtain social benefits from the state either inside or outside their registered location.  
Until the 1980s, this mechanism also served to curb rural to urban migration. Even 
though social welfare benefits were scarce and poor in rural areas, moving away from 
 50 
rural areas also meant no access to jobs, no legal residency and no social welfare benefits 
at all.   
Types of Policy Legacies 
Institutional Changes under Market Reforms 
 
In the policy legacy literature, institutional change is heavily path dependent 
(Heclo 1974; Myles and Pierson 2001; Pierson 1994, 1996; Skocpol 1995). Policy 
feedback mechanism tends to lock in existing structures over time, thereby making 
changes to welfare state politically infeasible as these institutions expand and mature over 
time (Pierson and Weaver 1993; Weaver 1998).  However, as Haggard and Kaufman 
(2008) argue, these path dependent policies can shift to new equilibriums during critical 
alignment periods.  For countries in Latin America, East Asia and Eastern Europe, these 
periods included democratization and financial crises.  For China, this period was the 
shift from a command economy to a market economy.   
During the 1990s, China’s social insurance system imploded as the economy 
underwent market reforms.  As mentioned earlier, until the 1980s, the urban welfare 
system was entirely funded and managed by urban enterprises.  Even though most urban 
enterprises were in the public sector and the state essentially paid for pensions, medical, 
occupational injury, maternity and occupational injury benefits, enterprises were still the 
ones responsible for managing and delivering welfare benefits (Croll 1999).  As more 
people became employed in the private sector, these people were outside of the social 
insurance system.  
Additionally, to improve enterprise efficiency and profitability, China terminated 
lifetime employment in SOEs for new employees in 1994.  Subsequently, rather than 
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obtaining lifetime tenure, new employees receive renewable contracts, usually up to five 
years (Selden and You 1997).  The spread of contract employment and the increasing 
frequency of separations from the danwei imply that long-term attachment to work-units 
no longer holds for a majority of the urban labor force.  
Localization of Social Welfare 
 
As China rebuilds its welfare system, it inherits a socialist welfare system 
characterized by the danwei and hukou systems.  The institutional legacy of the danwei 
system means that there is no centralized provision of social welfare in China. The 
relative cellular provision of social welfare through the danwei means that the 
government finds itself ill-equipped to provide needed social services to its citizens.  It 
also means that local governments, not the central government, are responsible for social 
welfare provision.   
To replace the inherited danwei system, the Chinese government has instituted an 
urban social security system managed and administrated by local governments.   As the 
government takes over social service functions formerly provided by the danwei, the new 
system continues to be highly localized.  The new system emphasizes that social 
insurance costs are to be shared between the individual, the enterprise and the state.  The 
new pension system has made individual and employer contributions compulsory  
(Nielsen et al 2005).  In terms of medical insurance, prior to market reforms, enterprises 
paid the treatment costs for their workers, and the state budget paid the treatment costs 
for public sector employees.  Employees did not make personal contributions to their 
health insurance.  Moreover, employers continued to pay for employees’ medical 
treatments after they retire (Dixon 1981).  The new medical insurance program requires 
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both employers and employees to contribute to health insurance.   
All urban governments give primacy to serving urban residents because these 
people are their main constituents.  While the new social insurance schemes (pension, 
medical, occupational injury, unemployment, and maternity) extend coverage, previously 
confined to state and urban collective sector employees, to all urban wage-employed 
workers (including migrant workers) regardless of the ownership status of work units, 
these policies usually limit coverage to employees of urban enterprises (Hussain 2000, 
Frazier 2010).   Rural residents, workers in township and village enterprises (TVEs), and 
migrant workers are usually barred from coverage (Frazier 2010).  Though migrant 
workers are technically supposed to be covered under urban social insurance programs, 
many local governments do not have policy provisions to enforce these policies.  As 
social welfare provision is moved from the danwei to local governments, the provision of 
these services is highly variable between localities because local governments have 
different resources and constraints.  
Employer’s role in the New Social Welfare System 
 
Another legacy from the danwei system is the role of employers in the social 
welfare system.  Employers, having had enormous political and social functions in the 
command economy, continue to play a major role in the current system, thereby giving 
credence to the policy feedback argument that inherited capacity is important for the 
creation of new policies.  Although the danwei is no longer the sole provider of all 
welfare functions, a formal employer is still very important because without one, the 
worker lies outside the welfare system because social insurance programs require 
substantial employer contributions. Moreover, other social insurance programs, such as 
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occupational injury, unemployment, maternity, are funded entirely with employer 
contributions.  Even in pension and medical insurance programs, employers pay the 
majority of the contributions.  So, while current changes in the welfare regime have 
“flattened the employment status hierarchies so that, in theory, all urban workers 
(including migrant workers) have equal rights to welfare provision through social 
insurance” (Frazier 2010, 7), the reality is quite different.  The ambiguous status of part 
time and temporary workers implies that the actual coverage of workers in pension and 
other social insurance programs is between 30-50% (Frazier 2010).   
Additionally, the 2007 Labor Contract Law prioritizes formal workers (those with 
a labor contract) over informal workers.  The law has “increased the penalties for failure 
to establish a written labor contract, increased restrictions on the use of fixed term 
contracts and set out severance compensation requirements for contract expiration” 
(Gallagher et al 2010, 14).  In effect, the law is a push to formalize the labor force and 
provide more protection to formal workers.  However, the law has done nothing to 
provide protection and benefits to the informally employed.  For the most part, employers 
want to hire workers informally because they can avoid payroll charges for social 
insurance programs.  Thus, workers in the rapidly growing private sector, including the 
self-employed, usually lack access to social insurance programs.  More specifically, the 
informal worker coverage rate was 20% for pensions, 27% for health insurance, and 8% 
for unemployment insurance, as compared to 74%, 78%, and 55%, respectively, for 
formal employees in 2008 (Park et al 2008).   
 However, the Labor Contract Law has increased the rate of workers with formal 
labor relations through stricter punishments for firms that fail to sign written labor 
 54 
contracts with their employees.  Between 2005 and 2010, the proportion of migrant 
workers with labor contracts rose from 12% to 34%, and the proportion of local urban 
workers with labor contracts rose from 65% to 71% (Gallagher et al 2012).   With more 
workers signing labor contracts, it also means that more workers are participating in 
social insurance programs.  By prioritizing labor protection, the government is trying to 
meet the development goal of reducing inequality among urban workers, but at the same 
time, there is a perverse result of subcontracting where employers are hiring temporary 
workers rather than hiring permanent workers (Gallagher et al 2010).  This current 
practice is not unlike the peasant-worker system during the command economy, where 
temporary workers were consistently used as a way to lower costs.  Yet, throughout all 
these changes, employers remain an important actor in social insurance programs.  
Rural Migrants as a New Social Group 
 
The hukou system continues to play a key role in the new social welfare system 
because rural and urban populations are still accorded different social benefits.  As a 
result of market reforms, a new group has emerged, rural migrant workers.  They are 
rural hukou holders that have migrated to the city to live and work.  Many are defacto 
urban residents without urban social rights.  Until recently, the new urban social welfare 
system had largely ignored this population.  
While market reforms have rendered the hukou status less important for mobility 
and job opportunity, the hukou system still determines the type of social benefits 
available to different groups.  In the current employer based social insurance system, 
rural migrant workers are usually closed out of the system because most of them are 
engaged in informal work.  In a 2010 study, 29% of local resident workers and 66% of 
 55 
migrant workers were informally employed (Gallagher et al 2012).  In 2010, coverage 
rates for urban resident workers were 89% for pensions and 86% for health insurance; for 
migrant workers, coverage rates for pensions and health insurance were 24% and 22%, 
respectively (Gallagher et al 2012).  Moreover, while urban social relief covers all urban 
residents and is non-contributory, rural migrant workers are not included in this program 
because they are not “local urban hukou” holders.    
In many ways, the hukou system is anachronistic with economic reforms as the 
movement of labor is vastly important for creating a unified labor market.  However, the 
legacy of the command economy and the fear of social instability have determined the 
pace of hukou reform.  Initially, the hukou system was tied to rations and coupons that 
were determined by the central government.  Each locality was allowed a certain number 
of urban hukou by the central government.  Recognizing the need for a unified labor 
market under market reforms, the central government have allowed local governments to 
experiment with hukou reform and called local governments to expand social benefits to 
the migrant population.  
In sum, policy legacies from the command economy, the hukou system and the 
danwei system are the localization of social services, the importance of employer in the 
social insurance system, and the creation of rural migrants as a social group.  Since China 
never had a centralized social welfare system, the shift from the danwei to local 
governments as the sole provider of social welfare means that there is substantial 
variation in local social welfare provision.  Additionally, given enterprises’ role in the 
command economy as the sole welfare provider, employers continue to play an important 
role in social insurance.  Finally, without the hukou system, we would not have this rural 
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migrant issue.  Thus, the combination of these legacies means that as rural migrants are 
mostly employed in the informal sector, they continue to be excluded from the urban 
social welfare system.   
Past policies have shaped the current social welfare system and presented two 
options for extending social welfare benefits to rural migrants.  One is rural-urban hukou 
conversion.  By granting a local urban hukou, the city is bestowing upon the rural migrant 
the full social rights of an urban resident.  Second is through ad hoc social programs such 
as migrant medical insurance because local governments have taken over these social 
functions from the danwei.  With regards to hukou policy, all cities have minimum 
requirements for hukou conversion.  Small and medium cities have few requirements for 
hukou conversion, but at the prefecture level and above, most of these cities have more 
requirements for hukou conversion.  Most cities also have quotas for this conversion 
because the incremental per year cost of converting a migrant worker to an urban hukou 
resident is approximately ¥80000 ($12645) (State Council 2011).   
At the same time, these hukou conversions constitute only a minority of migrants 
moving into cities.  Looking at the percentage of migrants with a college education or 
who already have urban hukou, it is less than 15% of the entire of migrant population 
(Peng 2011). Thus to look at a social policy that covers the majority of the migrant 
population, I focus on the expansion of ad hoc social insurance programs to migrant 
workers.  While hukou conversion is explored as an option in this chapter, the remaining 
dissertation is focused on social insurance programs, more specifically medical insurance. 
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Political Structure: China’s Central-Local Bureaucratic Regime 
 
While policy legacies contribute to the structure of social programs for rural 
migrants, state structure is the primary source of differences in social policy among local 
governments.  The politics between bureaucrats, sheltered from societal pressures, is the 
key determinant in explaining the variation in welfare policy over time (Heclo 1974).  
The organizational structure of the state influences politicians’ incentives and the 
collective action of social groups.  Moreover, case studies on the US Social Security 
administration and Medicaid/Medicare programs find that state bureaucracies have a high 
degree of administrative autonomy in establishing and implementing priorities (Derthick 
1979; Shipan 2002).  Castles (1981) and DeViney (1983) find that administratively or 
fiscally centralized states are more conducive to generous social expenditures than 
decentralized states.  In Immergut’s (1992) comparative study of health insurance 
systems in France, Sweden, and Switzerland, she argues that political institutions shaped 
interest groups’ access to government to influence health insurance policies.  And in 
China, the complex state structure is a significant determinant of the political process and 
policy variation.  
While China is a unitary state, there are multiple layers of subnational 
government, provinces, counties and cities, townships and villages.  The Chinese 
government is made of 31 provincial units, 2500 counties, 650 cities, 30,000 townships 
and 900,000 villages approximately (Lieberthal 2004).  Province actually refers to the 
rank in the national political administrative hierarchy rather than a territorial province 
because four provincial units are municipalities (Beijing, Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin), 
and five are autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, Xinjiang).  
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Province is equal to the rank of a central government ministry.  Since binding orders 
cannot be issued to administrative units of the same rank, a central government ministry 
cannot issue binding orders to a provincial government (Lieberthal 1995).  Counties are 
ranked below provinces but are given considerable discretion in policy implementation to 
take into account local peculiarities and conditions.  “Cities can plug into the political 
system at any rank depending on their size and importance” (Lieberthal 1995, 167).  As 
economic reforms are increasingly making cities the key level of organization for the 
economy, cities are gaining administrative importance because large rural counties 
around major cities are brought under the control of municipalities (Lieberthal 2003).  
Townships are ranked below counties and villages below townships.  Moreover, since 
binding orders cannot skip levels, it means that the policy implementation process is 
complex and prolonged. 
The relationship between different layers of government is one of mutual 
dependence.  For instance, while the central government maintains control over the 
provinces through cadre appointments, military deployment, and the allocation of key 
resources, decentralization has given provinces enormous power over personnel 
appointments and residual land ownership (Whiting 2000).  The central government can 
appoint and dismiss any First Party Secretaries, Governors, and military commands in a 
province, but the bulk of personnel assignments are made at the provincial level and 
below because appointments are made one level down (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988).  
Since the central government controls military deployment, this can be used against 
provincial officials that are in defiance of central authority.  Moreover, the central 
government controls key economic resources in the provinces such as electricity, major 
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transportation infrastructure, and large foreign and domestic investments (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988).  
Despite the huge leverage that the central government has with its military and 
financial power, provincial power comes from the provinces’ intermediate position in the 
hierarchy because the center has to go through the provinces to reach the numerous 
counties, townships, and villages.  As a result, provincial leaders are “gatekeepers in 
guarding and providing access to local levels” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 350).  
Hence, the central government cannot accomplish its goals without the cooperation of 
provincial governments.  This necessitates a bargaining process between the center and 
provincial level to reach their independent and mutual goals (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 
1988).  Additionally, this center-provincial mutual dependence relationship is replicated 
at every layer of the government.  
Each level of local government is a duplication of the former.  This gives each 
political unit a counterpart to deal with at each level, but it also means that each layer of 
local government is made up of cadres with competing agendas and objectives depending 
on whether they are vertically linked to central agencies (bumen) or horizontally linked to 
territorial governments (zhengfu).  While vertical cadres enjoy political and budgetary 
support from higher levels, horizontal cadres generally rely on local resources (Baum and 
Shevchenko 1999).  Many times, local governments (zhengfu) would have to fund 
operations of local agencies belonging to the central government with budgeting, staff 
and other resources.  As a result, a single ministry or local government unit lacks the 
political clout to carry out a policy.  In this way, the local government tends to have more 
power because central government bumens are funded and appointed by the local 
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government.  Thus China has a “fragmented bureaucratic structure of authority, decision 
making in which consensus building is central and a policy process that is protracted, 
disjointed, and incremental” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 22).   
As a result of this complex network of center and local relations, policy 
implementation is dependent on local governments and their priorities, and thus great 
variation exists at the local level.  As Mertha (2005) demonstrates in his examination of 
intellectual property rights implementation, the central government finds it very difficult 
to implement policies if they are not in the interest of local officials.   Similarly, Kevin 
O’Brien and Lianjiang Li (1999) find that local rural officials were selective in 
implementing measureable policies such as one child policy and tax collection but 
ignored hard to measure policies such as village elections and corruption.  In Mark 
Frazier’s (2010) assessment of the pension system, he finds that local governments, 
namely urban governments, have the ability to undermine central government regulations 
and prioritized pensions over other social insurance programs. As a result, policy 
noncompliance and/or distortion are also virtually guaranteed by the time a central 
government directive passes through and is altered by agents found in the five separate 
levels of government.      
While the complexity of this central-local relationship is unique to China, the fact 
that the organizational structure of the state affects policy is common across countries.  
Policies are massaged to fit the organization needs of the government (Skocpol 1995).  
For example, despite US’s democratic roots, the US did not become bureaucratically 
centralized in response to industrialism.  At the beginning of the 1900s, industrial and 
social policies were largely left to the forty-eight state legislatures (Skocpol 1995).  Even 
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within the federal government, Congress had strong roots in state and local politics.  
Moreover, with its limited fiscal and bureaucratic capacities, the US national government 
had often relied on “business enterprises, local governments or private voluntary 
associations for policy implementation” (Skocpol 1995, 45).  This parallels China’s 
current policy environment where detailed policy formation and implementation are left 
to the provinces and prefecture cities and below.  Thus, local policy implementation can 
vary dramatically in China.  Despite the 2006 central government policy, which requires 
local governments to include migrants in local medical insurance or set up major illness 
insurance programs for migrants, we still see a variation in the expansion of medical 
insurance to migrant workers  
Political Incentives 
 
Political leaders care first and foremost about political survival and their career 
prospects (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).  So in pursuit 
of their career interests, political leaders will try to use existing governmental and party 
organs to devise and implement policies that will attract support from various social 
groups (Skopol and Amenta 1986).  However, China does not operate in an electoral 
system where social groups can press their interests with the state easily.  Chinese 
citizens do not have periodic elections where they can punish or reward their leaders by 
voting them out or electing them into office.  With the exception of villages (villages are 
not considered an administrative level of the government), where village committees are 
nominated and elected by villagers, the Chinese Communist Party puts government 
officials into office.  Ordinary citizens can nominate township level officials, but they 
have to be vetted by party-led electoral committees (Manion 2008).  Government 
 62 
officials at the county level and above are appointed within the party through the 
nomenklatura system and promoted through a cadre evaluation system where ordinary 
citizens do not have significant influence in this process (Manion 1985; Burns 1994; Lam 
and Chan 1996).   
Government officials are evaluated on a set of hard and soft targets, on which 
promotion, demotion and the removal of office are based.  Hard targets reflect core tasks 
crucial to the regime, including economic growth and fiscal collection; soft targets 
include member recruitment, propaganda work, and social stability (Edin 2003).  While 
failing to meet soft targets usually does not engender any real punishment, failing to meet 
hard targets can be detrimental to one’s career.   
In terms of hard targets, economic development indicators are assigned the 
highest priority, accounting for 30% of the evaluation, and GDP growth is the most 
important indicator (Wang 2011).  Social development indicators account for 22% of the 
evaluation and include measures of social stability, family planning, and school 
enrollment.  People’s livelihood indicators, which include social insurance coverage, are 
weighed at 23%.  Ecological environment indicators, including a pollution index, account 
for 25% of the evaluation.  Among these indicators, GDP growth, the social stability 
index, and the fertility rate are the most important criteria for the evaluation (Wang 2011).  
While having low scores on the stability index and the fertility rate can prevent an official 
from getting a promotion, having stellar scores on either will not per se gain him a 
promotion.  But consistently having GDP growth that outperforms other localities will 
lead to promotions (Whiting 2000, 2004; Wang 2011).  As a result, the career prospects 
of Chinese local officials are determined more by their performance in promoting local 
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economic growth and less by their performance in providing social welfare benefits (Edin 
2003; Laundry 2003, 2008; Li and Zhou 2005; Xu 2011).    
While Chinese local officials are not politically motivated to provide social 
welfare, they are politically incentivized to promote local economic growth.  Thus, they 
will do everything possible to grow the local economy, including the expansion of local 
social programs to migrants if it is in the local economic interest.  Analogous to research 
on cross-national differences in social insurance programs, different economic strategies 
are linked with different social insurance programs (Wibbels & Alquist 2007; Haggard & 
Kaufman 2008).  In Wibbels & Ahlquist (2007) study, countries use social policies to 
shape or create the labor force for their particular development projects.  Thus, the 
provision of social welfare can be used as a tool to serve the need of the local economy.   
Competition for High Skilled Workers  
 
Chinese local governments can use the expansion of social welfare to remake 
their labor profile.  First, local governments can use urban hukou conversions to attract 
non-local (rural or urban) migrants who are wealthy and/or talented to their cities.  By 
picking off the richest and most talented migrants, cities can sustain their economic 
development with additional investment capital and high quality labor.  These urban 
hukou conversions have very strict requirements and vary between cities.  For example, 
large and medium sized towns in Zhejiang province will grant local hukou to individuals 
with local home purchases of a certain size and price or to individuals with higher 
educational levels (CECC 2005).  In Shanghai, the requirements for a hukou conversion 
are: the possession of a Shanghai Residence Permit for at least seven years, urban 
employee social insurance contributions for at least seven years, the attainment of mid-
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level professional qualification and beyond, tax receipts for at least seven years, and no 
criminal records.  Individuals with special achievements such as sport champions, large 
investors, and high-income earners are also given hukou conversions.  In 2010, the 
number of conversions in Shanghai was 71,700, which only increased the urban hukou 
population by 0.5% (Ulrich et al 2012; Zhu et al 2011).  
In 2009, Guangdong province introduced a hukou conversion process based on a 
scoring system.  Depending on an applicant’s educational background, skills, years of 
social insurance contributions, place of origin and other criteria, points are assigned.  
Those with 60 points are qualified to apply for an urban hukou.  Although the province 
set a target of 1.8 million conversions, only 100,000 migrant workers had acquired an 
urban household registration in Guangdong between 2009-2010 (Ulrich et al 2012; Zhu et 
al 2011).   
Second, local governments are using the expansion of social insurance programs 
to attract high skilled workers because these workers are needed in the local economy.  
While hukou conversions can attract the highest skilled workers to a locality, a city 
cannot attract enough workers with this process because too many new citizens will exert 
undue pressures on the existing urban infrastructure and social welfare system.  Moreover, 
not every city has the same demand for high skilled workers.  Each city has a different 
labor endowment and economic structure that require a different labor composition.  As a 
result, though every city will have hukou conversions to attract the best talent, not every 
city will put in social insurance policy to attract higher skilled migrant workers.   
In my study of Shanghai and Guangzhou, I find that Shanghai’s emphasis on 
heavy industry and financial services has created a demand for highly skilled workers.  In 
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response to this, Shanghai may have adopted a comprehensive insurance plan, which 
provides pension, medical and occupational injury benefits to migrant workers in order to 
attract more highly skilled workers to the city.  In contrast, Guangzhou does not need as 
many higher skilled workers because the city has chosen to develop its light industry and 
retail services.  As a result, Guangzhou did not adopt medical insurance for migrants until 
2009.   Thus I argue that those Chinese cities with a demand for high skilled workers are 
more likely to expand medical insurance to migrant workers.  More specifically, I 
hypothesize that a city with an emphasis on heavy industry and high value tertiary 
services are more likely to adopt migrant medical insurance. These hypotheses are further 
elaborated in Chapter 4.  
Fiscal Incentives  
 
As outlined in the previous sections, the central government needs the cooperation 
of local governments for policy implementation.  To accomplish this, the central 
government must provide the appropriate incentives.  On the one hand, the cadre 
evaluation system provides officials with the political incentives to implement central 
government policies.  On the other hand, fiscal incentives are also needed.  In China, 
local governments have responded to central-local fiscal sharing rules in their policy 
choices (Oi 1992, 1999; Han and Kung 2012; Duckett 2000; Blecher and Shue 1996; Ruf 
1999).  The fiscal reforms beginning in the 1980s have given local governments greater 
incentives and responsibilities to provide local public goods such as economic growth, 
public infrastructure, and social services (Shue 1988; Shirk 1993; Oi 1999; Whiting 
2001).  With this fiscal decentralization came a crucial transformation in property rights. 
Local authorities at local levels (cities, counties and townships) received the rights to 
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revenue from local economic activity (Montinola, Qian and Weingast 1995; Oi 1999).  
Since the 1994 fiscal reforms, local governments have been squeezed by the central 
government to provide social services but are not given enough revenue to do so and are 
forbidden to raise funds through borrowing.  As a result, local governments are fiscally 
incentivized to raise extrabudgetary funds through the sales of hukou, sales of land rights, 
and the establishment of migrant social insurance funds. 
Types of Revenue 
 
The fiscal revenue of local governments in China can be divided into two 
categories: budgetary and extrabudgetary revenues.  Budgetary revenue includes value-
added tax, enterprise tax, and business tax, and is shared between local governments and 
upper levels of government.  The central government has exclusive rights on setting the 
tax rates and bases.  Extrabudgetary revenue includes non-tax items, which are fees and 
funds, authorized by various governmental departments.  It is not shared with the upper 
levels of government.  Thus, local governments have exclusive authority over the use of 
extrabudgetary revenue (Wong 2007).  
Extrabudgetary funds are not unique to China.  The two common types of 
extrabudgetary funds found around the world are special accounts and fees.  Special 
accounts are separate from the budget and are intended to carry out a specific activity or 
benefit to a specific agency (like a pension fund).  These accounts are often organized as 
funds or self-balancing accounting entities.   Special fees are revenues raised outside the 
budgetary framework.  These fees include motor vehicle registration fees, construction 
permits, and highway tolls (Wong and Bird 2008).   
Extrabudgetary revenue is not new to China. It was first created in the early 
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1950s, following the Soviet practice, as a way to set aside small funds from centralized 
management and control.  The earliest examples were the surcharge on agricultural taxes 
and the surcharge on wage bills (Wong and Bird 2008).  Local governments were 
permitted to spend this revenue without upper level approval.  Presently, extrabudgetary 
revenue includes social security funds and revenue from the sale of land leases (Wong 
and Bird 2008).  Nationwide, extrabudgetary funds may total 20% of GDP (Saich 2008). 
Revenue Sharing Structure 
 
To reduce the central state’s fiscal burden, make localities fiscally self sufficient, 
and provide incentives for local authorities to promote local economic development, the 
central government instituted a revenue–sharing fiscal system in the 1980s.  Prior to 
market reforms, local governments turned over virtually all taxes and SOE profits to the 
central government, and local governments looked to the central government for 
budgetary allocations (Whiting 2000).  With the reforms, the central government 
eliminated top down budgeting and granted governments at each level residual property 
rights over state owned enterprises within their jurisdiction.  
The current tax system, instituted in 1994, separates the tax types into central, 
local, and shared taxes, where only the central government has the right to authorize 
taxes.   Among major shared taxes, the central government gets 75% of value added tax (
增值税), a tax levied mainly in the production process and comes primarily from 
township village enterprises (TVEs) and other industrial enterprises,  60% of enterprise 
income tax, which is drawn from enterprise profits, and 60% of personal income tax (Lou 
et al 2008; Han and Kung 2012; Ahmad 2008).  Local governments have exclusive rights 
over the business tax (营业税), which is based largely on the construction sector and to a 
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lesser extent on the service sector, land use tax, and real estate tax (Ahmad 2008).  Local 
governments also get three types of general-purpose transfers: revenue sharing transfers, 
tax rebates and equalization transfers (Lou et al 2008).  
In contrast to the previous system where local governments collected all the taxes, 
the center government has established central tax offices at provincial, municipal and 
county levels as well as in some townships for tax collection (Whiting 2000).  The new 
tax system also revokes the formal authority of local governments to approve tax 
exemptions and reductions for collective firms, which was the main source of tax 
avoidance in pre-1994 (Whiting 2000).  Additionally, township governments and village 
associations have been prohibited from levying agricultural taxes since 2005.  These 
abolished fees include funding for rural education, the militia and subsidies for rural 
officials and social relief programs (Han and Kung 2012). Without these agricultural 
taxes, these local governments are completely dependent on central government transfers.   
As the central government increases its share of tax revenue, which resulted in 
falling revenue for local governments, local governments have become increasingly 
dependent on extrabudgetary revenue in achieving their policy goals (Wong and Bird, 
2008).  In an attempt to rein in these fees by local governments, the central government 
has declared that extrabudgetary levies to be illegal if not approved by the central or 
provincial government (Whiting 2000).   In recent years, land conveyance fees (土地出
让金), which local governments receive from selling the land usufruct rights of formerly 
arable land to a third party for a different usage, have become an important source of 
fiscal revenue  (Wong and Bird 2008; Xu 2011).  This is considered a legal 
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extrabudgetary fee because the Ministry of Finance has deemed its nonrecurring nature 
unfit for inclusion into the fiscal revenue base (Wong and Bird 2008). 
Expenditures Imbalances 
 
Under the current fiscal arrangement, the central government receives the bulk of 
tax revenue, but local governments are responsible for providing the bulk of social 
security, basic education, health care, and public safety services.  China is unusual in 
assigning heavy responsibilities for public services and social welfare to local 
governments.  The assignment of costly services such as pension and unemployment 
benefits to local governments is unusual because they account for a very high proportion 
of total budgetary expenditures, close to 55% (Wong and Bird 2008).  For comparison, in 
a sample of 100 countries, on average, subnational governments only account for 13% of 
total welfare expenditures in developing countries and 35% of total welfare expenditures 
in developed countries (Wong and Bird 2008).  In most countries, social security, i.e. 
pension, is almost always financed by the central government, and central and local 
governments jointly finance the social safety net system.  Similarly, the responsibility of 
education and public health is usually shared between central and local governments to 
ensure some minimum level of provision across localities.   
However, in China, local governments account for 70% of budgetary expenditures 
on education and 55–60% of expenditures on health (Lou 2008).  At the same time, there 
are fairly limited central government transfers to finance these services.  As a result, local 
governments tend to end up with expenditure responsibilities in excess of the revenue at 
their disposal.  Yet, cities are generally expected to cover any deficit from their own 
budgets.  In 2010, local governments accounted for over 80% of public spending but 
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collected only 45% of the country’s tax revenues, a gap amounting to ¥4.1 trillion ($631 
billion) or just over 10% of national GDP (Economist 2012).   
Moreover, the tax sharing arrangements introduced in 1994 are not extended to 
the sub-provincial level, and the most serious fiscal disparities remain at that level. Sub-
provincial fiscal arrangements are at the discretion of provincial governments, leading to 
a high variation across provinces.  In general, the higher-level government grabs a higher 
fraction of the fiscal revenue than its share of expenditure responsibility. As a result, the 
most serious vertical and horizontal imbalances are at the lower levels of government 
(counties and below).  In 2005, provincial governments on average took about 25% of 
total sub-national revenue, municipal governments took another third, and county 
governments, which provide most social services, took the remaining 43% (Wong and 
Bird 2008). 
Additionally, under the 1995 Budget Law, local governments are not allowed to 
borrow but are allowed to run deficits.  Unable to raise adequate funding through 
measures such as property or vehicle user taxes, local governments are excessively reliant 
on inadequate central government transfers (general or earmarked) and extrabudgetary 
revenue (Saich 2008).  The funding environment became even tougher for local 
governments after 2004, when the Ministry of Finance shifted its macroeconomic policy 
to ensure greater fiscal restraint and less reliance on borrowing (Su and Zhao 2006).  
Because local governments are prohibited from borrowing directly from banks, they have 
established special purpose vehicles such as Urban Development Investment 
Corporations that are free to borrow for infrastructure and urban construction (World 
Bank 2012).  These corporations are financed principally by local land sales and bank 
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loans, often with land as collaterals (World Bank 2012).  According to the World Bank 
China 2030 report, the total local government debt in 2010 was as high as 26% of 
national GDP.  
Revenue Generation through Migrant Social Welfare  
 
Despite fiscal decentralization, the central government has retained control over 
the policy agenda. While localities do not have enough funding to carry out central 
government policy, the center still mandates many tasks that must be carried out. Most of 
these are unfunded mandates (Saich 2008).  Local governments are charged with finding 
the solutions and supplying most of the funding for promises made by the central 
government.   
Beginning in the 1980s, different levels of government have to contend with the 
rural-urban migration issue.  Since the central government does not have a coherent 
policy on delivering social welfare to the migrant population, local governments have 
been experimenting and implementing social policy reforms to cover this population.  As 
mentioned earlier, two sets of practices are available to provide social welfare to rural 
migrants.  One is rural-urban hukou conversion.  By granting a local urban hukou, the city 
is bestowing upon the rural migrant the full social rights of an urban resident.  Two is 
through ad hoc social programs such as migrant medical insurance.  Given the fiscal 
squeeze, local governments have used both methods to raise fiscal revenue to cover 
shortfalls in government budgets, and not as ways to improve rural migrants’ livelihood 
in cities.   
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Hukou Conversion for Revenue  
 
Rural migrants are divided into local and outside migrants because a local rural 
resident is counted as a rural migrant in the same city.  For example, a Guangzhou rural 
hukou holder and a Henan rural hukou holder are both considered rural migrants in 
Guangzhou city. The only difference is that the Guangzhou rural hukou is considered a 
local rural holder.  Moreover, there is a high likelihood that the Guangzhou rural hukou 
holder can exchange his rural hukou for an urban hukou in Guangzhou because he has 
land rights in Guangzhou, but the Henan rural hukou holder has a very low probability of 
gaining a Guangzhou urban hukou if he is not rich and/or highly educated/skilled.  As a 
result, hukou conversion can be used as a revenue-generating vehicle in two ways.   
One, local governments are using hukou sales to outside migrants to generate 
additional revenue.  Starting in 1992, local governments began to offer blue stamp hukou 
and local urban hukou to wealthy, educated, and highly skilled individuals (CECC 2005).  
Many city governments granted these blue stamp and local hukou registrations based on 
educational and/or financial criteria.  Blue stamp hukou registrations were initially used 
to attract capital investment to cities and enrich local government coffers.  Eligibility was 
primarily based on “contributions” to the locales, calculated mostly in terms of monetary 
investments or years of education and skills (Chan and Buckingham 2008).  Since blue 
stamp hukou were not officially “nongzhuanfei” hukou, they did not entail any fiscal 
obligations from the central government.  This became a policy alternative to legalize a 
defacto urban population.  Blue stamp hukou also required an urban entry fee for any 
newcomer, and thus this was very lucrative for local governments.  The fee structure was 
based on the size of the city and the sub-district.  On average, a prefectural level city’s 
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fee was at least ¥10000 ($1587), a county level city’s fee was around ¥5000-10000 
($794-$1587), and the fee at cities and towns below county level was approximately 
¥2000-5000 ($317-$794) (Chan and Zhang 1999).  In Shanghai, the fee ranged from 
¥40000 ($6349) for the city proper to ¥20000 ($3174) for suburban district to ¥10000 
($1587) for suburban counties.  In Guangzhou, the fee ranged from ¥20000-40000 
($3174-$6349) depending on the city district (Chan and Zhang 1999, 838).  However, 
these blue stamp hukou holders did not necessary enjoy the full benefits of formal hukou 
holders. They were considered provisional citizens.  When these blue stamp hukou 
holders moved out of their registered area, they were to resume their original hukou 
status.  Blue stamp hukou were phased out because the massive influx of these blue stamp 
hukou holders had overburdened the urban infrastructure in the early 2000s (Mallee 
2003).  
Two, some local governments have been using hukou reforms as an attempt to 
move peasants off their land for urban development.  Given the revenue sharing 
agreement with upper levels, many local governments have large funding gaps.  This 
squeeze has led many local governments to rely on the sales of land under their 
jurisdiction to raise additional revenue (Saich 2008).  In theory, all land is owned by the 
state in China but local governments are authorized to sell the usufruct rights of land for a 
certain time period (up to 70 years) in the “primary land market” (Han and Kung 2012).   
The land conveyance fees and the usufruct rights of land can also be legally transferred (
土地转让) within the leasing period in the “secondary market” (Han and Kung 2012). 
Initially put forward in 2004, local governments are reclaiming rural collective land, 
including farmers’ residential land and converting it to farmland.  A unit of reclaimed 
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farmland creates one unit of construction land quota that can be applied elsewhere in the 
jurisdiction (Han and Kung 2012).  The government can convert this one unit of farmland 
for non-agricultural use and grant land use rights to this new non-agricultural land to 
developers in a high land price area in the city.  Through this mechanism, currently non-
transferable rural residential land rights are made marketable.  
Under the banner of eliminating rural-urban hukou distinction, equalizing benefits 
and unifying the labor market, local governments are pursuing a range of programs aimed 
at promoting urban-rural integration, which is really a thinly veiled attempt at land 
grabbing.  These programs often target farmers’ rights to farmland and residential land 
through an approach of “exchanging farmland rights for social security coverage and 
exchanging residential land rights and houses for urban apartments,” which really means 
exchanging land rights for an urban hukou (Han and Kung 2012, 8).  Hence these hukou 
conversions are, in effect, “a partial compensation arrangement to expropriate the 
remainder [portion] of peasants’ land” (Chan and Buckingham 2008, 597).  
Revenue Generation through Social Insurance 
 
Social insurance funds, including medical insurance and pensions, are another 
way for local governments to generate additional fiscal revenue.  The 1994 Labor Law 
also requires local governments to set up social insurance programs for urban workers.  
As local governments bear the direct responsibility for administering and managing these 
programs, social insurance funds have become an important source of extrabudgetary 
revenue that is not shared with the upper levels.  
From 1998 to 2010, we see a positive balance for every social insurance fund in 
the country.  By the end of 2010, the national social insurance fund balance was ¥2.3 
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trillion ($354 billion) (Figure 2.1).  Next to pensions, urban employee medical insurance 
(UEMI) had the largest balance, at ¥505 billion ($77.7 billion).  From 1998 to 2010, the 
national social insurance fund balance grew 28 times.  
Figure 2.1 National Social Insurance Fund Balance 1998-2010 (¥10 Million) 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011 
Note: Data of basic medical care insurance include both urban workers and urban residence from 2007 
 
 
Table 2.1 Urban Employee Medical Insurance Balances (¥100 million) 
Year Revenue Expenditure Payout Rate 
2006 1747.1 1276.7 73% 
2007 2214.2 1551.7 70% 
2008 3040.4 2083.6 69% 
2009 3671.9 2797.4 76% 
2010 4308.9 3538.1 82% 
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Looking only at the medical insurance fund, we see that the payout rate has been 
increasing in recent years (Table 2.1).  However, high deductibles and uncovered medical 
services still prevent many people from receiving these benefits.  As medical costs 
continue to rise, out of pocket payment remains around 50% as compared to 18% around 
the world (WHO 2012).  In 2009, out of pocket expenditure as a percentage of private 
health expenditures was 79% in China and 50% globally (WHO 2012).  While general 
government expenditure on health as a percentage of total health expenditure had risen 
from 42% to 53% between 1998 and 2009, government expenditure on health as a 
percentage of total government expenditure had actually fallen to 13% from 12% 
between 1998 and 2009 (WHO 2012).  As government healthcare spending as a share of 
fiscal expenditure declines, the government is amassing a sizable year-to-year balance in 
this insurance fund.  While the fund is supposed to be earmarked for medical expenditure 
in personal accounts and social pooling accounts, external audits for these funds do not 
exist.  As a result, medical insurance funds, along with other social insurance funds, can 
be an additional source of financing for local governments.   
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Figure 2.2 2008 Provincial Urban Employee Medical Insurance Balance 
 



































































































































































Source: China Health Statistical Yearbook 2009 
In addition to social insurance funds for urban residents, some urban governments 
have expanded these social insurance funds to include migrants.  Since these funds are 
pooled at the city level, there is significant variation in these local insurance programs.  
Some local governments, such as Shanghai, have chosen to implement a comprehensive 
insurance that includes medical insurance, occupational injury insurance and pension 
benefits with a high employer contribution rate.  This revenue is not shared with upper 
levels.  Compared to urban employee medical insurance funds, the payout from migrant 
medical insurance funds is very small because migrants are young and healthy.  
Additionally, when a migrant leaves, contributions from the employers remain at the 
original city.  
Given this scenario, most local governments will want to expand medical 
insurance to migrant workers, but implementing these programs is not costless.  While all 
governments may want to generate additional revenue from this policy, not all local 


















































































































































 Figure 2.3 Provincial Medical Insurance Payout Rate in 2008 
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potential backlash from a poorly implemented and managed program.  So local 
governments are incurring a cost in expanding medical insurance to migrant workers.  As 
a result, local governments will only do so when they feel substantial fiscal pressure to 
raise additional revenue.  Thus I argue that cities with high fiscal deficits are more likely 
to offer medical insurance to migrant workers.   
Conclusion 
 
In China, the institutional legacy of the command economy, the danwei system 
and the hukou system has created a social welfare system based on employer 
contributions where there are only two options for expanding social welfare to migrant 
workers, hukou conversion and ad hoc social program expansion. The political structure 
characterized by bureaucratic negotiation between central and local governments has 
created a space for variation in local policy and promoted competition between local 
governments.  
The cadre evaluation system and fiscal system have created political and fiscal 
incentives that motivated the expansion of social welfare to migrants.  Two hypotheses 
are generated from this examination, labor competition and fiscal generation. To promote 
local economic growth, cities that need highly skilled workers will have to attract high 
skilled migrants to their cities.  While hukou conversions are used to attract the highest 
skilled workers and attract capital to a city, a city cannot rely on this method to attract all 
the required workers to the local economy because each city has a quota on the number of 
new hukou holders. Moreover, too many new hukou holders can cripple the local urban 
infrastructure and social welfare system.  Thus ad hoc social insurance programs have 
been used as a way to compete with other cities for high skilled migrant workers.  
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In the current fiscal system, local governments are cash strapped, and they are 
looking for new ways to raise revenue.  Besides selling urban hukou registrations to 
outside migrants and using urban hukou registrations to gain land revenue from local 
migrants, ad hoc social insurance programs for migrant workers have been used as a 
revenue generating vehicle that is not in the purview of upper levels of government.   
These funds also assume a low utilization rate among migrant workers. Thus, cities with 
high fiscal deficits are more likely to offer social insurance to migrants as a way to plug 
shortfalls in their budgets. 
Overall, social welfare programs for rural migrants are designed so that the “best” 
rural migrants are converted to urban residents, and the “other” rural migrants are 
provided minimal social protection while they reside in the cities. These policies are 
designed so that these rural migrants would leave their host cities when they are past their 
productive years.  Local governments are counting on the fact that migrants are 
infrequent users of the urban social welfare system because most of them are young and 
healthy.  Thus, migrant social programs are really about the state building and not about 
the migrants.  
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CHAPTER 3  
 
IT’S NOT ABOUT THE MIGRANTS 
 
A key explanation in the origins of social policy is social demands.  In the logic of 
industrialism literature, social demands for welfare programs are a byproduct of 
industrialization and urbanization. Though economic variables are identified as the 
drivers for social policy, these economic variables are important because the traditional 
family can no longer take care of life’s uncertainties, thus the government needs to 
provide social benefits such as old age pensions and health care.  In the power resources 
theory, social pressures from important political groups are the mechanisms by which 
social policy originates. Even in the state centered theory, social beneficiaries created by 
past policies can lobby and access the government to provide additional social benefits. 
Thus an important driver of social welfare is bottom up pressure.   
In the Chinese case, low skilled migrants, those with less than high school 
education, makes up 78% of migrant population, are generally not demanding social 
insurance.  In this research, I have focused on this category of migrants because they 
represent the majority of migrants.  While they attribute some importance to health care, 
they do not think medical insurance is important in their lives.  In this chapter, I first 
review China’s health care system and the types of medical insurance that are available to 
these migrants. Then, I provide a general assessment of migrants’ health situation.  Next, 
I examine this lack of demand from these low skilled migrants, and I conclude by 
postulating rationales behind this phenomenon. 
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Overview of China’s Medical Insurance System 
 
China’s transition from a centrally planned to a market oriented economy 
transformed China’s health care system from one that provided affordable preventive and 
basic health care to most people to one where most people cannot afford basic care, and 
many families have been driven into poverty as a result of large medical expenses (Liu et 
al 2003; Hsiao and Yip 2008).  According to a WHO survey in 2000, China ranked 188 
out of 191 nations in terms of health care access.  Compared to Western Europe, the US 
and other East Asian countries, which spend between 10-15% of their GDP on health 
care, China spent a mere 5.1% of its GDP on health care in 2010 (World Bank 2012). 
Recognizing this lag in health care spending and worsening health outcomes, the Chinese 
government rolled out a health care reform in 2009 to provide universal basic medical 
coverage for its population (State Council 2009).  To date, China has set up three types of 
medical insurance plans, Urban Employee Medical Insurance (UEMI), Urban Resident 
Medical Insurance (URMI), and the New Rural Medical Cooperative (NRMC).  These 
three medical insurance plans cover around 97% of the population (Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security 2011, Ministry of Health 2012).    
For urban areas, UEMI and URMI were put in place in 1998 and 2007 
respectively.  Under central government’s guidance, all cities have set up a UEMI 
scheme that offers workers medical savings accounts combined with catastrophic 
insurance accounts.  Employer participation in this insurance scheme is compulsory.  The 
minimum contribution rate is set at 8% of total wages, shared between employers and 
employees at 6% and 2% respectively.  Depending on local conditions, local 
governments may choose to set their contribution rate above 8%, but not below it.  
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Benefits packages vary between cities, but both inpatient and outpatient services are 
covered.  Under the principle of broad coverage, the new program is intended to provide 
basic medical insurance for all formally employed urban employees. Dependents of 
employees are not covered.  Currently, the UEMI covers approximately 252 million 
people (Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 2011).  
In 2007, the central government piloted the URMI program in 79 cities to cover 
urban residents not engaged in formal employment.  By 2009, URMI has been expanded 
to all cities.  The population covered includes students, children and the unemployed. 
Participation is voluntary, and the plan is financed with government subsidies and 
household premiums. The plan is a catastrophic insurance that covers hospitalization and 
major illnesses. To date, around 221 million people are covered under this insurance 
(Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 2011).      
For rural areas, China began rolling out NRMC, a voluntary insurance system, in 
2003.  It is a voluntary insurance that insures rural residents against catastrophic health 
expenses.  The financing is shared between the central government, the local government 
and the individual.  To expand the benefits package, the combined premium has 
increased from ¥120 ($19) to ¥220 ($32) per year, where the central government 
contributes ¥100 ($16), the local government contributes ¥100 ($16) and the individual 
contributes ¥20 ($3) (Yip et al 2012).  As long as they follow the two policy guidelines of 
voluntary enrollment and major illness coverage, local governments are free to choose 
the contents of their benefits package and the administrative arrangement of their 
program. Some locales have been experimenting with outpatient coverage to their 
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members.  According to official statistics, the NRMC currently covers 96% of the rural 
population, around 832 million people (Ministry of Health 2011). 
While urban and rural medical insurance programs cover over 97% of the 
population, most people (more than 80%) have very shallow coverage under the URMI 
and NRMC plans, which are basically catastrophic insurance.  Additionally, there are few 
linkages between urban and rural insurance plans. For example, a Shanghai NRMC 
member will have difficulty being reimbursed at a Shanghai urban community clinic. 
Moreover, few linkages exist between locales.  A Beijing urban worker requiring medical 
treatment in Shanghai will not be covered under his Beijing medical insurance.  This 
feature in China’s medical insurance system makes it very difficult for people to use their 
medical benefits, especially for those who have moved or are mobile.  While the 2010 
Social Insurance Law is requiring local governments to establish linkages between these 
different insurance schemes, there has been limited progress due to the wide disparities in 
health provision between localities. 
Chinese Migrants and Their Access to Medical Care 
 
Overall, migrants are typically younger and healthier than their urban 
counterparts.  In a 2003 Ministry of Health survey, researchers find that migrants in 
Beijing and Guangzhou are significantly younger than the national average.  While a 
third of the general population is age 45 and above, less than a fifth of migrants are in this 
age category (Zheng 2007).  Migrants are also 2-3 times less likely to describe 
themselves as being in poor or fair health than their rural and urban counterparts (MOH 
2004).  Moreover, given their youth, migrants suffer from less chronic illnesses.  
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Although migrants are healthier than the general population, they have poorer 
health outcomes, in terms of incidence of communicable diseases and infant and maternal 
mortality rates, than their urban counterparts because they usually work in harsh 
conditions, live in crowded and shabby housing, and earn a minimal income.  In my visits 
to migrant communities, a family of four usually lives in a room that is less than 200 
square feet with no indoor plumbing.  Cooking is done outside on a coal-burning stove.  
Open sewage runs through these communities. Garbage is usually piled four feet high 
outside their living space.  As a result of their poor living conditions, migrants are highly 
susceptible to communicable diseases.  In the late 1990s, regional studies in the Yangtze 
River delta find that migrants are 12-27 times more likely than local residents to suffer 
from malaria (Liu and Wang 2007).  Since the late 1990s, there has been a significant 
increase in the incidence of Hepatitis A among migrants (Liu and Wang 2007).  In an 
interview with a healthcare worker at a second tier hospital in Shanghai, I find hepatitis 
and high blood pressure to be more prevalent among migrants than urban residents.  
Moreover, among the migrant population, the maternal mortality rate is more than three 
times the local urban rate, and the under-5 infant mortality rate is twice the local urban 
rate (Liu and Wang 2007).  Additionally, according to the International Labor 
Organization, approximately 90% of the workers suffering from occupational diseases 
are migrants (Amnesty International 2007).  
Furthermore, compared to their local counterparts, migrant workers are less likely 
to access the urban health care system.  A 2005 survey finds that over 73% of migrants 
use home remedies in the event of illness instead of seeking professional care (State 
Council 2006).  Three factors contribute to this low utilization rate.  The first is migrants’ 
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income levels and the cost of urban medical services.  According to a 2010 survey, the 
average monthly income of employed migrant workers is ¥2554, which is a third less 
than the national urban average (Ministry of Population and Employment Statistics 2011, 
National Bureau of Statistics 2011).  Given their lower income, it is difficult for migrants 
to use urban health centers because an average outpatient visit to a city hospital costs 
around ¥200 (Ministry of Health 2009).  The second factor is the low rate of medical 
coverage of migrants in cities.  Generally, only 10-22% of migrants have medical 
insurance in cities (State Council 2006; Liu and Wang 2007; Gallagher et al 2012).  In a 
2004 Zhejiang study, researchers find that while 68% of urban workers have some sort of 
health insurance, only 19% of migrants do (Hesketh et al 2008).  In a 2010 multi-city 
study, the health insurance coverage rate is 86% for urban workers and 22% for migrant 
workers (Gallagher et al 2012).  Of the urban poor with no medical coverage, 40% of 
those are migrant workers (Liu and Wang 2007).  Moreover, though 80% of migrants are 
employed, compared to 54% of urban residents, employment is not a significant factor in 
determining coverage for migrants (Liu and Wang 2007).  This data implies that migrants 
are typically engaged in low paying jobs that offer little to no medical benefits.  The third 
factor is the lack of linkages between urban and rural medical insurance systems.  While 
only a small percentage of migrants have urban medical insurance, an increasing number 
of migrants have joined the NRMC plan at their hukou residence.  However, this has not 
translated into better medical access because most migrants cannot get reimbursement 
from their NRMC outside the program’s designated area.   In cases where they can file 
for reimbursement, they usually have to pay the entire treatment cost upfront and file for 
reimbursement later.     
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In conclusion, while migrants are younger and healthier, they are more vulnerable 
to diseases than their urban counterparts. Moreover, they are at risk for health related 
impoverishment.  The lack of medical coverage and high medical costs mean that many 
migrants delay medical treatment.  In doing so, ordinary diseases can develop into major 
illnesses, which can destroy their health and bring financial ruin to their entire family.  
These conditions can create a scenario where migrant workers are at risk being the sickest 
and poorest of China’s urban population. 
Medical Insurance Available to Migrants 
 
For the most part, cities do not want to expand medical insurance to migrants 
because their welfare is the responsibility of their hukou governments. A city’s main 
responsibility is to provide health care for its registered urban residents. Moreover, many 
urban governments bemoan the difficulty of designing an appropriate insurance for 
migrants given their transient nature. However, studies have shown that migrants are less 
transient than is commonly believed. Only 24% of migrants stay less than 1 year in a city, 
about 40% stay 1-4 years in a city, and 36% stay more than 5 years in a city (MOH 2004, 
Zheng 2007).  For migrants that stay less than a year, it may be understandable that city 
governments pass over this group because they are less likely to become urban citizens.  
For migrants that stay 1-4 years, city governments cannot ignore this group because they 
are making significant contributions to the local economy plus they are semi-permanent 
residents in their host cities.  For migrants that stay more than 5 years, city governments 
have a responsibility to these people because they are by default urban citizens, and they 
should be recognized as urban citizens through the provision of social programs such as 
medical insurance.  So, despite their supposedly mobile nature, close to 75% of migrants 
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are staying in cities on a semi-permanent to permanent basis (Zheng 2007).  As a result, 
urban governments should consider this population in their public health and social 
programs.  
Medical insurance for migrants has been evolving.  In the 1998 health care 
reform, migrants employed in the formal sector were recognized as participants in the 
urban medical system, but the central government did not require cities to cover this 
population.  Medical insurance coverage for migrants did not become an important issue 
until May 2006 where the Ministry of Labor and Social Security ordered that prefecture 
and large/medium sized cities to cover migrants under an urban medical insurance 
scheme.  In the 2009 healthcare reform, the central government has required that 
migrants be covered either through urban or rural insurance, but no specific plans have 
been laid out as to how they are to be covered.  With the 2010 Social Insurance Law, all 
migrants are to be covered in the Urban Employee Medical Insurance with the same 
contributions and benefits but implementation has been slow.  
Prior to these central government orders in 2006, 2009 and 2010, many cities did 
not have medical insurance programs that enrolled migrants.  Currently, 61% of Chinese 
cities provide medical insurance to migrants.  Migrants are covered in four ways: UEMI, 
URMI, Flexible Worker Medical Insurance, and Migrant Major Illness Insurance.  
Although UEMI and URMI are commonly provided to urban workers and residents, 
some cities have expanded these insurance programs to migrant workers with the same 
contribution rates and benefits.  Since UEMI and URMI have been covered earlier in this 
chapter, Flexible Worker Medical Insurance and Migrant Major Illness Insurance are 
described below:  
 89 
Flexible Worker Medical Insurance  
 
The flexible worker medical insurance plan is an easy way for cities to include 
migrants in urban medical insurance programs.  With market reforms, an increasing 
number of people are engaged in part time and flexible work.  Providing medical 
insurance for these informally employed workers became an issue, and thus the flexible 
worker medical insurance was created in 2003 (State Council Policy Document No. 3, 
2003).  This insurance plan has a lower employer/employee contribution rate, 3-5% of 
average city wages, versus above 6% for most UEMI plans.  This insurance does not 
carry a personal savings account and does not have outpatient care, and enrollment is 
voluntary. Reimbursement rates are around 60% (World Bank 2012).  For the most part, 
flexible worker insurance offers higher contribution rates and better benefits for inpatient 
services than migrant major illness insurance, but much lower than UEMI.   
Migrant Major Illness Insurance  
 
Migrant Major Illness Insurance is another way that cities can provide coverage to 
migrants.  Cities such as Shanghai (2002), Beijing (2003) and Guangzhou (2009) have 
chosen to cover migrants in this way.  Unlike UEMI, individual medical savings accounts 
are not set up.  This insurance is financed entirely by employers; and thus only the 
formally employed are included in this insurance.  The insurance premium goes into the 
city’s social pooling fund and major illness fund.  The contribution rate is based on 60-
80% of the city’s annual average wage, and the contribution rate is typically 1-4%.  
Given the low contribution base and rate, members typically receive 60-80% of the 
UEMI coverage and benefits.   
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Lack of Demand for Medical Insurance  
 
If migrants do not believe that medical insurance is important, they will not 
demand it from the local government.  Thus, the importance of medical insurance can be 
used as a proxy for social pressure for medical insurance.  Given migrants’ vulnerable 
health situation, we would expect migrants to consider medical insurance to be very 
important and demand it from the government, but this is not the case. In my interviews 
with migrants, local activists, and scholars, I find that medical insurance is not an 
important concern for migrants, especially the low skilled migrants. 
Between 2009 and 2010, I visited a number of migrant communities in Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  During this time, I interviewed over sixty migrants about 
their lives in their host cities and their experiences and expectations of the healthcare 
system.  Depending on the interviewee, the interview lasted between half an hour to an 
hour. Over 70% have their spouse and children living with them at their host city.  They 
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work in services, manufacturing, and construction.  Most of them (80%) are between the 
ages of 18-45.  63% of them are women because I mostly visited these communities 
during the day when the men were working.  I include more men in my study by 
interviewing some migrants outside their worksites during their lunch breaks.  While my 
interview sample is not representative of the migrant population, trends can still be drawn 
from these interviews. More importantly, these interviews allow me to tease out 
migrants’ needs and expectations from the healthcare system.  In addition to interviews 
with migrants, I also visited non-governmental organizations serving migrant 
communities in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou.  To understand the health care 
situation from the health care professional perspective, I also interviewed a number of 
physicians and hospital administrators at a third tier hospital, two secondary tier 
hospitals, a first tier hospital, a rural community clinic, a private first tier hospital and six 
private migrant clinics in Shanghai.   
Given their “vulnerable” health status, one might expect that migrants would 
desire medical insurance?  However, in my research I found that migrants tend not to 
expect the government to provide medical insurance for health care.  Similar to other 
studies, my interviewees generally consider themselves to be very healthy (Smith and 
Fan 1995; MOH 2003; Liu and Wang 2007; Hesketh et al 2008).  While older migrants 
do express concerns about their health, they do not consider sickness a major concern at 
this time.  To most migrants, the generally attitude is, “If you get sick, you buy some 
medicine. It’s not a big deal” (病了就病了， 买药吃了， 不是大问题).  When asked to 
list their major concerns with living in the city, social insurance, including medical 
insurance and pensions, usually come fourth or fifth after wages, housing, and children’s 
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education.  Among my interviewees, only 11 have local medical insurance.  However, 
most of them do have NRMC because their relatives have registered for them at their 
hukou place.  Though most of them have never used NRMC and do not return regularly 
to their hometown to access healthcare, they want to have it because it is very cheap.  As 
a Jiangxi man working at a Shanghai ship building company says, “It’s only ¥20 ($3) per 
household per year, why not? Maybe I can use it, maybe I can’t. But if I can, all the 
better.” Overall, my interviewees have a nonchalant attitude towards medical insurance.  
While they are not opposed to having it, they do not feel that they particularly need it 
either.  Given a choice between higher wages and medical insurance, more than half 
would choose higher wages.  As a 20 year-old electrician from Hunan says, “Having 
medical insurance is fine, but I’d much prefer to keep my money.  I can purchase 
commercial insurance when I want to.”  There is a sense among migrants that they do not 
need medical insurance and it is an extra expense that they will spend money on if they 
can afford it.  Thus, it is not surprising that migrants are enormously disgruntled about 
back wages and have taken to the streets on this issue (Zhang 2012), but medical 
insurance is seen as a non-issue.  Moreover, in Li (2006) Tianjin study, social insurance 
never made it into the list of concerns among migrants.   
Moving beyond my interviews, I find similar trends in a 2005 Shanghai Migrant 
Public Goods Survey, conducted by the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) 
with 2000 participants.  In this study, while 65% of migrants consider healthcare a public 
good, only 30% of migrants find medical insurance to be very important; 34% of 
migrants are willing to forgo medical insurance for higher wages, and 35% of migrants 
do not want medical insurance because they are young.  Of the migrants that do not want 
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medical insurance, 90% are age 40 and younger, 78% completed middle school and 78% 
earn less than ¥1800 per month (the average for this survey sample).  Similarly, Hesketh 
et al (2008) find that 47% of migrants were unwilling to make contributions to health 
insurance, and of the uninsured migrants, 53% were unwilling to join a health insurance 
plan (Hesketh et al 2008).  Thus, even though migrant medical insurance programs are 
available in Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou at the time of my fieldwork, migrants are 
not concern or interested in enrolling in these medical insurance schemes.  As such, they 
do not see this as social benefits that they should demand from the government.    
Why No Demand for Medical Insurance? 
 
Given migrants’ vulnerable health status, why do they attach such little 
importance to medical insurance?  Migrants are not demanding medical insurance as a 
result of their social economic status (SES), barriers to access, the lack of trust in urban 




SES indicators are important in explaining the lack of demand for medical 
insurance among migrants.  As mentioned earlier, over a third of migrants surveyed in 
this SASS study believe that medical insurance is not important because they are young.  
In this survey, migrants are fairly young, close to 75% are age 35 and younger, and less 
than 7% are age 45 and above.  Similarly, in the latest national migrant population report, 
80% of migrants are age 15-59, and 44% of migrants are age 30 and younger.  Given 
their youth, migrants suffer from less chronic illness and consider themselves to be very 
healthy.   Other researchers also find similar results in their studies, migrant workers are 
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willing to risk living in the cities without medical insurance because many believe that 
“they [are] unlikely to require extensive medical treatment because they [are] young and 
healthy, and also because they [have] been careful (and lucky)” (Smith and Fan, 1995, 
174).  As a result, they are more likely to believe that they do not need medical insurance 
and thereby do not make demands on the government for this social program.  However, 
as we move away from the young migrants, older migrants are more likely to consider 
medical insurance to be a concern because they are experiencing more health problems. 
These two stories illustrate this difference between the two age groups: 
   “I’m young, only 19 year old. If I’m sick, like get a cold and have minor ailments, I can 
just take some medicine. When I’m 30, then I may worry about having medical insurance.  
Right now, I’m as healthy as an ox.”  -- Henan migrant who is studying at a vocational 
school in Beijing to be an electrician.  
 
“I am near my 50s now. When I was young, I didn’t care about my health.  I rarely got 
sick then, but I am starting to develop ailments like pains in my joints.  I don’t have any 
medical insurance now but I do worry about this from time to time.” – Jiangxi migrant 
who is taking care of her grandson in Shanghai.  
 
In addition to age, education plays a role in accounting for their view on medical 
insurance.  Better educated than their rural counterparts, migrants are less educated than 
their urban counterparts.  Compared with 43% of Shanghainese that have a high school 
education and above, only 28% of migrants in this SASS survey have the same education 
attainment (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2010).  Similarly, in a Hangzhou study in 
2004, around 25% of migrants have completed high school and above, compared with 
15% of rural residents and 45% of urban residents (Hesketh et al 2008).  Education is an 
important marker for life opportunities.  Thus having less education than their urban 
counterparts mean that migrants are usually engaged in occupations that provide lower 
income and greater work related injuries and stress (Fan 2008; Nielson et al 2005; Peng 
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et al 2010).  However, despite their greater risk of injury and disease, lower education 
usually translate into less desire for medical insurance. 
Moreover, being less educated affects a migrant’s knowledge of medical 
insurance.  People may not know what this insurance is, what it covers, and what it 
means not to have insurance.  As a middle-aged Anhui housewife in Shanghai points out, 
“My family and I need it (medical insurance), but we don’t understand it.  We don’t 
know how to buy it (insurance)…we are afraid of being swindled.  After we pay into it, 
we may not be able to find these people to get reimbursement.”  Similarly, on the types of 
insurance they would prefer, a middle-aged Jiangxi man working in recycling in Beijing 
mentions, “The cost efficient one…but I don’t understand the different types of 
insurance, covering major illness vs. covering minor illness.  I don’t know enough to 
make a choice between them. They both sound good, but it really comes down to what I 
can afford and use.”  Thus, it is reasonable that migrants would not demand medical 
insurance because they do not understand it.  
Besides age and education, income plays a large role in the demand for medical 
insurance among migrants.  According to a 2004 survey, the average monthly income for 
migrant workers is ¥780 ($124), which is just half of the national urban average (State 
Council 2006).  In this 2005 SASS survey, migrants’ earnings mirror results in the 
national study.  Even though the average monthly income for a Shanghai migrant is 
around ¥1800 ($288), it is only 55% of the average monthly income in Shanghai.  Thus, 
as lower income earners, migrants’ main concerns are not medical insurance.  In my 
interviews with migrants, their top three concerns are 1. Make money 2. Provide 
education for their children 3. Save money for rainy days.  Migrants are most concerned 
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about having a stable income.  As many put it, the reason for leaving their hometown is 
to make money.  All other concerns fade in comparison.  Only after these other concerns 
are met would these people consider medical insurance.  As a 30-year old Henan shop 
keeper in Beijing says, “If I can't even have enough money for food, how can I go to a 
doctor?  If I become ill, I’ll just buy medicine and take care of myself.”  Similarly, a 
Beijing housekeeper from Anhui says, “We poor people do not get sick.  We just buy 
some medicine and make do. We don't spend much on health.  We cannot afford to get 
sick."  It is the same sentiment that I hear from many other migrant workers. "Since we're 
poor, we don't get sick."  In sum, cost is a main barrier to accessing health care for 
migrants.  Moreover, 71% of migrants would prefer to pay out of pocket for what they 
use rather than be burdened by regular insurance payments  (Hesketh et al 2008).   
Of the migrants in the SASS survey that are not willing to take a job without 
medical insurance, 62% of them have attained at least high school education as compared 
to 28% in the whole survey.  35% of these migrants are age 35 and older compared to 
25% in general survey.  The average income for this subgroup is Y2285, which is 25% 
more than general survey mean.  Henceforth, older migrants are more likely to place 
importance on medical insurance because they have a higher need for medical care.  
Better-educated migrants may be more aware of the risks associated with the lack of 
medical insurance and thereby place more importance on having medical insurance.  
High-income migrants will have more disposal income to spend on non-basic needs such 
as medical insurance.   Hence, older, better-educated, and high-income migrants are more 
likely to consider medical insurance to be important and unwilling to accept jobs without 
medical insurance.  These migrants are also the ones more likely to seek out cities that 
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provide more adequate medical insurance or have conversion hukou conversion policies 
that would allow them to take urban residency.  
Barriers to Access 
 
Though SES provides part of the explanation, it is not the complete story on the 
limited demand for medical insurance among many migrants.  Although the combination 
of migrants’ age, income and education level is important in explaining this limited 
demand, it is also important to think about whether or not the insurance plans offered is 
suitable for this population.  Given their youth and health, catastrophic insurance is what 
this population mostly need.  They are most at risk for major illnesses and thus need 
insurance coverage in an event of major medical expenses.  However, the fact that this 
insurance is a catastrophic insurance with a high deductible means that most people 
cannot use this insurance.  In a Jiangsu study, researchers find that migrants are unwilling 
to participate in social insurance because they are concerned about the ability to use the 
insurance after paying into it (Nielson et al 2005).  In sum, migrants lack confidence in 
the system.  In a study of health insurance schemes, researchers find that as financial 
barriers are removed in the access to care in insurance plans, and members begin to 
realize their benefits and gain a positive experience in the medium and long term, they 
will develop trust in the institution and increase the demand for health insurance (Jutting 
2003; Chen 2005).  Thus, as long as there are high financial barriers to prevent the access 
to care, migrants will have limited demand for medical insurance. 
With an annual deductible of ¥1500 ($240), the near equivalent of their average 
monthly wage, migrants would not be able to realize any benefits from this insurance due 
to minor illnesses.  Since migrants are younger and healthier than their urban 
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counterparts, they will naturally use the healthcare system less frequently.  To date, the 
current reimbursement claims made by migrants are only 1-2% of total contributions in 
Shanghai (Xia et al 2009).  Besides their youth and health status, low income and rising 
health care costs have prevented many migrants from seeking medical care.  An average 
Shanghai migrant in the SASS survey earns around ¥1800 ($288) per month, and the 
annual medical deductible is ¥1500 ($240).  Depending on the types of treatment 
required, inpatient care could cost more than ¥10000 ($1600) where his copayment 
would be 20%, approximately ¥2000 ($320).  So, an insured migrant would have to pay 
¥3040 ($487) for an ¥10000 ($1600) treatment, which would be almost 15% of his 
annual income.     
Thus, migrant medical insurance is underutilized.  In an interview with an Anhui 
woman working at a Shanghai property management company, this is her view, “I have 
comprehensive insurance.  I have never used it.  I have a drug card, so sometimes I use it 
to get some medicine from the pharmacies.  It’s better than nothing, but I just don’t use it. 
Most of the time, I just go to a small clinic to pick up some medicine…plus only 
hospitalization is covered.  Neither my family nor I have had a need for hospitalization.”  
Similarly, a Jiangxi man working at a logistic company in Shanghai says, “My wife has 
comprehensive insurance working for this small plastic flower company.  It’s useless 
because she’s young, only 27. So she doesn’t need to see a doctor. Besides it’s only for 
hospitalization, so having it is the same as not having it.” Similarly, a Guangxi migrant 
working at a Guangzhou accessory factory says, “My employer buys me medical 
insurance, but I have not used it. I don’t even know which clinic to go to because I’ve 
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heard that not every clinic accepts my insurance…so I just go to my nearby [private] 
clinic when I’m sick.”  
Moreover, dependents are not covered in this insurance scheme.  The insurance 
may not be vital for the individual, but having the option to buy insurance for a 
dependent is very important.  As a 58-year old Anhui woman mentions, “My husband has 
comprehensive insurance, and we can use his medical card for some over-the-counter 
medicine because he gets ¥240 on his card a year, but we cannot use it for anything 
else…he has had it for more than a year because he works for a factory.”  For a Jiangxi 
housewife in Shanghai, “I used to work for a clothing factory.  I had comprehensive 
insurance…I no longer work there because I have to take care of my son now. He has a 
nervous disorder.  We have spent tens of thousands of yuans on his treatment but it’s no 
use.  My husband and I have depleted our savings. We have borrowed from my family 
and friends…my entire family, husband, father, mother and brother, have comprehensive 
insurance in Shanghai, but it doesn’t help us.” 
Since many migrants have not been able to use this insurance, their demand for 
health insurance is not high.  Since people’s demand for health insurance is to buy health 
services, it is only reasonable to expect there to be limited demand for health insurance in 
scenarios where health services cannot be accessed as a result of high deductibles and 
limited benefits. 
Lack of Trust in Urban Health Providers 
 
Migrants also have alternatives to urban medical insurance schemes.  With the 
development of NRMC, some have insurance at their place of origin.  Many migrants 
seek care at their hometown prior to returning to their host city.  When asked about major 
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illnesses, most migrants’ responses are, “If there is a major illness and an emergency, I 
will go to the urban hospitals, but if it's really serious and can wait, I will just go home 
for treatment because my family members are familiar with the good doctors at my 
hometown (laojia) plus it's much cheaper to seek treatment there.”  Similarly, as a NGO 
worker working at a migrant center rightly points out, “Migrants will primarily self-treat, 
they then will go to private clinics. In an emergency, they will go to local hospitals.  If it 
can wait, they will return to their hometown (laojia) because they can tap into their 
network of family and friends for care taking. Plus they are familiar with the health 
facilities there.”  
Additionally, many migrants do not wish to go to city hospitals due to the 
environment. It is not purely a cost issue.  While most Chinese use this phrase to describe 
the health system, “看病难，看病贵” (getting treatment is difficult and expensive), 
among migrants, it is “看病难，看病贵， 态度差” (getting treatment is difficult and 
expensive and doctors’ attitudes are poor).  Migrants feel that they are looked down upon 
at hospitals. Since they are poorly educated, they find city hospitals to be very confusing. 
When they arrive, they are unfamiliar with the procedures of getting seen by a doctor 
there. They are unfamiliar with the registration process. They are confused about which 
department to go to. When they ask nurses for directions, they feel shunned because they 
are migrants. They find hospitals to be a scary, confusing, and isolating place that are best 
to be avoided.  To some extent, they feel humiliated at hospitals.  They find doctors' 
bedside manners to be infuriating because they are given cold shoulders or talked down 
to. As a result, they prefer to return home to see village physicians that are recommended 
by their family and friends.  In Shanghai, a Szechuan migrant working at a glass factory 
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relays, “Last time I went to a hospital for a broken arm, I was sent around the hospital 
from department to department. Since I don’t speak Shanghainese, when the nurses and 
doctors speak amongst themselves, I didn’t understand it and felt utterly lost. If I didn’t 
need to go to a local hospital, I would much prefer to go to private clinics. Since they are 
usually operated by outsiders like us, it feels better.” 
Moreover, there is an abundance of private (unlicensed and licensed) clinics that 
can take care of migrants’ outpatient needs.  In any migrant community, there are 
numerous private “black” clinics.  Within a three-block radius, there is bound to be at 
least one private clinic if not more.  These clinics usually have a sign outside, “clinic” (诊
所).  In the private clinics that I have visited, the space is usually 1-2 rooms around 100-
200 square feet each.  One room is used to treat patients, and other room is used as the 
doctor’s living space.  If it is a one-room clinic, a curtain separates the room.  In the 
patient room, a patient bed is usually set up with an IV drip.  A cabinet showcasing 
different medicine is also in this room.  As one doctor in Beijing says, “Besides regulated 
drugs such as morphine, I can pretty much buy any medicine that I can sell including 
antibiotics.”  These clinics are open anytime of the day, between 7am to 1am. Since they 
live there and everyone knows that they are doctors, a patient can come knocking on their 
door anytime of the day.  The  “doctor” is usually a migrant with 2-3 years of vocational 
training in medicine.  People come to see them for all types of ailments and procedures, 
from treating minor colds to delivering babies.  
Moreover, migrants do not trust doctors at hospitals.  Since doctors are 
incentivized to overprescribe, migrants feel that they are overcharged and prescribed a 
battery of unnecessary tests and drugs.  At these private clinics, they, on average, spend 
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no more than ¥100 per visit, compared to several hundred yuans at a city hospital. 
Besides the cost, there is also a level of trust established between these private clinicians 
and migrants.  Below is a story relayed to me by a Henan woman who has a fruit stand in 
Beijing.  
“In 2006, I took my son to several hospitals to treat a swollen prostate.  He was 
kicked while playing with some friends.  I initially went to Wujing (a local public 
hospital) and was transferred to a pediatric hospital. They said that my son needed 
surgery and inpatient care for 2 weeks.  They did a battery of tests on him and asked for a 
¥2000 deposit for the surgery.  These tests were taken on Monday and the results were to 
be ready on Friday. When I went back on Friday, I was assigned to a new doctor. This 
doctor was in his 60s and says that my son does not require any surgery. Instead, my son 
just needs rest and a cold pack. This doctor mentioned that if he were my son's doctor 
from the beginning, I would not have had to spend all that money on these tests and a 
deposit.  At this time, I was very skeptical since the other doctors were certain that my 
son needed surgery. So this doctor suggested that I wait a week and see what 
happens.  Miraculously, in a week, my son did get better without any intervention.  Since 
my son didn't need the surgery, I went to the hospital to get my deposit back, but they 
refused.  I was so angry that I filed a complaint against the hospital. After a prolonged 
process, I was able to get half of my deposit back, which was ¥1000.  Ever since then, I 
have been very distrustful of doctors at urban hospitals. These doctors lack medical 
ethics. My son does not need surgery so why say he does（医生没有医德。明明不要手
术，都说要手术).” 
 
The plethora of private clinics, the availability of rural healthcare, plus the 
discomfort and distrust experienced by migrants toward the urban healthcare system 
make them less likely to seek care in the city, and thereby contributing to the low demand 
for urban medical insurance.   
Lack of Confidence in the Government 
 
Additionally, this population has never realized any social benefits from urban 
governments.  During the 1980s-1990s, urban governments repeatedly harassed migrants 
with fees and registration requirements; thus they have little trust that the city 
government will carry through on their promises on social insurance.  Despite the fact 
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that Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance has been in place for eight years in 2010, 
migrants do not have any expectation or confidence that the Shanghai government is 
really looking after their interests.  A housewife from Anhui says, “When I worked for a 
small factory, I had comprehensive insurance but not anymore…my husband has such 
insurance now, but it doesn’t cover me…medical insurance is really for local 
Shanghainese. It’s not for us. Comprehensive insurance is something, but we can’t stay 
here long…I don’t expect the Shanghai government to do much for us.”  
This lack of expectation originates from their hukou status and their identification 
with being outsiders and being peasants.  A Fujian woman who owns a noodle shop 
points out, “We are peasants…we don’t have health insurance here. The Shanghai 
government doesn’t need to take care of us.”  Similarly, a young pedicurist mentions, 
“The countryside is getting better.  I don’t expect the social safety net to be in place here 
or at my hometown when I am old and gray.  So in the meantime, I will just have to make 
enough money for rainy days and take care of my family…nobody cares…the 
government doesn't care.”  Another migrant who works at a massage parlor says, “ I only 
can blame fate and not the government (只怨命苦 不怨政府). It is fate that I have a hard, 
manual labor life, and I cannot expect the government to help everyone because there are 
too many of us.”  Similarly, Huang (2010) finds in his migrant study that only 29% of 
respondents “expect” to change their urban hukou.  In his study, 73% of migrants report 
the difficulty of obtaining an urban hukou. Despite residing in their host cities for years, 




In conclusion, we can see that low skilled migrants are not exerting pressures on 
the local government to expand medical insurance because they are younger, healthier, 
poorer, and less educated.  Their lack of knowledge about the insurance system is a bane 
for medical insurance uptake and demand because they do not have the information to 
correctly assess their medical risks and see the benefits associated with medical insurance 
coverage.  They are also less likely to use the insurance because high deductibles make 
hospital visits too expensive for these migrants.  Additional, migrants usually self-treat, 
visit private clinics, and return home for health care, thus they are less likely to use urban 
health facilities. Finally, given their historical experience with the state, they do not 
consider themselves to be urban citizens and do not expect city governments to provide 
them with social benefits.  
At the same time, while low skilled migrants do not attribute importance to 
medical insurance, high skilled migrants do.  Though not examined in detail in this study, 
migrants with higher SES, those with higher income and higher educational level are the 
ones that consider medical insurance to be very important in the SASS study.  These 
migrants are also the ones more likely to have the resources to move to another city with 
better economic opportunities.  Since these migrants are unwilling to take a job without 
health insurance, they are also more likely to move to a city that has better medical 
insurance programs for them.  These migrants fit the profile of highly skilled migrants 
that some cities would want to attract through social programs.  Hence, though the 
majority of migrants do not consider medical insurance to be important, this subset of 
migrants with higher SES could be a motivating factor for local governments to adopt 
migrant medical insurance. 
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CHAPTER 4  
 
A TALE OF TWO CITIES: SHANGHAI AND GUANGZHOU 
 
Shanghai and Guangzhou are selected to examine the leader and laggard cases.  
Both cities are situated in rich regions with booming local economies with large migrant 
populations, but they have taken different paths in developing medical insurance for 
those populations.  In Chapter 3, we see that the impetus for migrant medical insurance is 
not coming from society because medical insurance is not a primary concern for 
migrants.  To understand the evolution of migrant medical insurance, these two cities are 
used to examine the factors that drive the expansion of medical insurance for migrants in 
one city and not the other. The hypotheses drawn from this inductive process are then 
tested in a multi-city dataset on migrant medical insurance adoption in Chapter 5.  In 
Shanghai’s case, I ask the question, “Why so fast?” In Guangzhou’s case, I ask the 
question, “Why so slow?”   
Overview of Shanghai and Guangzhou 
  
Shanghai and Guangzhou are similar in two respects. Both are economically 
developed with large migrant populations.  Both are regional leaders; while Shanghai is 
the economic power in the Yangtze River Delta, Guangzhou is the economic leader in the 
Pearl River Delta.  Over the last two decades, Shanghai has been experiencing an average 
GDP growth of 17%, with the largest growth period between 1990-1995, where the 
average growth rate was 24%.   In 2010, Shanghai’s GDP stood at ¥1.7 trillion ($264 
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billion), accounting for 4.3% of China’s economy of $5.9 trillion.3  In 2010, Shanghai’s 
GDP per capita was ¥76074 ($12,075).  Similarly, Guangzhou’s economy has been 
growing at 16% in the past ten years, and was growing at the pace of 26% between 1984 
and 1995.  In 2010, Guangzhou’s GDP was ¥1.1 trillion ($171 billion), accounting for 
2.9% of China’s GDP.  In 2010, Guangzhou’s GDP per capita was ¥87458 ($13,822).  
Economically, both cities are comparable in size, as Shanghai is ranked 1st and 
Guangzhou is ranked 3rd in the country. 
In terms of migration, both cities are populous cities with large migrant 
populations.  Shanghai and Guangzhou have followed similar trajectories, where market 
reforms drew large number of migrants to these cities looking for economic 
opportunities.  In Shanghai, there were merely half a million migrants in 1990 (3.8% of 
the population). By 2000, there were 2.8 million migrants (18% of the population), and 
by 2003, the number had reached 3.8 million.  In the 2010 census, among the 23 million 
people counted as living in Shanghai, only 14 million held Shanghai hukou, which meant 
that 9 million, 39% of Shanghai’s residents, were migrants. 
Since Guangzhou was one of the first cities allowed to experiment with market 
reforms, by 1987, Guangzhou already had 1.1 million migrants, about 33.2% of the 
population.  At the time, it was by far the highest percentage of migrants in any large 
Chinese city (Ikels 1996).  By 1988, Guangzhou was such a major hub for migrants that 
the city had to turn away workers (Vogel 1989).  By 2000, the migrant population had 
grown to 2.9 million.  By 2010, this population had swelled to 4.8 million, which was 
approximately 37% of the city’s population. 
                                                
 
3 2010 Exchange Rate: $1 to Y6.5 
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 Given the parallel tales of these two cities, economically and population-wise, we 
would expect both cities to develop migrant medical insurance at similar times.  
Moreover, we would expect Guangzhou to adopt a migrant medical insurance earlier 
because it had a head start on developing its local economy and had experienced an 
earlier inflow of migrants.  However, this was not the case.  While Shanghai 
implemented a comprehensive medical insurance for migrant workers as early as 2002, 
four years prior to the 2006 central government order to implement a medical insurance 
for migrant workers, Guangzhou did not adopt a medical insurance for migrant workers 
until 2009.  
Shanghai’s 2002 “Interim Regulations on Out-of-Town Employees' 
Comprehensive Insurance,” stipulates that all employees and their employers, except 
home care services and agricultural workers, must participate in this plan. Migrant 
workers without a work unit can also enroll in this insurance.  This program is separate 
from the city’s main insurance system.  From 2002 to 2009, the Shanghai government has 
employed private insurance companies, Pingan, China Life, and Taiping, to manage this 
insurance program.   
This insurance covers pensions, occupational injuries and medical insurance for 
migrant workers. A monthly premium is set at 5.5% for construction companies (which 
does not include pension benefits) and 12.5% for all other companies. Of the 12.5%, 7% 
is for pension benefits, 3-4% is for medical benefits, and 1-2% is for occupational injury 
benefits.  For every twelve months of enrollment within a three-year period, a pension 
card is given to employees, which can be redeemed at retirement (age 50 for women and 
age 60 for men).  
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Based on the previous year’s average monthly city wage, the insurance cost per 
employee is around ¥292 ($47) at the 12.5% contribution rate, where ¥70-94 ($11-15) is 
allocated to medical insurance.4  Benefits start the month after contributions are first 
made.  This is a catastrophic insurance that only covers hospitalization and major 
illnesses.  The annual deductible is ¥1500 ($240) for hospitalization with a 
reimbursement rate of 80%.  The benefit caps are four times the previous year’s annual 
per capita salary, which is approximately ¥187000 ($29,687).5   Since its inception, the 
hospitalization rate among migrants has been around 1-2% (Zhou and Gao 2009). A drug 
card is also offered to migrants to offset pharmaceutical costs, where each worker 
receives ¥20 ($6.5) per month.  This card can also be used for free physical exams at two 
designated hospitals, Jiangong hospital and Changning Zhongxin hospital. By 2010, 
about four million migrants have enrolled in this insurance, about 44% of the migrant 
population.6  
In 2009, Guangzhou also announced a migrant medical insurance to formally 
employed migrant workers. The insurance provides both inpatient and outpatient care. 
The contribution rate is 1.5%, approximately ¥40 ($13).  The copayment is between 45-
60%, depending on the clinics chosen.  The annual benefit caps are ¥295000 ($47,244) 
for hospitalization and an ¥300 ($48) monthly cap on outpatient care. While most cities 
are afraid to open up outpatient care because it may bring financial ruin to their insurance 
funds and overburden urban health facilities, Guangzhou has expanded this outpatient 
care to migrant workers.  It has done so because it has learned from Shenzhen’s 
                                                
 
4 Based on monthly city average wage of Y3896 in 2010. 
5 Based on city average wage of Y46757 in 2010. 
6http://www.12333sh.gov.cn/200912333/2009xxgk/zhxx/tjsj/201204/t20120405_1137963.shtml 
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cooperative medical insurance that few migrant workers use outpatient care even when 
offered because these clinics are closed when they are off from work and few migrants 
are willing to take time off of work to see a doctor.7 
Similar to Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance, Guangzhou’s migrant insurance 
does not receive any subsidies from the government.  This insurance has lower benefit 
levels than UEMI and URMI.  However, unlike Shanghai, where employers have to pay 
into a fund that covers all three social insurances--occupational injury, medical and 
pension--Guangzhou’s insurance only includes medical.   By 2009, 1.1 million migrants 
had enrolled in this insurance, about a quarter of the migrant population.8  
 
                                                
 
7 Interview with an official at the Guangzhou Social Insurance Bureau 
8 http://www.gov.cn/fwxx/jk/2009-03/18/content_1261734.htm 
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Migrant Medical Insurance in Shanghai and Guangzhou 
Cities Shanghai Guangzhou 
Start Date September-02 Jul-09 
Eligible 
Population 
All formally migrants; self -employed 
migrants 






Coverage Hospitalization, ¥240 ($38) annual drug 
card for OTC drugs, free annual physical 
exams at designated hospitals 
Hospitalization and outpatient services 
Copayment Deductible plus 20% coinsurance for 
amount above deductive  
Copayment is 45% at designated clinics and 
60% at other clinics 
Provider 
Choice 
All urban health facilities Choose 2 designated hospital, 1 primary 1 
tertiary care at patient choice, no restrictions 
on 24 listed specialty hospitals 
Deductible ¥1500 Deductible is 50% lower than resident 
insurance 
Benefit Caps 400% of last year’s per capita salary for 
1 year enrollment, reduction for shorter 
enrollment (~¥187000) 
80% of resident (~¥295000), highest 
monthly outpatient reimbursement is ¥300, 
¥300 cap out of district health care costs 
Financing Employer Employer 
Contribution 
Base 
60% of last year’s per capita salary 60% of last year’s per capita salary 
Contribution 
Rate 
12.5% (3-4% (¥70-94) for medical 
insurance) 
1.2% (¥40 per month) 
Benefits Start 
Date 
Following Month Immediate 
Plan Manager BOHRSS BOHRSS 
 
In the sections below, I first present the Shanghai case. I then introduce the 
Guangzhou case. After these cases are presented, I draw out the major implications from 
these two cities that can be generalized to other Chinese cities.  




Located on the Huangpu River, Shanghai was a fishing village until the 1800s.  
The history of modern Shanghai really comes from its status as a treaty port as a result of 
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the Opium War (1839-1842) and the Treaty of Nanking.  Under the protection of foreign 
powers, Shanghai flourished as an economic power (Bergere 1981).  By the 1930s, 
Shanghai was a thriving commercial and financial center.  At the time, it was the most 
modern city of East Asia, dubbed the “Paris of the East” (Wong et al 2004, 1).   The 
socialist revolution put a radical stop to this prosperity.  The transformation of Shanghai 
into a socialist city meant that the bulk of local resources had to be surrendered to the 
state.  Once a freewheeling capitalist city, it came under the shackles of a communist 
state.     
Overall, Shanghai’s economic development can be described in three periods.  
Between 1953 and 1978, Shanghai operated under a command economy with economic 
growth averaging 8.8%.  During this time, Shanghai was under the watchful eyes of the 
central government, which was suspicious of Shanghai’s capitalist leaning, and many of 
its industries and skilled workers were redistributed to the rest of country.  Between 1979 
and 1990, Shanghai was relegated to the “rear guard” of economic reforms as Guangdong 
and other southern provinces received economic discretion to surge ahead.   At the time, 
Shanghai’s manufacturing sector lacked vitality and its economy grew at an annual rate 
of 7.5%, well below the national average of 9.4%.  Since the 1990s, Shanghai has been 
released from the “rear guard” to become the “dragon head” of economic reforms with 
the development of the Pudong economic zone.   
Focus on Heavy Industry 
 
Shanghai has a long history as China’s industrial center. Prior to 1937, half of 
China’s large-scale, modern industrial production was located in Shanghai.  The city 
dominated the national production of textiles, ships, chemical and metal working.  During 
 112 
the command economy, the city was turned into the industrial core for the nation.  On the 
eve of the reforms, Shanghai’s economy was concentrated in the secondary sector. 
Moreover, Shanghai’s industrial output accounted for 76% of local GDP in 1979.  
Leveraging its industrial base, Shanghai concentrated on building up its heavy 
industry.  In 1990, heavy industry made up 48% of industrial output, and made up 79% in 
2010.  In the 1990s, Shanghai emphasized the six pillar industries of automobiles, iron 
and steel, petrochemicals, power station equipment, telecommunications, and household 
electronics (Jacobs 1997).  Even though sectors such as food, textiles, and chemicals 
continue to grow, their proportion of Shanghai’s industrial output have declined while 
metals and machinery have gained importance.  Low value-added types of manufacturing 
such as textiles were relocated outside of Shanghai.  
Moreover, Shanghai is home to big industrial firms such as Baosteel Group, 
Fosun Group and Shanghai Automobile Industry Corporation (SAIC).  Shanghai Baosteel 
was founded in 1978 and chosen by the central government to locate in Shanghai.  
Today, it is the second largest steel producer in the world as measured by crude steel 
output (after ArcelorMittal) and had an annual operating revenue of $30.6 billion in 2010.   
Fosun Group is one of China’s largest private steelmakers.  Moreover, SAIC’s origins 
date back to the 1940s, as one of the few car manufacturers in Maoist China.  The 
company has been revived in the reform era with huge investments from the Shanghai 
government and strategic partnerships with Volkswagen and General Motors (Segal and 
Thun 2001).  By 2010, SAIC had produced 3.6 million vehicles, the largest to date by any 
Chinese car manufacturer and had an annual operating revenue of $34 billion.    
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Focus on Financial Services in the Tertiary Sector 
 
Besides focusing on heavy industries, Shanghai’s economy has also been powered 
by the service sector. Prior to market reforms, Shanghai’s economy was concentrated in 
the secondary sector, which accounted for 65% of Shanghai’s economy in 1991.  By 
2000, the secondary sector had shrunk to 46%, and the tertiary sector accounted for 52% 
of the economy.  By 2010, the tertiary sector accounted for 57% of the economy and had 
grown from ¥24 billion ($4.4 billion) in 1990 to ¥983 billion ($157 billion) in 2010.9  
Within the tertiary sector, financial services, real estate, and logistics have had the fastest 
growth. In terms of employment, a significant proportion of Shanghai’s labor force, 
around 25%, is engaged in highly skilled tertiary work such as financial services and 
science and technology.  
Shanghai has been able to grow its financial sector due to its history as a major 
financial center.  The first modern Chinese bank, the Commercial Bank of China, was 
established in Shanghai in 1897 (Jao 2003). The first stock exchange was formed in 
Shanghai in 1904.  By 1936, Shanghai had forty-seven foreign banks, of which thirty-
three came from the UK, the US, and Europe (Jao 2003).   At the time, it accounted for 
40% of the nation’s total bank deposits (Jao 2003).  Aside from being the nation’s 
banking center, Shanghai was also the place where modern financial markets were 
concentrated: the securities market, the gold market, the foreign exchange market, the 
internal remittances market, and the inter-bank market all operated there (Jao 2003). 
Given its past experience as a financial center, Shanghai has quickly capitalized 
on its past to become the de-facto financial center in China with the opening up of 
                                                
 
9 1990 Exchange Rate: $1 to Y5.4 
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Pudong in 1990.  With the aspiration of becoming a major international financial center, 
the Shanghai stock exchange was reopened in 1990.  In April 1994, following the 
exchange rate reform, the central government located the China Foreign Exchange 
Trading Centre in Shanghai to unify the country’s foreign exchange trading (Jao 2003).  
In 2010, Shanghai’s financial industry generated an added value of ¥195 billion ($31 
billion), with over 900 financial institutions (Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2011).   By 
2011, Shanghai Stock Exchange became the 6th largest stock market by market 
capitalization at $2.3 trillion (Shanghai Stock Exchange 2012). 
Firm Ownership  
 
The Shanghai government has a major role in developing its heavy industry and 
financial services sectors.  Throughout the 1980s, close to 66% of investment projects in 
Shanghai were of central government origin.  Of those, the more notable projects were 
the expansion of Shanghai Petrochemical Plant and the formation of Shanghai Baoshan 
Iron and Steel Corporation and SAIC (Li 1998).   Given the capital investment required 
in heavy industry, government financing has been very important.   
Although enterprise’s ownership structure has changed dramatically since 1990, a 
large part of the economy remains in the public sector, over 51%.  The actual number 
may be much higher than 51% because joint ownership units and cooperative units with 
state investments have no longer been counted as urban collectives since 1998.  
Additionally, large and medium state-owned firms make up 37% of the gross industrial 
value of Shanghai’s economy, and 15% of the urban labor force works for these 
companies.  Taken together, this means that there is a continued strong state presence in 
Shanghai’s economy.    
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In terms of employment, most workers are employed in the private sector, but a 
significant portion of the workforce remains in the public sector.  In 1990, 90% of the 
workforce was employed by SOE.  By 2000, 38% of laborers were employed in the 
private sector.  Over this period, average annual wages also grew from ¥2917 ($540) in 
1990 to ¥46757 ($74,22) in 2010.  Moreover, in 1990, 81% of total wages were paid by 
SOE, and by 2010, 66% of total wages were paid by private enterprises.  At the same 
time, when including small SOEs and collectives, over a third of the total urban labor 
force works in the public sector, at 36%.  
Another implication of an emphasis on heavy industry is the presence of large 
firms.  In terms of having industrial firms above a designated size, defined as firms with 
an annual revenue above ¥5 million ($800,000), Shanghai has 16,684 units, more than 
twice the number in Guangzhou.  Also, large firms accounted for 43% of the gross 
industrial output of the city in 2010. 
Foreign Direct Investment  
 
Given its past as an economic center, Shanghai does not lack international 
experience, and it occupies a more advantageous position in attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI) than other cities in China.  More than 300 of the world’s top 500 
enterprises have invested in Shanghai, such as Delphi, GE, Mitsubishi, Siemens and 
Hitachi.  In 2010, Shanghai accounted for 10.5% of China’s FDI, at $11.1 billion.  As a 
result of the recent liberalization in the services sector that emphasizes financial services, 
tertiary industry accounted for 79.4% of Shanghai’s total utilized FDI in 2010 (Statistical 
Yearbook 2011).   
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 Given its original ties with outside investors, most of Shanghai’s FDI comes from 
the US, Europe and Japan rather than from overseas Chinese communities in Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan.  Prior to the communist takeover in 1949, Shanghai had an 
international settlement of more than 300,000 foreign residents, French, British, 
American and Japanese, who helped build Shanghai’s industrial sector. Of the total 
utilized FDI, wholly foreign-owned companies account for close to 82%.  
Shanghai Demographics  
 
The combination of an emphasis on heavy industry and highly skilled tertiary 
services mean that Shanghai needs a highly skilled labor force.  Moreover, Shanghai 
needs migrant workers to fuel its economic development.  Shanghai’s demographic 
pattern is the most advanced in China, and resembles that of many developed countries. 
The major driving force of Shanghai’s demographic transition is its rapid fertility decline.  
Since the mid-1970s, Shanghai’s fertility rate has been kept below the replacement level 
of 2.1.  Since 1993, Shanghai has been experiencing a negative natural growth rate of its 
native urban residents, averaging -1.8% per year (Shanghai Statistics Bureau 2011).  In 
the mid-2000s, Shanghai’s total fertility rate was as low as 0.8.  While the fertility rate 
has increased to 0.9 recently with the encouragement of single-child couples to have two 
children, Shanghai still has the lowest fertility rate in China, a country that already has a 
low fertility rate of 1.63 (Peng 2011).   
As a result, the 1980s was the golden period for Shanghai because it had an 
abundant supply of young labor as the baby boomers of the 1950s and early 1960s 
entered the labor market. However, since the late 1980s, the decline in fertility rate of the 
past decades has led to slower growth in the number of new workers in the urban-born 
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labor force.  Beginning in the mid-1990s, scholars were projecting that Shanghai’s native 
labor force would start contracting in 2010, which would correspond with a 30% decline 
in GDP per capita without a migration of outside workers into the city (Wang and Sheng 
2001).   
Therefore, the demographic window in Shanghai that has opened since the late 
1960s due to the rapid decline in total fertility rate is rapidly closing in the coming years 
as the city ages. Fortunately, the flow of young migrants has greatly restructured the 
actual age distribution of Shanghai’s population.  From the 2010 census, we see that 
Shanghai has added 5.5 million migrants since 2000.  The additional migrants boost the 
working age population (age 15-59) by 3.5% to 76.3%, which puts Shanghai ahead of the 
national statistics. Moreover, the addition of the migrant population also lowered the 
proportion of those age 65 and older by 1.3% to 10.1%.  The 2010 Shanghai statistical 
report notes that the inflow of migrants has greatly improved the demographic structure 
of the city and helped slow the aging of the population in Shanghai.     
Thus, given the small number of Shanghai residents in their mid-20s, the desired 
age for factory workers and construction workers, the influx of migrants provided the 
labor needed to spearhead Shanghai’s economic growth throughout the reform period.  
Since the majority of migrants are young, this migration complemented a Shanghai labor 
force that lacked young workers.  Moreover, these migrant workers are engaged in 
various manual jobs that urban workers are not willing to take. In addition, the number of 
skilled and educated young migrants, particularly young university graduates, has also 
increased.  As a result, Shanghai has been able to reap a prolonged demographic bonus 
through inward migration and sustain its economic growth.  Furthermore, researchers 
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agree that migrant workers have been the main contributor of the labor component to 
Shanghai’s economy over the last two decades (Wang and Sheng 2001).  Some 
researchers estimate migrants’ contributions to Shanghai’s GDP to be as much as 31% in 
2007 (Chan 2010).  Moreover, according to a retired official from Shanghai’s social 
insurance bureau, there were already numerous white-collar workers within this migrant 
population that did not have any social insurance in the early 2000s; thus, the 
comprehensive insurance program could have been set up as a way to retain this talent. 
Attitudes Towards Migrants  
 
Although Shanghai needs migrants for its economic development, migrants have 
not been treated well in Shanghai.  Similar to the rest of the country, Shanghai was most 
concerned about how to best control and manage this population without taking into 
consideration its welfare in the 1990s (Solinger 1999).  Moreover, much of the discussion 
among Chinese academics was focused on the ills that these migrants had caused in the 
city, such as over crowdedness and crime (Ding and Stockman 1999; Solinger 1999).  In 
a study of Putou District Caoyang Xincun, Ding and Stockman (1999) find that urban 
residents perceive a negative influence from migrants in transportation, living 
environment and personal safety.  In 1994, the Shanghai Municipal Police Bureau 
claimed that 70% of thefts in the city were attributed to migrants (Ding and Stockman 
1999).  This widespread perception of criminality among migrants meant that there was 
much wariness among urban residents and policy makers regarding the migrant 
population in their city.   
Shanghai, being a major industrial center, also witnessed a period of tumultuous 
labor relations, where a large number of SOEs were reformed and large layoffs were 
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implemented. Moreover, SOEs were firing local workers and using migrant workers who 
were willing to accept lower wages.  To limit these occurrences, the Shanghai 
government restricted the types of jobs that migrants could legally hold (Jacobs 1996).  In 
1995, Shanghai authorities differentiated between three areas of employment and barred 
migrants from certain jobs.  The first (heavy industries and textiles) was open to 
migrants; the second (mass consumer goods, mostly in electronics) was open to migrants 
only in the case of pressing need; and the third (administration, security, banking etc.) 
was completely closed to migrants. In the same year, the Shanghai Bureau of Labor and 
Social Security published a list of twenty types of employment forbidden to migrants, 
which included taxi drivers, telephonists, insurance agents and bank clerks. This list was 
modified in 2001according to labor demand, but migrants are still not allowed to work 
for official or public services, public security or environmental protection services, the 
management of joint property in city districts, sales departments in state-owned stores, 
and cleaning services in airports, railway stations and harbor facilities (Jacobs 1996; 
Roulleau-Berger and Lu 2005). 
Beginning in the mid-1990s, a small but growing number of scholars pushed for a 
sympathetic understanding of the migrants’ situation and sought to repudiate urban 
prejudices through survey research. A focus on the lives of migrants in the city seemed 
motivated by a growing realization that coercive restrictions and regulations on migrants 
would not prevent them from threatening social and political stability (Hu 2002).  
Instead, some efforts needed to be made toward incorporating them into urban social life 
and instilling a type of self-regulation in them. In the late 1990s, some newspapers began 
running columns providing information on migrants’ legal rights and responsibilities 
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(Jacka 2006).  Some local scholars even suggested that Shanghai could benefit from 
migrant workers because they were doing jobs that Shanghainese did not want to do and 
provided the labor necessary to fuel the economic boom (Wang and Sheng 2001; Wang 
2002).  
The attitude towards migrant workers changed dramatically in the 2000s.  At the 
16th Party Congress in November 2002, President Jiang Zemin argued that “all the 
institutional and policy barriers to urbanization must be removed and the rational and 
orderly flow of the rural labor be guided” (Lague 2003, 25).  With China’s accession to 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2000, the demand for workers led to the saying, 
“离土又离乡，进场又进城,” which means “leave the land and the village, enter 
factories and towns and cities” (Jacka 2006, 48).  As a result, migrants were deemed 
necessary and beneficial for urban development.  Since March 2002, Shanghai has 
forbidden the imposition of arbitrary taxes on migrants seeking to obtain various permits.  
In 2003, a university graduate, Sun Zhigang from Henan Province, was beaten to death in 
a Guangzhou custody and repatriation center after being detained by the police as a 
suspected illegal migrant.  This tragedy sparked public outrage regarding the treatment of 
migrants in cities.  Three months after the event, the State Council replaced these 
administrative detention centers with humanitarian relief centers to support migrants, 
vagrants, and the homeless (Li and Wu 2006).   
Moreover, the wave of labor protests in 2006 led the central government to issue 
many documents and policies requiring local governments to step up their efforts toward 
helping migrants win back-wages and provide labor protection for this population. In the 
past couple of years, migrant workers have been brought to the forefront of media 
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attention.  In the party congress of 2010, there was a migrant worker delegate.  
Additionally, while migrant workers were forced to leave Beijing prior to the Olympics 
in 2008, migrant workers were honored in Shanghai’s 2010 World Expo with a plaque 
dedicated to them.  Moreover, migrants were featured prominently in the World Expo 
advertisement.  Additionally, in the 2011 CCTV Spring Festival Gala, one of the most 
watched Chinese TV shows, with approximately 700 million viewers, migrants were 
given three slots to perform, including a duet by two Beijing migrant workers, Wang Xu 
and Liu Gang, a dance by a “Xidan” girl who performed in the Beijing pedestrian 
underpasses, and a dance by a Shenzhen hip hop dance group (CCTV 2011). In Shanghai, 
migrants were also featured in a popular talent show in 2010, called "Star Migrant 
Workers" hosted by a popular local stand-up comedian Zhou Libo.  While migrants’ 
fundamental status as the underclass in urban areas has not changed, this is a huge 
departure from an atmosphere where migrants were ignored and ostracized.   
Additionally, in contrast to years past, Shanghai was reporting a shortage of 
150,000 migrant workers after the Spring Festival 2011.  The city was actively trying to 
attract migrants through government job centers that post jobs for migrants.  Companies 
were also hiring over 400 tour buses to pick up migrant workers from their hometowns in 
Anhui, Jiangsu, Henan, and Hubei.  Companies were also paying headhunters to find 
workers and paying bonuses to these new workers, which was unheard before then.   
Against this background and shift in attitudes towards migrants, a space has been 
created to have a more inclusive urban social policy towards them. Also, there is 
recognition that migrants should be included in the social welfare system because 
Shanghai’s economic rise is attributable to this population’s efforts.  
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Capacity of the Shanghai Government and the Preferences of Employers 
 
State capacity can be defined broadly into two areas, the state’s role as a tax 
collector and its role as public goods provider (Besley and Persson 2011).  Compared 
with other cities, Shanghai excels in both areas.  Shanghai is not the same “unenthusiastic 
tax collector” as Guangzhou.  Shanghai’s image is a “diligent and sometimes overdiligent 
revenue collector” (Li 1998, 244).  Between 1940 and 1980, Shanghai’s tax revenues 
accounted for one sixth of central government revenues, and the city was only allowed to 
retain less than 13% of this amount (Li 1998).  During this time, Shanghai gained the 
reputation of being a “house that follows the law,” and this reputation endures to this day 
(Segal and Thun 2001, 567).  
The Shanghai government has a reputation for being strict on regulatory 
compliance and fee collections. While Shanghai did have a difficult time getting firms to 
join the comprehensive insurance initially, especially construction firms, the government 
was able to use licensing rights to coerce these firms into joining this scheme.  Moreover, 
in my firm interviews in Shanghai, managers mention that in Shanghai, they have to pay 
the required payroll tax, but in surrounding cities, they can negotiate a flat rate fee. Below 
are some examples of firms’ assessments of Shanghai’s government capacity:  
  “In Shanghai, we pay all of our social insurance fees, but outside of Shanghai, we 
can negotiate to pay a percentage of our social insurance fees.” – Human Resource 
Manager at a paper product firm with operations both within and outside of Shanghai 
 
“Shanghai has really high standards. To operate a business, we need licenses for 
everything, and it is hard for small businesses to survive.  Big businesses have access to 
bank loans and preferential policies from the Shanghai government, and small businesses 
have access to nothing. Moreover, there are too many requirements, from business 
licensing to labor protection.  In other places, you can negotiate with the local 
governments on the amount of social insurance fees, but not in Shanghai.  In Shenzhen, 
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everything is possible (negotiable), but not in Shanghai.” -- Owner of a Shanghai legal 
consulting agency 
 
   “As a business owner, I am not afraid of workers, I am afraid of the government. 
I am afraid of labor inspections and penalties (fines) by the labor affairs and social 
security people.  I have never been inspected but I am afraid of being inspected.  Plus, 
every firm has a relationship with the local labor office (劳务所).  Unless there’s a 
complaint, inspection does not happen.”   --Owner of a shoe company  
 
 Moreover, Shanghai is very much a “developmental state,” with a strong 
government presence in industries as witnessed by the emphasis on heavy industry.  The 
government believes that pooling the risk of compensating workers involved in 
occupational injury cases will lower the risk of doing business in Shanghai.  Moreover, 
the comprehensive insurance makes it possible to spread the risk across the migrant 
population by also extending medical and pension insurance to them. Comprehensive 
insurance also translates into an image of better labor protection, hence attracting more 
migrants to Shanghai.  In an interview with a researcher at the Shanghai social insurance 
bureau, he says, “Migrant workers became a population that we need to worry about in 
the 1990s.  Migrant workers were mostly engaged in dangerous and dirty jobs.  They 
were at the most risk of being injured at the jobs because their occupations were 
dangerous, mostly clustered in construction and logistics.  As a result, there were a large 
number of occupational injury cases. If they worked for a large enterprise, at least they 
were able to get some compensation. When they worked for a small enterprise, their 
chances of getting compensated were minimal, especially since these employers were 
more likely to close shop and leave town.  In the case of occupational injury, each case 
could be upward of several ¥100000 ($16,066).  These workers were not able to raise 
these issues in the courts at the time, but they were able to petition. Seeing the rising 
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number of occupational injury cases and petitions regarding this problem, the Shanghai 
government decided to act, especially on occupational injury insurance.”  When I asked 
about the response from firms, he mentions, “There actually was not that much push back 
from enterprises but they actually supported it because they did not have to contribute 
that much to the fund.  For 12.5%, they were covered for occupational injury, medical 
and pension.  Since an occupational injury case could be upward several ¥100000 
($16,066), companies actually wanted to be protected.  Companies benefited a lot from 
this insurance, especially in occupational injury. We demanded that all enterprises 
contribute to all three insurances because we wanted to increase the risk pool. We did not 
only want enterprises in high-risk sectors to join. With this insurance, everyone benefited, 
the workers, the employers and the government.”  
A labor lawyer affirms this view.  This is what he said: “For the firm’s 
perspective, they are most afraid of occupational injury.  This is especially true for 
enterprises that have had 1-2 occupational injury cases.  An occupational injury case is at 
a minimum ¥200000 ($32,134).  So for a firm to spend ¥200 ($32) per month per worker 
on comprehensive insurance that covers occupational, medical and pension, it’s well 
worth it.  Of course, the firm would prefer not to pay for pension but Shanghai is an all-
in-one insurance. Plus the one-time payout for occupational injury is good for financing 
the insurance scheme.” 
Overall, employers are not opposed to providing workers with migrant social 
insurance, especially occupational injury insurance, but the administrative hassle of the 
whole process nonetheless makes compliance difficult.  As a construction foreman said, 
“My uncle’s company took out accident and health insurance for our workers for one 
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year, but found it to be too burdensome.  It is not the costs, but it is the administrative 
hassle of setting up these accounts.  In order to buy the insurance, each worker needs to 
have a residency permit, labor contract and other paperwork in place. It takes around two 
months to get all the paperwork in place and get the insurance accounts set up. But by 
this time, the worker may have already left my work team because the project has been 
completed or he left for other reasons.  The temporary nature of these jobs makes it 
impossible for us to set up social insurance accounts.” 
For bigger firms that can afford it, they will actually buy additional commercial 
insurance for their workers.  In a meeting with a human resource manager at an staffing 
agency, this was her view on insurance: “Besides the regular government insurance 
schemes, we also buy additional commercial insurance for our migrant workers because 
they are in high-risk industries such as manufacturing.  Even drivers run a huge risk of 
injuries.  Since accidents and injuries are common among migrant workers, it is much 
cheaper administratively to take out an additional commercial insurance for these 
workers. With an additional private insurance, workers get up to 90% reimbursement in 
outpatient and inpatient care.  Plus when an injury happens on the job, the insurance 
company can take on the investigation and compensate the workers.  The parent company 
does not have to waste human resources and time to do this.  It's worth the extra money 
not to deal with the hassle.”  Similarly, an HR manager at a packaging company 
mentions, “Besides the required social insurance, we also take out additional insurance to 
cover our high-risk workers, the ones who have a high risk of getting injured because 
they operate dangerous machinery and equipment.  They make up around 10% of our 
workers.  We take this additional insurance for our workers because we have done the 
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accounting. It’s cheaper for us take an additional insurance for them than for us to pay in 
case of an accident.  Moreover, administratively, it’s less hassle for us because the 
insurance company can do the investigation and pay out for these cases.”  
Social Insurance Programs as Revenue Generation Opportunities 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, revenues are shared between the central and local 
governments in China.  In 1994, China struck a central-provincial budget deal, where the 
central government will get 75% of value-added taxes and 60% of enterprise income 
taxes and personal income taxes collected at the local levels. In return, the central 
government will make three types of general-purpose transfers: revenue sharing transfer, 
tax rebate and equalization transfers (Lou 2008).  Shanghai had the largest per capita 
revenue sharing transfer and tax rebate in 2004, but received no equalization transfers as 
a rich province (Lou 2008).  
Fiscal Pressure 
 
While the central government receives the bulk of the tax revenues, local 
governments are responsible for providing the bulk of social security, basic education, 
health care, and public safety services.  Moreover, there are fairly limited transfers to 
finance these services.  As a result, local governments tend to end up with expenditure 
responsibilities in excess of the revenue at their disposal. Cities are generally expected to 
cover any deficit from their own budgets.  Shanghai has been experiencing a growing 
yearly fiscal deficit since 1994.  In 2010, Shanghai had a fiscal deficit of ¥42.9 billion 
($6.8 billion), which is 2.5% of its local GDP.  As a result, Shanghai is pressured to raise 
additional funds for make up for this fiscal gap.  The social insurance fund is one such 
revenue source.  
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Table 4.2 Shanghai Fiscal Balance 1994-2010 
Year Fiscal Balance (¥100MM) Balance as Percentage of GDP 
1994 -21.65 -1.1% 
1995 -40.59 -1.6% 
1996 -54.17 -1.8% 
1997 -76.59 -2.2% 
1998 -88.48 -2.3% 
1999 -114.53 -2.7% 
2000 -124.88 -2.6% 
2001 -106.14 -2.0% 
2002 -158.05 -2.8% 
2003 -203.35 -3.0% 
2004 -275.97 -3.4% 
2005 -226.42 -2.4% 
2006 -213.43 -2.0% 
2007 -99.29 -0.8% 
2008 -235.34 -1.7% 
2009 -449.35 -3.0% 
2010 -429.31 -2.5% 
Source: Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2011 
 
Aging and Pension Pressure 
 
Besides suffering from a fiscal deficit, Shanghai, along with other fast developing 
coastal cities, is also suffering from a rapid aging process and increased dependency ratio 
because it had an earlier and sharper drop in fertility rate.  Shanghai is also aging faster 
than the rest of the country. Between 1990 and 2000, Shanghai’s native population age 60 
and older increased from 14.1% to 18.1%.   By 2010, compared to the national figure of 
13.3%, Shanghai’s elderly population of age 60 and older had increased to 23%.  The 
combination of falling natural growth rate and an aging population means that there are 
fewer native workers added to the workforce each year.   
 An aging society is also a great challenge to Shanghai’s pension system, and rural 
migration is seen as a way to reduce pension pressure in the city as evidenced by a UN 
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Report, “Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?” 
The report proposes migration as a policy tool to extend the demographic bonus and 
relieve pressure on a country’s social security systems in aging societies.  As early as 
2000, some local scholars were predicting that Shanghai could be experiencing a pension 
gap in 2002 (Wang and Sheng 2001).  Moreover, in Peng and Cheng’s (2005) analysis, 
Shanghai’s pension balance could be kept running until as late as 2028 before turning 
negative with a high level of migration.  Without any migration, Shanghai’s pension fund 
would begin experiencing a negative balance in 2008.  The intensity of migration also has 
a significant effect on the performance of pension funds because a higher volume of 
migration means a longer demographic bonus and a longer sustainability of the pension 
system (Lu and Wang 2008).  Additionally, the government would also have more 
opportunities, time, and experience to formulate public policy to relieve the pension 
problem.  Thus, beginning in 2000, Shanghai researchers noted that migrant workers 
could increase local tax revenue and local security funds and sustain Shanghai’s rapid 
economic growth (Wang and Sheng 2001; Hu 2006).  
As proposed in Chapter 2, there appears to be a national trend of using social 
insurance as extra-budgetary revenue.  In 2008, Shanghai’s UEMI balance is ¥13.6 
billion.  However, Shanghai’s payout rate is much higher than the national average, at 
89%, as compared to the national average of 69% (China Health Statistical Yearbook 
2009).  This large difference is due to the more generous medical insurance benefits and 
the larger proportion of retirees in Shanghai’s insurance enrollment.  Currently, 28% of 
Shanghai’s UEMI members are retirees.  Retirees do not contribute to the medical 
insurance fund, but they receive more generous medical benefits than current workers 
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(Table 4.3).  Retirees also have lower deductibles, ¥300-¥700 for outpatient and ¥700-
¥1200 for inpatient care, and higher reimbursement rates of 75-85% for outpatient and 
92% for inpatient care.  The generous retiree benefits mean that the medical insurance 
fund will be depleted faster as the city ages.  By 2015, the number of retirees is expected 
to reach four million, which will make up approximately 30% of Shanghai’s hukou 
population (Shanghai Human Resources and Social Security Bureau 2009).  As 
experiences in the US suggest, older people are much more likely to be the top spenders 
on health.  While the elderly (age 65 and over) made up only 13% of the US population 
in 2002, they accounted for 36% of the total US health expenditure (Stanton 2006).  To 
prevent this future gap in the medical insurance fund, Shanghai may have been thinking 
ahead in 2002 when it implemented the migrant comprehensive insurance fund (Hu 
2006).   
Hence it is not surprising that Shanghai has created a comprehensive insurance to 
include migrants in the city’s social insurance system.  Migrants’ youth, health and lack 
of intention to stay make this a very attractive population to cover in the urban social 
insurance pool.  By including this group in the city’s medical insurance fund, the city is 
enlarging the medical insurance fund with minimal risks.  Thus, deducing from 
demographic numbers and local scholarly discussions, a very compelling reason for 
Shanghai to create a migrant comprehensive insurance is revenue generation (Zhong and 
Zha 2006; Yuan and Sun 2008; Xie 2009).   
By establishing a comprehensive insurance fund for migrants, Shanghai’s 
government has added over ¥10 billion to the social insurance fund every year since 2008 
(Figure 4.1).  While 3-4% of this fund is supposed to be allocated for medical coverage, 
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there is no set policy on this matter.  In terms of medical benefits, less than 1% of this 
population had been hospitalized between 2004-2006 (Zhou and Gao 2009; Li 2006).  
Using the assumptions that an average hospitalization is around ¥8600 and the 
hospitalization rate is 1% among members, the payout is around 6-8% from the medical 
insurance share of the fund (Xia 2009).  If one adds the ¥20 per month drug card, the 
payout rate increases to 31-41%, but this money expires after 12 months.  So at present, 
the low payout rate from this fund suggests that the aggregate medical insurance fund 
balance from 2002-2010 can be between ¥7.7B-¥12.3B.   
 
Figure 4.1 Comprehensive Insurance Balance 2002-2010 
 
*Based on comprehensive insurance’s enrollment numbers, contribution rate, average city wages from Shanghai 
Statistical Yearbooks and Shanghai Human Resources and Social Security Bureau reports 
 
Additionally, most of this comprehensive insurance fund is supposed to be 
allocated for pension vouchers.  For every 12 months of contributions, the workers 
receive a voucher for around ¥1000, but they cannot cash in on this benefit until they 
retire at age 50 for women and 60 for men, which can be more than 40 years later for 
many migrants given their youth.  Between 2000 and 2005, migrants age 60 and over 
made up only 2% of the total migrant population (Xie and Sun 2010).  Of those people, 
very few had fulfilled the twelve-month employment period with employer contributions 



























to this comprehensive fund; thus, at present, only a very small number of people can 
actually withdraw money from these pension vouchers (Feng 2008).  As one interviewee 
puts it, “I think I’ve received two vouchers so far, but I don’t know where I put them 
because the amount is so small, maybe less than ¥1000…I’m only 35 this year, so it 
won’t be another 15 years until I get this money.”  Currently, the total balance on 
Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance can be approximately ¥35-40 billion, and that is 
assuming a 100% payout rate on the occupational injury fund.  This is more than 1.5 
times the 2010 UEMI fund in Shanghai of ¥20.4 billion (Table 4.3).  To put these 
numbers into perspective, Shanghai’s 2010 fiscal revenue was around ¥287 billion.  So 
the comprehensive insurance fund is around 12-14% of Shanghai’s 2010 fiscal revenue, 
which is a not an insignificant number.  
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Table 4.3 Comparison of Shanghai's UEMI, URMI, and Comprehensive Insurance 
 Urban Employee Medical 
Insurance  




 Current Workers Retirees   
Financing Party Employee / 
Employer 
Fund Resident and government Employer 
Enrollment 
principle 




employers and 2% 
by employees 
Fund Resident: ¥60-¥700 per 
year depending on age 
12.5% (3-4% for medical 
insurance fund) 
Base Salary Employee’s wage   None 60% previous year’s 





¥1000 for age 18-59; No 
deductible for children and 
senior 




70% 75-85% 50% (60% at community 
clinic) 









85% 92% 50-70% 80% 
Additional 
Benefits 
None None None ¥240 annual drug card for 




Health Insurance Bureau Health Insurance Bureau Human Resources and 
Social Security Bureau 
Total Number of 
Covered People 
(2010) 
12.8 MM 3.9MM 2.6MM 4.0 MM 
Fund Balance 
(2010) 
¥20.4 B ¥150MM** ¥35B-40B* 
China Statistical Yearbook 2011, Shanghai Health Insurance Bureau, Shanghai Human Resources and Social Security 
Bureau 
*Based on comprehensive insurance’s enrollment numbers, contribution rate, average city wages from Shanghai 
statistical yearbooks and Shanghai human resources and social security bureau reports.   
**2008 statistics 
 
With the migrant population, Shanghai has no responsibility toward their old-age 
medical care. The comprehensive insurance is only valid when the worker’s employer 
pays into the fund and is terminated once the worker leaves employment or when the 
employer stops making payments.  Moreover, while both the UEMI and URMI require 
the government to subsidize the funds when these funds fail, the comprehensive 
insurance requires no such obligations from the Shanghai government.  Currently, there 
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are no medical provisions in the insurance for migrant retirees because to date, around 
85% of migrants residing in Shanghai are under the age of 40 (Xie and Sun 2010).  In 
terms of the risk for this fund, expanding coverage to migrants through a comprehensive 
insurance fund carries very little risk.  The insurance is available to migrants who have 
formal employment or who can pay into the fund independently. If they have formal 
employment or can pay into the fund independently, chances are that they are young, 
healthy and capable. Given their youth, migrants also suffer from less chronic illness.  By 
self-selection, these people are less likely to use the medical services in cities because 
they are younger and healthier.  Moreover, a serious illness could also mean employment 
termination and the loss of any insurance; hence, migrants may not be able to access the 
medical insurance fund for services when they need it most.  
Additionally, a 2005 survey finds that over 73% of migrants use home remedies 
in the event of illness instead of seeking professional care (State Council 2006).  
Migrants’ income levels and the cost of urban medical services are the underlying 
reasons behind this phenomenon.  Given their low income, it is difficult for migrants to 
use urban health centers because an average outpatient visit to a city hospital costs around 
¥200, which is more than a quarter of a migrant’s average monthly income (MOH 2009).   
Since Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance only covers inpatient care, all outpatient care 
is out of pocket for migrants.  Even in cases where the migrant needs to seek inpatient 
care, the ¥1500 deductible, which is nearly a month’s salary for many migrants, can be a 
deterrent to seeking care (MOH 2009).  Moreover, the comprehensive insurance requires 
the member to pay for the medical costs up front and file for reimbursement later.  Given 
high medical costs, this can create a cash flow problem for many migrants seeking care in 
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Shanghai.  As a result, unless it is an emergency, migrants will delay treatment until they 
can return to their hometowns to seek treatment because the combination of high 
deductibles and overall higher medical costs in Shanghai offsets the benefits of having 
comprehensive insurance.  As one migrant woman puts it, “We cannot afford to go to the 
Shanghai hospitals, [because] a simple procedure can be several thousand kuai.  We can 
probably get the same procedure done in our hometown for less than a thousand.  If we 
can bear it, we will wait until we can return home.”  Thus, this comprehensive fund has 
been operating in a low-risk environment where young, healthy and mobile migrants are 
included in a medical insurance program that they under-utilize due to their good health 
and high medical costs.  Overall, this insurance fund can be generating revenue for the 
local government to use at its own discretion.  
Relations Between Shanghai Leaders and Central Government 
 
As a provincial level city, Shanghai’s leaders are appointed by and beholden to 
the central government.  Moreover, Shanghai has served as the final grooming and testing 
ground for potential national level leaders.  The most prominent promotions were those 
of Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji and Wu Bangguo. In the current generation of leaders, we 
also see that Xi Jinping, had also served as Shanghai’s party chief.   As a result, it is 
important that Shanghai should respect the central government’s concern for this 
vulnerable population. The importance attached to migrant workers around 2002 was 
especially apparent in the leadership change from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao at the 16th 
National Congress. Under this new leadership, there is a greater concern for the poor and 
vulnerable.  Migrants’ comprehensive insurance can also be a way for Shanghai to 
showcase to the central government that Shanghai is respecting the party line. 
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Additionally, given Shanghai’s political clout, Shanghai has to lead and innovate 
in social policy.  With the exception of Beijing, the level of involvement of Shanghai 
leaders in national politics since 1949 has been much higher than most other localities.  
Following the fall of the Gang of Four in the late 1970s, the central government has kept 
a tight rein on Shanghai’s leaders in the early 1980s, but since the ascension of Jiang 
Zemin in 1989, Shanghai’s leaders are once again active in national politics.  As Jiang 
lacked an extensive political network in Beijing, he relied on his Shanghai network and 
was latter coined the Shanghai faction by China observers.  While some viewed this 
Shanghai faction as the agent of the center rather than of those fighting for Shanghai’s 
interests, the close association with Shanghai certainly benefited the city in terms of 
policy leeway and economic projects, as witnessed by the 1994 revenue sharing reform 
debate where Shanghai’s leaders threw their support behind this reform in return for the 
central government’s support for their Pudong project (Cheung 1996).  Thus, given that 
there were no set timelines and mandated programs on migrants delineated by the central 
government, while touting the party line, Shanghai leaders could make innovative policy 
to shine next to their brother cities, also signaling to the central government that they 
could innovate and lead.   
City’s Image and Aspirations 
 
Also, Shanghai is considered the big brother among Chinese cities.  With its rapid 
economic growth and cosmopolitan and forward-looking urban culture, Shanghai is an 
inspiration for the nation. With landmark buildings such as the Oriental Pearl Tower and 
the Jinmao Grand Hyatt, Shanghai has regained its past glory as a pace setter for China’s 
socio-economic development.  Not only has Shanghai led the nation’s economic growth, 
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Shanghai has also led the country in reforming the social security system. Hence, it is the 
example to follow, be it in economics or social policy.  
As early as 1984, Shanghai introduced a pooled collection and distribution of 
pensions for its urban employees, which initiated the transition away from an employer-
based to a government-administered pension program (Selden and You 1997).  This was 
officially formalized into a universal retirement insurance program for all urban 
employees in 1997.  Shanghai was also the first to introduce the dibao program in 1993, a 
minimum living allowance program for urban residents (Wong and Shixun 2004). The 
system was initiated to cope with urban poverty exacerbated by the restructuring of 
SOEs.  The system was later replicated throughout the country to help destitute urban 
households.  Reform efforts for unemployment insurance also started in 1986 and 
culminated in the Regulation for Unemployment Insurance in Shanghai in 1995.  
Similarly, health insurance reforms started in 1992, which was earlier than the 
Zhenjiang (Jiangsu Province) and JiuJjiang (Jiangxi Province) urban health insurance 
experiments in 1994 (Cheng and Gu 2004).  By 2000, Shanghai was offering better basic 
health care coverage for all urban employees in its Regulation on Basic Health Insurance 
for Workers in Cities and Towns than that mandated by the 1998 central government 
health insurance policy.  
Moreover, Shanghai was also the first to institute a requirement of the wubao 
concept, which dictated that employees should be covered under the five principal social 
insurance schemes covering occupational injury, maternity, medical, pension and 
unemployment (Wong and Shixun 2004). These employer social security obligations 
were governed by the location of the enterprise (urban, rural) and the type of employee 
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(urban, rural, migrant), and the first regulation that specified the minimum employer 
contributions as a percentage of the previous year’s payroll for urban residents was first 
was passed in 2002 (Nyland et al 2011).   
According to AmCham Shanghai, employers in Shanghai pay higher social 
insurance costs than employers in other Chinese cities and other Asian countries.   
Despite an opposing policy position statement in 2002 from AmCham Shanghai stating 
the mandated social welfare costs in Shanghai could be a disincentive for investors and 
could potentially drive investors away from Shanghai to other regions in China or 
elsewhere in Asia, Shanghai did not change its official position and kept its mandated 
social insurance contributions.  While Shanghai lowered the housing fund contributions 
for employers, it added occupational injury and maternity to its benefit package in recent 
years, bringing the cost of employer contributions to 51% of wages (Table 4.7). 
 
Table 4.4 Urban Social Insurance Contribution Rates in Urban China 
Type Employer* Employee** 
Pension Insurance 20% 8% 
Unemployment 2% 1% 
Medical at least 6% 2% 
Occupational Injury 0.5-2% 0% 
Maternity 0.5-1% 0% 
Total 29-31% 11% 
*of payroll  **of monthly wages 
Source: World Bank 2012 
  
Table 4.5 Total Employer Contribution Rates in Selected Chinese Cities 2002 
City  Employer 
Shanghai 51.5% - 56.5% 
Beijing 33.50% 
Guangzhou 34.20% 
Chongqing 28% - 36% 
Nanjing 33% 
Source: AmCham Shanghai 2002 
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Table 4.6 Employer Social Welfare Contribution Rates, Shanghai vs. Asian 
Countries 2002 
Types of Insurance Shanghai Philippines Thailand Korea Taiwan 
Pension 22.50% 5.07% 2% 4.50% 4.56% 
Unemployment 2% - - 0.50% 0.70% 
Medical 12% 1.25% 1.50% 0.5-25.8% 2.55% 
Housing 15 -20% 2% - - - 
Total 51.5% - 
56.5% 
8.32% 3.50% 7 - 32.3% 7.80% 
Source: AmCham Shanghai  2002 
 
Table 4.7 Shanghai Social Welfare Contribution Rates 2002-2010 
Types of Insurance 2002 2002 2010 2010 
 Employers Individual Employers Individual 
Pension 22.50% 6% 22% 8% 
Unemployment 2% 1% 2% 1% 
Medical 12% 2% 12% 2% 
Occupation Injury 0% 0% 0.5% 0% 
Maternity 0% 0% 0.5% 0% 
Housing 15 -20% 7% 14% 14% 
Total 51.5-56.5% 16% 51% 25% 
 
Given Shanghai’s history as a social policy innovator, Shanghai’s migrant 
comprehensive insurance can also be another example of the city’s innovative reputation.  
The comprehensive insurance has been touted as the new frontier in the country’s social 
insurance (Hu 2006).  It is the first insurance to pool medical, injury and occupational 
into a single fund for migrants.  It is also considered a custom-designed policy for 
migrants (量身定做).  Six months after its creation, the insurance was emulated by the 
cities of Chengdu and Dalian in 2003.  According to Chinese social insurance scholar, Hu 
Wu, Shanghai’s social security bureau sees the comprehensive insurance program as 
Shanghai’s answer to years of propaganda on protecting migrant workers (2006).  In the 
absence of any central government policy, Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance program 
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is an effective and innovative way to cover this population, and Shanghai has had to take 
a leadership role because nobody else could do it (Hu 2006).   
Moreover, Chinese pundits believe that Shanghai has shown that it cares about the 
migrant population by continuously improving on this program. Shanghai has been 
making changes to the comprehensive insurance since its creation in 2002.  To encourage 
enrollment, in 2004, the Shanghai Development and Management Committee and the 
Labor and Social Insurance Bureau started to require construction companies with 
Shanghai projects to first hand over comprehensive fees prior to releasing permits for 
these projects. The contribution rate for the construction industry was also lowered to 
5.5% as pension contributions were no longer required. Since firms did not want to pay 
for workers who only work one out of the three months that they had contributed to in 
this insurance, fee collection was also changed from quarterly to monthly to 
accommodate the transient nature of the migrant population.  Moreover, the ¥20 per 
employee enrollment was also eliminated to ease the burden on firms.  As a result of 
these policies, the enrollment rate in this industry climbed to around 70% (Ying 2010; Hu 
2006).    
In 2005, the comprehensive insurance benefits were also expanded.  The 
maximum benefit payout was increased from 100% to 400%.  The insurance also 
provides members with an annual ¥240 drug card for over the counter drugs and free 
physical exams at designated hospitals.  Furthermore, the pension payout was increased 
from 5% to 7%.  In 2010, the annual deductible was lowered to ¥1500.   
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Table 4.8 Changes in Comprehensive Insurance from 2002-2010 
  2002 2004 2005 2010 
Financing Party Employer       
Enrollment 
principle 
Compulsory       
Contribution Rate 12.5% (3-4% for 
medical insurance 












    
Contribution Base 60% of previous 
year’s average 
monthly city wage 
      
Outpatient 
Deductible 




No outpatient care       
Hospitalization 
Deductible 
10% of previous 
year's average 
monthly year: ¥1947 
(2002) 




80%       
Benefit Caps Based upon 
enrollment period, 
benefits are capped at 
60% of average 
annual city wage  
• 3 months: 100%  
• 6 months: 200% 
• 9 months: 300% 
• 12 months: 400% 
  Based upon 
enrollment 
period, benefits 
are capped at 
60% of average 
annual city 
wage  
• 1 month: 
33%  
• 2 months: 
67% 
• 3 months 




None  • ¥240 annual 
drug card for 
OTC drugs 









Pension Benefits • Pension cards after 
12 consecutive 
months of 
enrollment.   
• Pension cards can 
be redeemed at age 
50 for women and 
60 for men in 1 
time payment. 
• 5% of actual 
contribution base 
in enrollment 
period.   














• Compensation for 
death: ¥14800 
• Compensation for 
injuries ranges 
from 1st degree of 
¥14700 to 10th 
degree of ¥10000 














    
Fund Collection  Every three months Every month     
Management of 
Fund 
China Life (pension), 
Ping An (medical and 
occupational injury 
for non- construction 
workers), and Tai 
Ping Yang (medical 
and occupational 
injury construction 
workers) and oversee 
by the Bureau of 
Human Resources 
and Social Security 
    China Life 
(pension), Medical 
and Occupational 




Overall, Shanghai may want to appear as a city that cares about social programs. 
As a world-class city, Shanghai needs to treat its population reasonably and fairly.  In a 
research report by the Shanghai Social Insurance bureau, the comprehensive insurance 
was mentioned as a way to avoid US and European criticism of Chinese labor practices, 
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which could help set the stage for Shanghai enterprises to be competitive in the global 
market.  
Moreover, although Shanghai has higher social insurance costs than other cities, it 
does not appear to be very concerned about the loss of enterprises to other cities with 
lower social insurance contributions.  Shanghai is actually giving financial incentives to 
some low-value companies to move outside of Shanghai because it wants to attract high 
value, high tech manufacturing, information technology and biomedical research.  As an 
in-house counsel to a big domestic electronics company says, “Shanghai is not terribly 
concerned about the exiting of companies such as DHL because newer, better companies 
are coming in to take its place.  Moreover, these firms cannot leave Shanghai completely. 
Shanghai is the economic powerhouse in China, so these firms will have to maintain a 
presence in Shanghai.  Oftentimes, these firms will leave a management and/or marketing 
team in Shanghai, which provides the higher value added services.  So the Shanghai 
government is not worried.”   
Moreover, for some firms, social insurance contributions are a labor cost that one 
cannot avoid.  When asked whether or not social insurance figures in their plans for 
relocating in Shanghai or elsewhere, some HR managers offered the following responses:  
“Social insurance is not a factor that figures in my firm relocating elsewhere.  
Social insurance is a fee that my firm will have to pay in every city.  It’s a percentage of 
the local wage.  So if I move my firm to a tier two city, labor costs will naturally be 
lower, rent will be lower, thus the social insurance fee is lower.  So it doesn’t matter what 
the social insurance fees are because other factors will trump it.”  -- Packaging firm 
 
“When we were choosing a new location, there were two main considerations:  
the size and the profitability of the local market. Initially, we were choosing between 
Shenzhen and Shanghai as our headquarters.  Ultimately, we chose Shanghai as our 
headquarters because of the following: labor in Shenzhen is much more mobile. So it’ll 
be harder for us to retain talent there. Social trust among people is weaker in Shenzhen.  
There is also less culture and less opportunity for expansion and development into other 
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service areas in Shenzhen. So social insurance costs is not a factor at all.” – Home 
furnishing firm 
 
“Social insurance was one of our considerations but not our main one in opening 
our factory here.  We also looked at other locations such as Wuxi, Nantong. But we 
decided on this location because it’s close to our existing factory in Shanghai plus we got 
a good deal on the land rental.” -- Glass production company     
  
In sum, Shanghai may have adopted medical insurance for migrants as a 
development strategy and fiscal strategy.  Shanghai’s economy needs highly skilled 
workers due to its emphasis on heavy industry and financial services.  Moreover, 
Shanghai also has a labor shortage due to its low birthrate.  Given this need for additional 
workers, it may be using medical insurance as a method to attract and retain talent.  
Moreover, given the reputation of the Shanghai government as a strong regulator, it 
would have an easier time coercing and collecting fees from enterprises.  Plus, 
Shanghai’s unique economic status as the economic powerhouse of China means that it 
could throw its weight around with employers because they could not afford to bypass 
Shanghai.   
Another factor driving migrant medical insurance may be the pressure to raise 
additional funds to bridge the current fiscal gap.  Shanghai, as an aging society, is 
anticipating a big shortfall in paying for its retirees. By extending medical insurance to 
migrants, it can raise funds from a low-risk population that is healthy, young and mobile, 
and potentially spend the money on its more important constituents, the aging Shanghai 
residents and/or use the fund for other purposes. 
Additionally, Shanghai’s role as the big brother among Chinese cities and its 
innovator role could also shape the type of policy it would pursue. Unlike other cities, 
Shanghai leaders would want to showcase their success through economic and social 
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policy innovation because Shanghai is already an economic powerhouse.  Hence, having 
a comprehensive insurance that includes pension, medical and occupational injury for 
migrants is a policy innovation that could present Shanghai as a leader in social policy.   
Shanghai could have adopted comprehensive insurance for multiple reasons 
including rhetorical support for migrant insurance on equity and social justice grounds to 
burnish its city’s image, but in my interviews with Shanghai researchers and officials 
from Shanghai Social Insurance Bureau, Shanghai has been concerned about its rapidly 
aging native population and the related fiscal pressure.  While the comprehensive 
insurance fund is officially earmarked for migrants, my interviewees did not dispute the 
fact social insurance funds in general have and could potentially be used for other 
purposes. This suggests that Shanghai government may have adopted comprehensive 
migrant insurance for more self-interested reasons related to its demographic and fiscal 
needs. 




Guangzhou is an ancient city with over 2100 years of history that dates back to 
the Han dynasty. Guangzhou’s location at the head of the Pearl River Delta made it easily 
accessible to foreign traders coming by sea, and it was known as the “Silk Road on 
Water” (Ikels 1996, 12; Xu and Yeh 2003, 363) in ancient times.  Between 1757 and 
1840, Guangzhou monopolized foreign trade in China because it was the only port city 
opened to foreign trade.  The preeminence of the city declined after 1840 because the 
Nanking Treaty opened four other ports, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo and Shanghai, which 
competed with Guangzhou (Xu and Yeh 2003).  Shanghai became Guangzhou’s fiercest 
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rival due to its favorable geographic location on the Yangtze River.  The subsequent 
decline in Guangzhou’s foreign trade was followed by the shift of the commercial center 
to Shanghai.  In modern times, Guangzhou’s fortunes reflect a similar tale.  
Guangzhou is the political, economic and cultural center of Guangdong province 
and southern China.  In the early years of the reform period, it was one of the first cities 
to open up to the outside world.  At the time, Guangdong was considered the province 
one step ahead of China, and Guangzhou was considered the city one step of Guangdong 
(Vogel 1989).  However, as preferential policies were granted to other cities in the later 
years of the reform, especially with the development of Shanghai’s Pudong Area in 1990, 
Guangzhou lost its position as a dominant city.  
Focusing on Light Industry 
 
Guangzhou, similar to other large Chinese cities under the command economy, 
emphasized heavy industry because the motto from 1954 through the Cultural Revolution 
was to change Guangzhou from a “consumption city to an industrial city” (Vogel 1989, 
197).  However, given its history as a consumption port city, it lacked the robust 
industrial base and natural resources of other Chinese cities.  Moreover its geographic 
location on the coast and connections with international communities also prevented the 
central government from making investments in its industries.  As a result, on the eve of 
the market reform in 1978, Guangzhou’s economy was distinct from those of other major 
large cities.  Industrial development played a less important role in its economy than in 
other key industrial cities such as Shanghai.  In 1978, Guangzhou’s industrial output 
constituted only 58% of its GDP as compared to 76% in Shanghai’s economy (Xu and 
Yeh 2003). Furthermore, light industry made up 63% of the industrial output of 
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Guangzhou, as compared to 52% in Shanghai.  Given this economic legacy, Guangzhou 
chose to emphasize the development of light industry when it was granted the permission 
to open up to the outside world in 1984.   
Guangzhou also concentrated on light industry such as textiles, bicycles, watches, 
tires, refrigerators, televisions, air conditioners, etcetera, because investment in heavy 
industry was severely constrained by shortages of capital and readily accessible raw 
material (Vogel 1989).  Guangzhou’s lack of natural resources meant that they had to be 
brought in from long distances, and thereby would put strains on the national 
transportation system.  Thus, planners only modernized heavy industry producing goods 
needed by local industry (Vogel 1989).  Moreover, large industrial plants making steel, 
ships, tires, and machinery, were decades out of date, and modernization required large 
investments.  Light industry, on the other hand, required less investment and brought 
greater, quicker returns and more foreign sales. Furthermore, Hong Kong investors were 
interested in making quick returns and showed little interest in capital-intensive industries 
(Vogel 1989).  The emphasis on light industry continued through the 1990s, and 
accounted for more than 60% of its industrial output.  It was only in 2004 that heavy 
industry constituted more than 50% of the city’s industrial output.  In recent years, 
Guangzhou has been making great efforts to develop its three pillar industries, namely 
automobiles, petro-chemicals and electronics.  By 2010, 35% of Guangzhou’s industrial 
output was still in light industry, as compared with 22% in Shanghai.   
Low-Value Tertiary Services and Primary Sector 
 
Similar to Shanghai, Guangzhou’s economy shifted from the secondary to the 
tertiary sector.  However, Guangzhou began with a higher share of tertiary sector in its 
 147 
economy than Shanghai, 30% vs. 18%. Between 1978 and 1990, the secondary sector 
went from 58.5% to 43%, and the tertiary sector grew to 49% of its economy. By 2000, 
the tertiary sector made up 55% of the economy; and by 2009, 61% of the economy was 
concentrated in the tertiary sector. As a first mover in the reform period, Guangzhou 
moved to reorganize into the tertiary sector faster than Shanghai.  Even though 
Guangzhou moved into tertiary services earlier, tertiary services covers a wide range of 
services. Whereas Shanghai has emphasized tertiary services such as financial services 
and logistics, Guangzhou’s tertiary sector has more focused on retail and wholesale trade.  
In Guangzhou, transportation and telecommunications, catering, retail and wholesale 
trade as well as the social service sector are major sub-sectors of the city’s tertiary.  In 
2000, wholesale, retail, and catering made up more than 17% of tertiary employment, and 
financial services made up 1%.  In recent years, Guangzhou has also been developing its 
financial services, but it has a significant rival, Hong Kong, across its border. Thus, 
Guangzhou’s aspiration as a regional financial center is limited. To date, only 5% of 
Guangzhou’s tertiary labor force is engaged in financial services, as compared to 
Shanghai, which has 10%.  This later emphasis on higher skilled services may have 
contributed to the late adoption of migrant social insurance.   
Furthermore, Guangzhou’s leadership was also much more interested in earning a 
quick return on investment.  “Officials were instructed to listen to the market” (Thun 
2006, 157).  In 1992, Guangzhou Mayor, Li Ziliu, argued that profiteering was the way to 
economic development (Thun 2006, 158).  Thus, smuggling across the border to Hong 
Kong was another way to grow the local economy, as this provided the start up capital for 
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further development (Thun 2006, 161).  Hence, the government then held a myopic view 
on economic development. 
In addition to developing low value services, Guangzhou also has a bigger 
primary sector.  In 1990, Guangzhou’s primary sector made up around 8.1% of its 
economy, which was close to twice the size of Shanghai’s primary sector.  Moreover, 
Guangzhou has a higher agricultural population than Shanghai.  On the eve of market 
reforms, Guangzhou was less urbanized than Shanghai.  Guangzhou’s non-agricultural 
population made up 51% of its population.  Between 1980 and 2000, Guangzhou had 
approximately 10% more agricultural population than Shanghai.  While Guangzhou 
attracted huge number of migrants from the 1980s, the majority of these migrants were 
also part of its agricultural population (Li and Shang 2011).  This higher agricultural 
population also meant that the city was able to absorb most of this population into its 
industries in the reform period, meaning that there was less need for migrants from 
further afield.  Unlike migrants from other areas, these rural residents with Guangzhou 
hukou would be covered under Guangzhou’s new rural medical cooperative, and a 
separate migrant medical insurance would not be needed for them (Li and Shang 2011). 
 
Table 4.9 Percentage of Non-Agricultural Hukou Population 
Year Shanghai  Guangzhou 
1980 61% 51% 
1990 67% 58% 
2000 75% 63% 
2005 85% 89% 
2009 89% 90% 
Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook 2010 
 
The combination of light industry, high agricultural sector and low value tertiary 
service means that Guangzhou’s economy needed a different migrant profile than 
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Shanghai.  Light industry meant that lower skilled workers were needed for these 
factories.  Moreover, migrants were also absorbed into the agricultural sector, which 
again required less skilled workers.  Finally, low value tertiary services meant that less 
skilled workers were required. In all these scenarios, the migrant laborers needed were 
easily replaceable because they had no specialized skills.  
FDI and Relationship with Hong Kong  
 
Guangdong’s connection with overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao was 
vastly important to the central government’s decision to allow the province to experiment 
with early market reforms. In Guangzhou, a third of the families have overseas 
connections (Vogel 1989).  Guangdong has a special relationship with overseas Chinese 
because some 80% of the overseas Chinese originate from Guangdong province, and the 
estimated remittances from this community totaled around ¥745 million ($298 million) to 
Guangdong in 1979 (Vogel 1989).10 As such, the hope at the time was that these overseas 
Chinese would invest in China and bring in foreign currency much needed to purchase 
other resources abroad.  Additionally, Hong Kong investors could also bring in 
technology to expand Guangdong’s efforts in light industries.  In the era of economic 
reforms and opening to the external world, overseas Chinese investment (including that 
from Hong Kong and Macau) has been an important force promoting China’s economic 
development. Guangdong in particular has been a beneficiary of overseas Chinese 
investment.  By 2004, there were 80,000 foreign-invested enterprises in the province, and 
                                                
 
10 1979 Exchange Rate: $1 to Y2.5 
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capital from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Macao made up about three-quarters of 
them.11 
 Additionally, Hong Kong has been Guangdong’s gateway to the outside world 
throughout the Maoist and reform eras. Just as Guangdong was looking to Hong Kong as 
a way to gain access to technology, economic expertise, business connections and 
financial resources to develop the local economy, Hong Kong was looking at Guangdong 
for investment opportunities. Hong Kong businesses were looking to access cheap labor 
for their manufacturing needs and to access the Chinese market (Vogel 1989).  Moreover, 
just as China was trying to build good will for national reunification with Hong Kong in 
1997, Hong Kong in the 1980s was also trying to build relationships and prepare for this 
eventual reunification.  
   The fact that there are more Hong Kong investments in Guangzhou also implies a 
different relationship between workers and employers.  In my fieldwork, the sense among 
workers is that they would prefer to work for foreign firms because they are usually 
better compensated.  Among these foreign firms, migrants would rank Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan at the bottom (Zheng 2007).  They believe that Hong Kong and 
Taiwan employers are the most demanding and provide the worst working conditions.  
As an 18-year-old Guangxi girl working in a Taiwanese accessory factory in Guangzhou 
says, “I am not allowed to talk at work. I work twelve hours per day, and sleep in a room 
with seven other girls.  I get fifteen minutes for meals.  During the rush season, I don’t 
even get my allotted day off per month…I can’t leave because I would lose two months 
of salary because they only give you that at the end. I hear it’s better working at European 




and American firms.”  This conversation along other interviews from migrant workers 
and scholarly reports highlights the belief that working conditions at Hong Kong and 
Macao firms are worse than those at other foreign firms (Zheng 2007; Xie 2011). For the 
most part, the Guangzhou government is less likely to pursue a more onerous policy 
towards these firms because they can easily move to another location since firms in light 
industry require less capital investment.  
Guangzhou Demographics 
 
Additionally, Guangzhou may not need as many migrants as Shanghai. 
Guangzhou has a better demographic structure than Shanghai. In the 1990 population 
census, there were 6.3 million people residing in Guangzhou.  The age 0-14 made up 
23% of the population, which meant that Guangzhou had a crop of young people that 
would enter the workforce in the next decade.  At that time, Guangzhou had around 
487,000 migrant workers.  By the 2000 census, there were 9.9 million people residing in 
Guangzhou, of which 2.9 million were migrants, making up 30%, which far exceeded the 
percentage of migrants in Shanghai at that time, which was around 21% of its population. 
At the time, Guangzhou’s elderly, those 65 and older, made up 6.1% of the population, 
and the young, age 0-14 made up 16.4%.  It also had 77.5% of its population in the 
working age category.  In the 2000 census, Shanghai’s elderly population made up 
around 11.5% of its population, which implied that Guangzhou was aging more slowly 
than Shanghai.     
By 2010, those 65 and older made up 6.6% of the city’s population as compared 
to 10.1% in Shanghai.  Those aged 0-14 made up 11.5% in Guangzhou and 8.6% in 
Shanghai, which meant that even if both cities’ dependency ratios were similar, 23 for 
 152 
Shanghai and 22 for Guangzhou, Shanghai’s population was aging faster and there would 
not be enough young people coming of age to work in the coming years.  
 Moreover, unlike Shanghai, Guangzhou does not have a negative natural growth 
rate of its hukou population.  While Guangzhou has experienced a decrease in birth rate, 
it is still growing at approximately 4.3% annually.  As a result, Guangzhou does have a 
growing native work force. Thus, while Guangzhou does benefit from an influx of 
migrants in their labor force, the city is not in dire need of migrants to support its 
economic growth.  The brighter demographic picture suggests that Guangzhou does not 
need to do more attract migrants to sustain its economic development.  
Table 4.10 Changes in Hukou Population in Shanghai and Guangzhou 
 Shanghai Guangzhou 





Death Rate Natural 
Growth 
Rate 
1990 10.3% 6.7% 3.5% 15% 5.5% 9.5% 
2000 5.3% 7.2% -1.9% 10.3% 5.8% 4.5% 
2005 6.1% 7.5% -1.5% 8.9% 5.6% 3.2% 
2009 6.6% 7.6% -1.0% 9.7% 5.4% 4.3% 
Shanghai and Guangzhou Statistical Yearbook 2010 
Migration to Guangzhou 
  
Moreover, Shanghai migrants are also older.  While they are still in their 20s, 
Shanghai migrants are concentrated in the late 20s, with 79% of migrants above the age 
24 (Ruan 2009).  On the other hand, Guangzhou migrants are concentrated in their early 
20s with 40% of migrants under age 22 (Health Ministry 2004).  While Guangzhou is a 
city where younger migrants go as their first stop in a big city, Shanghai is the city where 
migrants want to go to when they have gained more experience.  Shanghai is the 
 153 
aspirational city that these migrants want to live.  Moreover, in a recent online Chinese 
survey (2012), Shanghai was voted the most favorable city by migrant workers.12  
Additionally, in a Chinese study, He and Wang (2007) find that Shanghai is 
attracting migrants through higher wages and Guangzhou through its industries, which 
signals that Guangzhou has more jobs to offer but lower wages and benefits.  Similarly, a 
2008 migrant study by Shenzhen Institute of Contemporary Observations found that Pearl 
River Delta enterprises (where Guangzhou is located) pay lower wages and migrant 
workers have longer workers there than in the Yangtze River Delta (where Shanghai is 
located) (National Population and Family Planning Commission 2011).  In the Pearl 
River delta, the 2008 city average monthly wage was ¥3320, but migrant workers got 
¥1090, which was 33% of the average local wage.  This is compared to the Yangtze River 
Delta city average monthly wage of ¥3189, with migrants receiving ¥1155, which was 
36% of the average local wage.  Not only did migrants in the Pearl River Delta earn a 
lower monthly base wage of ¥100 to ¥150, they also worked longer hours, which 
suggests that migrants in the Yangtze River Delta were faring better than their Pearl 
River Delta counterparts (National Population and Family Planning Commission 2011).  
 Since migrants are generally treated better in Shanghai, there is a general sense 
that Guangzhou is the first stop to a better life, but not the final destination.   More than 
half of the migrants that I interviewed (thirty-four) had worked in Guangzhou before 
moving to Shanghai.  They perceive Guangzhou as the first stop to gain some urban and 
work experience.  They then move to Shanghai because it’s the best city in China.  In an 
interview with a Chongqing girl working at a Shanghainese restaurant, this is what she 





said about moving to Shanghai.  “I was working as a secretary at furniture store in 
Guangzhou for 2 ½ years. I had a labor contract and had social insurance.  I left because I 
was bored. I came to Shanghai because I want to see Shanghai.  It’s the city.  Guangzhou 
is not the city.  Plus I want to open a restaurant in five years.  In Shanghai, there are many 
restaurants, so I figure I can learn a lot about the restaurant business here.”  Usually, the 
migrants that make it to Shanghai are better trained, more resourceful, and more resolute.  
In a survey by Shanghai Academy of Social Science (2005), they find that close to 6% of 
Shanghai’s migrants have at least a vocational degree as compared to 0.5% in Guangzhou 
(Ministry of Health 2003).  By self-selection, these migrants are the migrants that have 
made it.  Hence, the ones that come to Guangzhou are less skilled and younger.  Knowing 
this to be the profile of their migrants, the Guangzhou government may not want these 
migrants to stay in the city.  
Attitudes Towards Migrants 
 
In contrast to Shanghai, Guangzhou de-emphasizes migrants in its population and 
policy. Comparing statistical yearbooks from both cities, Shanghai has consistently 
maintained a section on migrants since 2003, whereas migrants are not mentioned in 
Guangzhou’s reports. Similarly, when comparing the 2000 and 2010 census reporting, 
Shanghai has a section on migrants.  Moreover, in the 2010 report, the increase in 
migrants is noted as a success of Shanghai’s economy and infrastructure projects because 
the city has been able to attract so many migrants.  Moreover, migrants are noted as the 
main contributors to Shanghai’s economic development, and they have greatly improved 
the demographic profile of the city (Shanghai Human Resources and Social Security 
Bureau 2011).   
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In contrast, migrants are completely left out of Guangzhou’s 2010 official census.  
Through a local media report, the government announced that the there has been an 
increase in the migrant population, from 2.9 to 4.7 million over the last decade, and that it 
now makes up 37% of Guangzhou’s population.13  While the city acknowledges that 
migrants are improving Guangzhou’s demographics because 92% of the migrants are 
between the ages of 15-64, it also sees this increase as a challenge to the city’s population 
management.   
While the city is trying to move away from viewing migrants as a management 
issue to viewing them as a service issue, population management is still the dominant 
perspective. In an unofficial meeting with Guangzhou’s public security officers, they 
mentioned that migrants are a big headache for them because they are hard to track down, 
draw on a lot of public resources and pose a security problem to the city as most crimes 
are still committed by migrants.  Moreover, they mentioned that Guangzhou could never 
expand public schools to migrant children because this will attract too many migrants.  
They were very surprised to learn that Shanghai has extended public school enrollment to 
migrant children and marveled at how that could be possible.    
In the latest migrant management policy, Guangzhou introduced resident permits 
in 2010.  The government tried to attract migrants to register voluntarily by offering gift 
baskets that included ¥50 ($7.7) transport subsidies during the Asian games in 2010.  An 
official with the Guangzhou Migrant Population Administration said the drive is a 
government effort to gain better knowledge of migrant conditions in the city (Li 2011).  
The residence permit is supposed to offer a series of welfare benefits such as education, 





free inoculation, disease prevention, employment guidance, job training, and legal and 
community services (Li 2011).  
 However, the new permit system is a way to tighten the city’s management of 
more than 4.5 million migrants.  The permit system comes with fines and increased 
barriers to gaining accommodations and jobs without such permits (Li 2011).  Those 
without permits are fined ¥50 ($7.7), and those providing false personal information can 
incur a fine of ¥500 ($77).  The registration of residence permits is free of charge, but 
starting from the seventh month after registration, people will need to pay two yuans 
every month for social services. Thus, this permit system provides the government with a 
way to monitor this population and raise revenue for the shortfall in local government 
budgets due to this population’s presence in the city.  
 Guangzhou’s government attitude on managing this population has consequences 
for social program expansions. Ultimately, Guangzhou does not want to attract more 
migrants with better social programs.  However, the government would like to better 
manage migrants by gathering more information on them.   In interviews with scholars at 
the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences and local research reports, Guangzhou views 
migrants as a troublesome population that it has to manage because they are usually low 
skilled, less educated, and largely transient (Su et al 2008).  As a result, this population is 
mostly ignored in official government documents and also low on the list of government 
priorities.  The government responds to this population when there is a social crisis such 
as a labor protest or bad press from tragic incidents such as the Guangzhou migrant 
student dying in police custody over a lack of permits.     
Weak Capacity to Collect Social Insurance Fees 
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Guangzhou’s private sector dominates its economy.  As the earliest city to offer 
preferential policies for international and overseas Chinese investors from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, Macao, and elsewhere, by 1991, joint ventures and foreign-owned businesses 
accounted for 23% of the total value of industrial goods and services produced in 
Guangzhou (Ikels, 1996).  By 2000, the private sector accounted for 51% of the industrial 
sector. By 2008, the private sector accounted for 68% of the industrial sector.  By 2000, 
the public sector only accounted for 66% of Guangzhou’s GDP (Statistical yearbook).14 
In contrast, Shanghai’s public sector accounted for 95.4% in 1990, and accounted for 
71% in the 2000 (Statistical yearbook).  In 2010, Shanghai’s public sector still accounted 
for 51% of the economy as compared to 47% in Guangzhou (Statistical yearbook). Thus, 
Guangzhou’s economy is more privatized than Shanghai’s.   
In a 2009 migrant survey, researchers found that domestic private enterprises 
accounted for the largest share of firms employing the surveyed rural migrant workers in 
Guangzhou (48.5%), followed by single proprietorships (18.4%) (Huang 2010).  These 
small firms make it harder to collect insurance fees.  In an interview with a social 
insurance official in Guangzhou, he says, “It’s hard for us to collect insurance fees. 
Compared to Shenzhen and Shanghai, which have big firms, we have to collect from 
thousands and thousands of small enterprises, and lots of small family businesses.  We 
cannot go and knock on every firm’s door and inspect them.  We don’t have enough 
people. Places like Shanghai have it easy, they can just go to the big firms.” 
Guangzhou’s private economy makes it more difficult for the government to 
enforce regulations and collect revenue.  In the state-owned sector, social insurance fees 
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are part of the operating budget for those firms.  However, in the private sector, the 
government has to convince firms to hand over social insurance fees.  As Frazier (2010) 
rightly notes, collecting all of the social insurance fees requires far greater authority and 
coercive abilities than many urban governments possess.  In terms of government 
capacity, Guangzhou has a weaker capacity than Shanghai (Thun 2006).  Moreover, to 
encourage investments, the Guangzhou government has a legacy of leaving more profits 
to private firms by giving them tax holidays. Firms can also negotiate with local 
authorities to pay a flat fee or pay social insurance fees for a subset of workers on their 
payroll rather than the 30-40% payroll tax (Frazier 2008).  Some private employers use 
this process to reward their best workers and also to enroll their family members into 
social insurance programs.  In an interview with a 19-year-old boy who lost three right 
fingers working at a glass cutting factory in Guangzhou, he says, “The boss knows that 
he’s supposed to contribute to accidental and medical insurance for his workers, but he 
doesn’t have to do it for all his workers.  He just enrolls his family and his favorite 
workers.  I wasn’t the lucky one.”  This boy lost his fingers within the first six months of 
working at this place.  After the first two weeks of treatment, his boss refused to pay for 
his medical treatments and disability claims.  It was only through a local migrant NGO 
that specializes in providing legal advice and services to injured migrants that he was able 
to continue his treatment and receive a small compensation for his injury.  
Furthermore, when labor officials inspect a factory, they are more concerned 
about child labor law adherence and work safety than social insurance fees compliance 
(Frazier 2010).  In a conversation with the human resource manager at a Guangzhou 
accessory plant, she mentions, “The labor inspection office rarely comes, maybe when 
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there’s a complaint.  But they are really looking for violations on under-age workers.  We 
have to provide proof that all workers are age 16 and over. On social insurance fees, they 
just want to see a number.”  In another conversation with a small Guangzhou business 
owner that runs a printing firm of about twenty people, he says, “We’re small fry, a 
shrimp. The government doesn’t care about us. They go after the big firms.  Plus, they 
care about underage workers, and we don’t have those workers here. Family doesn’t 
count.” Conversations with local scholars at Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences, 
Zhongshan University, and Hong Kong Polytechnical University also suggest a similar 
nonchalant attitude from labor inspectors toward social insurance fee collection.    
Given the difficulty of collecting social insurance fees, beginning in 2000, several 
southern and eastern provinces, most notably Guangdong and Jiangsu, empowered local 
tax agencies to collect social insurance contributions (Frazier 2010).  Prior to this time, 
social insurance agencies, formally employed under local department of Human 
Resources and Social Security, had collected social insurance fees from firms, generally 
with great difficulty.  Under the new arrangement, tax authorities collect and deposit 
social insurance contributions in special accounts with the local departments of finance. 
Even with this switch, the collection of social insurance fees is still not ideal because tax 
authorities do not have enough precise data on the number of employees and wage levels 
to collect social insurance fees.  Moreover, in an interview with a manager at Guangzhou 
accessory factory, she notes that labor inspectors merely review firms’ social insurance 
contributions to make sure that they are paying something and not to enforce mandatory 
enrollment of all eligible workers. 
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Guangzhou’s difficulty in collecting social insurance fees is a barrier to 
expanding social insurance programs because any expansion would be an unfunded 
mandate.  Expanding medical insurance to migrants could be met with pushbacks from 
employers because maintaining cheap migrant wages has been the main comparative 
advantage for these firms.  Hence these firms would do everything in their power to avoid 
paying social insurance fees.  As a result, it would not surprising that Guangzhou did not 
expand medical insurance to migrants until much later because it would be met with huge 
resistance from firms along with encountering an administrative nightmare in fee 
collection.  As a result, Guangzhou may be a slow mover because of the government’s 
weak ability to collect fees.  
Relationship with the Center 
 
Besides the difficulty in collecting social insurance fees, Guangzhou’s aspirations 
and self-image are also important to the city’s desire to expand its social programs.  This 
is influenced by Guangzhou’s place in the political system.  Unlike Shanghai, Guangzhou 
is not a provincial level city.  As mentioned earlier, it is the provincial capital of 
Guangdong province.  In the Chinese political system, the highest party and government 
officials are appointed by the next higher level; thus, top officials in Guangdong are 
appointed by Beijing. Guangzhou leaders are then appointed by Guangdong provincial 
leaders, and not by Beijing.  As a result, Guangzhou leaders need to follow the general 
policy of the province.  During the reform era, Guangdong provincial leaders had 
permission from Beijing to move forward with market reforms, and these leaders 
prevented Guangzhou from opening its markets while new cities in the province such as 
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Shenzhen and Zhuhai were given the mandate to grow by leaps and bounds (Vogel 
1989).  
Additionally, while Guangdong province and Guangzhou city are important to the 
central government due to their location as a strategic trading port and deep ties with 
international communities, they are considered the political periphery.  While these 
governments can leverage their economic weight to bargain with the central government 
for certain privileges, they are still beholden to the whims of central government policies.  
Moreover, it is important to note that market reform was started in Guangdong with the 
explicit intention that if the reform program failed, its location in the distant south would 
not infect the center or the economically important northeast corridor.  Hence, the lack of 
political importance attached to this region and the significance attributed to economic 
development mean that these local leaders are driven more by economic progress (Li 
1997).    
As such, Guangdong province went from a politically inconsequential province to 
a politically important province because of its dramatic economic growth in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  So to maintain its place in the political hierarchy, it is important for the local 
government to concentrate on economic growth and maintain fiscal freedom from the 
center.  During the fiscal contracting era of 1979-1994, the central government struck a 
bargain with Guangdong province that it would have freedom to pursue experimental 
reform policies without interference provided that it would not seek any resources from 
the central government. Furthermore, the central government also allowed Guangdong to 
retain all revenue above ¥1.2 billion, an amount that was fixed for five years (Vogel 
1989).  This freedom was extended to all sub-provincial units.  Similarly, Guangzhou 
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would have a fixed remittance amount to Guangdong, providing that Guangzhou would 
have the freedom to try different development policies.  As the slogan at the time was, “to 
the outside, more open; to the inside, looser; to those below, more freedom,” Guangzhou 
was allowed to experiment with all types of policies and fully exploit this fiscal 
advantage (Thun 2006).  The disadvantage was that the city could not look to the 
provincial government or central government for bailout.  The city was left to fend for 
itself.  As Thun (2006) notes in his auto-industry study, the Guangzhou and Guangdong 
governments wanted to do everything in their power to insure that the central government 
did not revoke the fiscal contracting arrangement that was the basis for their autonomy.  
In contrast, Shanghai was used to consulting with the central government on big 
economic decisions and received injections of resources to develop its economy.  
Moreover, the central government also kept closer tabs on Shanghai than Guangzhou 
because the central government believed that Guangzhou had its own money and it did 
what it would with it. Hence the relationship of the local governments to the center was 
much more autonomous than that of Shanghai-center relationship.   
However, this changed in 1994 when the central government introduced the tax 
sharing system.  Now, local governments are responsible for more than 80% of public 
services, including social welfare expenditures, but are able to only collect 45% of the 
revenue.   Similar to other cities, including Shanghai, the Guangzhou government started 
to run a budget deficit after the tax system changed from the fiscal contract system to a 
tax sharing system in 1994.  But Guangzhou is in a better fiscal situation than Shanghai. 
Between 1994 and 2010, Guangzhou was running an average deficit of 1.6% of GDP as 
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compared 2.2% in Shanghai. Moreover, Guangzhou actually had a budget surplus in 
2009 of ¥4.8 billion ($738 million).   
City’s Image and Aspirations 
 
This relationship with the center greatly influences Guangzhou’s image and 
aspiration.  During my visit to Guangzhou in the summer of 2010, I noticed that the 
Asian Games were going to take place there in November 2010, but having lived in 
Beijing and Shanghai for more than a year, I had heard no mention of this event.  Local 
researchers mentioned that Guangzhou was not allowed to promote this event at the 
national level because the central government did not want the Asian Games to compete 
with Shanghai’s World Expo in the same summer.  This incident allows a glimpse of the 
relationship between the central government and Shanghai and the central government 
and Guangzhou.  Since the center wants Shanghai to be China’s economic and financial 
center and wants to promote it to be an international city, Shanghai is given the room to 
expand, innovate, and promote itself as one.  
In contrast, Guangzhou is relegated to being a regional economic center. In the 
1990s, Guangzhou was to become the economic center in Southern China.  In the 2000s, 
Guangzhou was to be a modern metropolis with a “dragonhead” role in the Guangdong 
province, exerting influence in southern China and Southeast Asia (Xu and Yeh 2003; Li 
and Jian 2009). In neither vision was Guangzhou called upon to be the “dragonhead of 
economic reforms” or “the economic center of China” because these visions were given 
to Shanghai by the center. 
This difference in aspiration has had an important impact on Guangzhou’s desire 
to be an innovator in social policies, and especially medical insurance programs for 
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migrants. Given the province’s desire for fiscal freedom, it does not want to create an 
additional program for a population that it is not legally responsible for; furthermore, 
while the Guangzhou government could technically go to the upper levels of government 
for additional funding if these programs lose too much money, it would be difficult to do 
this for the migrant population.  Additionally, Guangzhou’s leadership wants to keep a 
low profile and not appear on the central government’s radar because it fears intervention 
from the center.  Moreover, according to local scholars, Guangzhou’s leadership does not 
have the same political aspirations as the Shanghai leaders (Li 1997; Xie and Sun 2009; 
Zhang 2007).  The next level for Guangzhou leaders to move up to is the provincial level.  
While the Shanghai leadership automatically gains membership into the Central 
Committee, Guangzhou leaders do not have the same status.  Moreover, the career 
prospect for most Guangzhou leaders is a promotion to the provincial level government, 
be it in Guangdong province or in another province. Since the provincial government has 
not been emphasizing migrant social insurance, the Guangzhou government sees little 
reason to innovate on social policies when economic growth is still the major factor in 
determining promotions.  Since Guangzhou does not have the aspiration of becoming an 
international, world-class city, it does not need to divert its energy into policies that do 
not bring about additional economic growth.    
Migrant Medical Insurance 
 
Given this combination of factors, Guangzhou did not have a medical insurance 
for migrants until 2009.  At the provincial level, Guangdong did have a policy document 
on expanding medical insurance to migrant workers with formal employment in 
manufacturing, construction and mining and services industries in 2006 (Wang 2008). 
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Guangzhou has been able to push back against this order by allowing employers to pay 
into the UEMI and Flexible Employee medical insurance for migrant workers. Between 
2006 and 2009, other priorities took its place.  In 2007, there were waves of labor protests 
pertaining to back wages.  Then there was the Labor Contract Law in 2008 that pushed 
for the formalization of the labor relations.  In late 2008, the financial crisis erupted; 
Guangzhou was hard hit because its industry was concentrated in the export sector, and 
the government gave a reprieve to firms on labor regulations.  Hence, throughout this 
whole period, the Guangzhou government had to respond to a string of crises, and 
migrant medical insurance was put on the back burner.  In an interview with an official 
working on the migrant insurance program at the Guangzhou Medical Insurance Bureau, 
he mentions that by 2009, most of these crises had subsided, and Guangzhou could no 
longer ignore the provincial and central government orders to draft and implement 
migrant medical insurance.  
Major Implications from these Two Cases 
 
In reviewing the timing and the types of medical insurance programs offered to 
migrants in Shanghai and Guangzhou, I argue that political economy factors are the  
drivers for the adoption of migrant medical insurance in Chinese cities.  The different 
economic make up in Shanghai and Guangzhou has created different needs for the types 
of migrant workers in these cities.  Thus, one city may be using social policy via medical 
insurance to attract additional highly skilled migrants, and the other city may not.  
Moreover, as these two governments have different fiscal capacities and have been 
experiencing different fiscal pressures, they may have chosen different social policies 
towards this population.   
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I argue that the economic structures and labor compositions of these two cities 
create different demands for the skill profiles of the desired migrants.  While most cities 
need migrants to fill low skilled positions in manufacturing and service sectors, some 
cities need higher skilled workers to fit their economic needs.  Shanghai may have 
instituted migrant medical insurance for two reasons; one is to attract highly skilled 
migrant workers, and the other is to raise additional revenue to fund existing fiscal 
commitments.  The types of industries and services in the local economy determine the 
labor demand in a locality. In Shanghai, the emphasis on heavy industry and financial 
services indicates that there is a greater demand for highly skilled workers.  In contrast, 
Guangzhou’s emphasis on light industry and retail signals a lesser demand for highly 
skilled workers.   
Contrary to common perception, not all migrants are poorly educated and work in 
low skilled occupations.  As mentioned earlier, approximately 15% of migrants are from 
other urban areas. These people are usually from small to medium-sized cities, have 
college educations, and are looking for better economic opportunities in large cities. 
Shanghai has benefited tremendously from highly skilled migration because close to 21% 
of its migrants have at least a high school education (Ruan 2009).  Young migrants, those 
age 30 and under, make up 51% of the total migrant population in China, and over 71% 
of them have at least a high school education (ACFTU Labor Relations Research Center 
2011).  Moreover, 17% of these young migrants have at least a junior college degree (大
专).  Thus, these highly skilled migrants can meet the labor demand in Shanghai and 
elsewhere in two ways.  One, these highly skilled migrants are employed directly by 
employers in heavy industries and financial services.  Two, migrant workers are filling 
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mid-level positions that native workers are vacating in pursuit of better, higher skilled 
positions.  
Although migrants are not concerned about medical insurance per se, they are 
concerned about their treatment by local governments.  While migrants are attracted to 
different cities due to a number reasons, higher wages and personal networks being some 
of them, they are also aware of the reputations of different cities. In my interviews with 
Shanghai migrants, there is a general consensus that the Shanghai government is “better” 
than other host governments.  One Jiangxi woman and her husband moved to Shanghai 
because her husband had a lot of problems claiming wages in Fujian province.  Though 
the wages in Shanghai may not be necessarily higher, she believes that the legal 
environment is better in Shanghai, so back wages are less of an issue in Shanghai.  
Moreover, in Chapter 3, we see that migrants with higher SES are more concerned about 
medical insurance.  Thus a city offering medical insurance to migrant workers could 
attract higher skilled workers to the locality.   In particular, cities with an emphasis on the 
high value tertiary sector and heavy industry would need highly skilled workers and 
thereby be more likely to adopt migrant medical insurance to attract those workers.  
I also argue that fiscal pressure and the need for additional revenue is a driver for 
medical insurance adoption.  Both Shanghai and Guangzhou have been running a fiscal 
deficit since 1994, but Guangzhou’s fiscal balance is less severe.  While Shanghai’s 
government deficit in 2010 was ¥42.9 billion, which was 2.5% of its GDP, Guangzhou 
was running a budget deficit of ¥10.5 billion, which was less than 1% of local GDP.  In 
terms of absolute amounts, Shanghai’s government deficit was close to four times that of 
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Guangzhou, which signals a higher demand to look for alternative revenue to fill the 
budget gap.   
 Moreover, Guangzhou’s demographic pyramid is better than Shanghai’s.  As 
mentioned earlier, the elderly, those 65 and older, make up only 6.6% of the city’s 
population as compared to 10.1% in Shanghai.  Fewer old people translate to less fiscal 
expenditure needed to take care of those people. Hence, Guangzhou may not be as 
pressured to raise alternative revenue as Shanghai.  Thus, cities that have higher budget 
deficits may be more pressured to raise additional funds, and thereby more likely to adopt 
migrant medical insurance.  
Given that many local governments are fiscally squeezed, one would expect all 
cities to be using migrant medical insurance fund to raise extra-budgetary revenue. 
Although the migrant population is a relatively low risk population that can bring in 
additional revenue, collecting insurance for this population may be difficult due to its 
transient nature.  Thus, the local government’s capacity to the collect these funds would 
be important, and it also hinges on the composition of the firms in the local economy.  In 
Shanghai, the government has a large role in the economy.  This may have a large impact 
on the city’s provision of social services.  On the one hand, a close relationship between 
the state and enterprises means the state has more capacity to implement new policies, 
such as extracting more contributions from firms. On the other hand, having larger firms 
also means that they have more clout with the government in avoiding these 
contributions.  As referenced in Frazier’s (2010) research on pensions, large SOEs could 
no longer use administrative rank to avoid paying social insurance fees because local 
governments were responsible for social stability and workers’ protests after the 1990s.  
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Moreover, although there was a clash between the Shanghai government and Baoshan 
Steel, a large SOE in the city, in 1999 and 2000, the government was able to force these 
managers to turn over two million yuans in annual pension contributions (Frazier 2010).  
Thus, depending on the local government, the presence of large firms may be better for 
government extraction because the government can better monitor and enforce rules 
because there are fewer companies from which to collect social insurance funds.  Having 
foreign firms that are non-Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Macao-invested firms is more 
conducive to contribution collection because these foreign firms are bound by their home 
countries to comply with local social insurance regulations (Frazier 2010).  While these 
factors are not the main factors driving the adoption of medical insurance for migrants, 
the presence of large firms and foreign firms may play a role in a city’s ability to 
implement such insurance, thereby affecting the willingness of the city to implement such 
policy.  
Additionally, Shanghai and Guangzhou have unique features that cannot be 
generalized to other cities.  For example, Shanghai is administratively both a province 
and a city. It has more discretionary political power and leeway in developing and 
implementing new policies than other cities. Moreover, Shanghai’s political leaders want 
to make a splash in creating headlines as the city’s leaders are usually promoted to the 
central government. In contrast, Guangzhou’s officials are usually promoted within the 
province, with the next stop being the provincial party offices. As a result, Guangzhou’s 
leaders need to toe the line within the Guangdong provincial leadership as appointments 
are made one level down. The differences in administrative rank between these two cities 
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CHAPTER 5  
 
MULTI-CITY DATA ANALYSIS 
 
The historical legacy of the command economy, the danwei system, and the 
hukou system has created a social welfare system based on employer contributions.  The 
political structure, characterized by bureaucratic negotiation between central and local 
governments, has created the space for large local variation in migrant social policy.  
More importantly, the political and fiscal incentives of local governments are driving the 
variations in the adoption of migrant social policy.  Local governments have incentives to 
develop and implement social policies that are tailored to their local economic 
environment.  In providing social welfare to migrant workers, local governments are able 
to attract the necessary workers for their local economy plus raise additional revenue to 
meet fiscal gaps.  
 In this chapter, hypotheses drawn from the Shanghai and Guangzhou cases are 
tested in a dataset of 285 prefecture level and provincial level cities in China. I first lay 
out my hypotheses. I then describe the data.  Next, I present the empirical analysis and 
results. I then check for robustness with different types of insurance plans. Finally, I 
examine the effects of policy diffusion, alternative explanations and conclude.  
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
To review, local governments are incentivized by the cadre evaluation system and 
the fiscal system to develop their local economy and meet all fiscal obligations.  As such, 
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I argue that cities are offering medical insurance to migrant workers for two reasons, to 
gain human capital and fiscal capital.  For human capital, I am referring to the demand 
for high skilled workers.  While most cities need migrant workers to fill low skilled 
positions in manufacturing and service sectors, some cities demand higher skilled 
workers to fit their economic needs.  With few restrictions on labor mobility, cities are 
competing for high skilled workers.  Besides giving migrant workers urban hukou 
registration, which is the best offer of social welfare benefits, local governments can also 
attract workers by offering ad hoc social insurance programs to migrants.  Even though 
the urban hukou is used by cities to attract high skilled workers, cities have strict quotas 
on how many people they will accept as urban hukou residents because the conversion of 
a migrant to an urban resident is costly.  Moreover, the hukou requirements bar most 
migrants from admittance, thus cities still need to put in place general social programs to 
attract high skilled migrant workers who do not qualify for hukou conversion.  
Additionally, since the mid-2000s, labor shortages have become more frequent in coastal 
areas, and factories could not find enough workers to meet their order deadlines.  Hence 
cities need to compete with each other to gain skilled workers through the adoption of 
medical insurance policy for migrants. 
As described in Chapter 4, high skilled workers are needed in both secondary and 
tertiary sectors.  While most cities would like to develop high value added sectors such as 
heavy industry and financial services, not all cities have the endowment and capacity to 
pursue this development strategy.  While both Shanghai and Guangzhou were industrial 
centers in the command economy, Shanghai was far more developed and had more 
central government investments given its political importance and economic history.  
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Thus, Shanghai was able to develop its heavy industry and financial sectors.  This 
economic composition meant that Shanghai needed high skilled workers that were in 
short supply in the city.  Similar to the argument offered by Wibbels and Ahlquist (2007), 
where countries will invest in social policies as a way to retain workers by insuring them 
against the risks of injury or sickness when there is a scarcity in labor, Chinese cities 
have also been using medical insurance programs to attract and retain high skilled 
workers. Thus I offer two hypotheses on labor demand and medical insurance adoption: 
H1: The likelihood of a city adopting medical insurance for migrants increases when 
there is a high proportion of high value added service sector in the economy. 
H2: The likelihood of a city adopting medical insurance for migrants increases when 
there is a high proportion of heavy industry in the economy. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, local governments cannot legally borrow to meet their 
budget shortfalls, thus revenues have to be generated elsewhere.  To gain promotions, 
local officials need to pursue development strategies that will grow their local economies.  
However, at the basic level, local officials also need to fulfill their obligations in 
governance, which include meeting existing fiscal commitments, such as paying benefits 
to current pensioners.  Unless they meet this basic requirement, they run the risk of 
removal from office because not meeting these fiscal commitments can spell social 
upheaval from important social groups, thus risking the party’s political legitimacy.  
Hence, in cash strapped local governments, local officials need to search for an 
alternative revenue source to meet these fiscal obligations, and thus medical insurance 
funds for migrant workers become an attractive option. 
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As described in Chapter 2, the 2010 national social insurance balance was ¥2.3 
trillion ($354 billion).  In many localities, social insurance revenues exceed local 
government tax revenues (Frazier 2010).  In terms of the medical insurance fund, the 
2010 national balance was ¥505 billion ($78 billion).  As for migrant medical insurance 
funds, as argued in Chapter 4, Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance fund had a revenue 
of ¥13 billion ($2 billion) in 2010, which was close to 5% of Shanghai’s budget revenue.  
Moreover, Shanghai has been running a budget deficit since 1994, averaging around 
2.2% of local GDP.  In 2010, Shanghai had a budget deficit of ¥43 billion ($6.6 billion). 
The comprehensive insurance fund can cover close to 30% of this gap.  
Thus, local governments can enrich their local coffers by setting up migrant 
medical insurance funds or expanding existing medical insurance funds to migrant 
workers.  Even though these funds are officially earmarked for social insurance purposes, 
misuse of these funds has been rampant in Chinese cities.  Based on personal interviews, 
using these funds for the general government budget is not uncommon.  Moreover, as 
witnessed by the Shanghai pension scandal in 2006 where ¥32.9 billion ($4.2 billion) was 
diverted to real estate and infrastructure projects, social insurance funds have been used 
as private war chests by local governments.  Similarly, in Guangzhou, an estimated ¥890 
million ($136 million) in social insurance funds had been diverted to illegal uses and 85% 
of this amount was invested real estate projects (Frazier 2010, 107).   As such, the use of 
social insurance funds by local governments for legal and illegal goals is not unusual.   
In the case of medical insurance funds for migrants, the fund payout rate is very 
low because migrants are young, healthy and mobile.  Thus, I hypothesize that cash 
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strapped local governments looking to raise additional revenue are more likely to have 
medical insurance programs for migrant workers. 
H3: The likelihood of a city adopting medical insurance for migrants increases when the 
city has a large fiscal deficit.   
Data  
 
The data used in this chapter includes all 285 Chinese prefecture-level and 
provincial level cities.  These cities include urban districts and rural counties.  Prefectural 
level and provincial cities are the appropriate unit to use in this study because medical 
insurance policies are made at the prefectural level and above.  While medical insurance 
accounts can be pooled at the county level, the policy is unified at the prefectural level.  
A county level city cannot deviate from the official policy set by a prefectural level city 
because a county level city is usually ranked below a prefectural level city.  A county 
level city also governs sub-districts and towns, which are non-urban areas.  In my 
research, I am concerned about urban governments’ inclusion of migrant workers in their 
medical insurance programs because the majority of migrant workers move to urban 
areas, and not to another rural area. 
Dependent Variable 
 
For my dependent variable on a city’s adoption of medical insurance program for 
migrant workers, I did a thorough search for policy documents, government press 
releases and announcements, media reports, and local researchers’ reports regarding the 
existence of a medical insurance program to include rural migrant workers (农民工) and 
outside workers (外来务工).  As described in Chapter 3, cities have expanded medical 
insurance to migrants through urban employee medical insurance (UEMI), flexible 
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employee medical insurance, migrant worker major illness insurance, and urban basic 
resident insurance (UBRI).  In some cities, employers are offered a choice between two 
or more of these insurance programs.  Technically, UEMI is supposed to cover “all 
workers” engaged in labor relations with any work unit, but migrant workers fall by the 
wayside because they are not “urban” workers but “peasant” workers, thereby not entitled 
to the same protection.  Recent labor regulations have tried to rectify this difference by 
giving migrant workers full “urban worker” status but this has not been adequate.  
Additional policy measures are needed to cover this population, either through 
amendments to the original policies on UEMI, flexible employee medical insurance, and 
UBRI or through migrant worker major illness insurance policies. These insurance 
schemes vary in their comprehensiveness (inpatient only vs. inpatient and outpatient), 
reimbursement rates, annual deductibles, benefit caps, and employer/employee 
contribution rates.   
Although cities do offer different insurance programs to migrants, I am interested 
in the adoption of any of these programs.  Thus, for my analysis, medical insurance is 
coded as a binary variable (1, 0) for every city, 1 for cities that offer any medical 
insurance programs to migrant workers, and 0 for cities that do not.     Examples of this 
search and coding process are: Shanghai has a policy document on migrant 
comprehensive insurance. This document, “The Measure on Shanghai’s Outside Workers 
Comprehensive Insurance 2002,” is coded in the dataset as 1 for Shanghai, with a starting 
year of 2002.  In contrast, most cities in Sichuan Province do not have policy documents 
readily available online or in Shanghai libraries.  However, a local researcher, Hu Wu, 
has written extensively about the types of medical insurance programs available to 
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migrant workers in those cities.  For those cities, this article is used to code the dependent 
variable on the adoption of medical insurance.  For other cities where there are no 
researcher reports and policy documents available, media reports are used to code the 
supply of medical insurance for migrant workers. Tianshui City, Gansu Province, is an 
example of this type of city.  For this city, an article was published in Tianshui Daily on 
August 30, 2006 regarding migrant workers and medical insurance. The details in this 
newspaper article are used to code this city.    
In cities where there are multiple policy documents, information from the most 
recent document is used to code the details of the policy but the date of adoption is based 
on the earliest policy document because I am most interested in when the city first 
adopted an insurance policy for migrant workers. For example, Shanghai had policy 
documents regarding its comprehensive insurance for migrants in 2002, 2004, and 2009.  
Shanghai is coded as 1 for policy adoption and 2002 for the date of the adoption.  
Cities with no policy documents, media reports, press releases or research reports 
available are coded as 0 for having no medical insurance for migrant workers.  There may 
be cases where some cities with medical insurance for migrants are coded 0 (having no 
insurance programs), but this exhaustive and expansive search should result in a very 
small number of cities in this category. A summary table of the dependent variable is 
presented below.  Of the 285 cities, 173 (61%) cities offer medical insurance programs to 
migrant workers.15   
Since my search and coding only deals with the existence of policy/programs to 
include migrant workers in medical insurance, this is not an assessment on the successful 
                                                
 
15 All sources used to code the dependent variable can be found in Appendix B.    
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implementation and enrollment of rural migrants in these programs. Whereas Shanghai 
publishes yearly statistics on rural migrants enrollment in their comprehensive insurance 
program, many governments do not publish nor mention these statistics in their 
government reports. However, I do not believe this is a big limitation in my data because 
I am interested in the supply of medical insurance programs to migrant workers.  The 
successful implementation of these programs is a separate issue, which I have not 
explored in the dissertation.  However, in future research, I may explore the link the 
between successful implementation of these programs and fiscal deficits.  Some cities 
have strengthened the government’s oversight over social insurance in order to collect 
more funds into these programs (Frazier 2010).  However, these funds are usually used to 
pay out to current urban retirees, while pay out to migrants remains low (Zhou and Gao 
2009; China Labor Bulletin 2012; Economist 2012). 
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Table 5.1 Medical Insurance by Province 
 Medical Insurance for Migrant Workers 
Province No (0) Yes (1) Total Percent (Yes) 
Anhui 12 2 14 14% 
Beijing 0 1 1 100% 
Chongqing 0 1 1 100% 
Fujian 2 7 9 78% 
Gansu 6 6 12 50% 
Guangdong 9 12 21 57% 
Guangxi 6 8 14 57% 
Guizhou 2 2 4 50% 
Hainan 0 2 2 100% 
Hebei 4 7 11 64% 
Heilongjiang 6 6 12 50% 
Henan 0 18 18 100% 
Hubei 6 6 12 50% 
Hunan 9 4 13 31% 
Inner Mongolia 4 5 9 56% 
Jiangsu 7 6 13 46% 
Jiangxi 4 7 11 64% 
Jilin 3 5 8 63% 
Liaoning 4 10 14 71% 
Ningxia 3 2 5 40% 
Qinghai 0 1 1 100% 
Shaanxi 2 8 10 80% 
Shandong 8 9 17 53% 
Shanghai 0 1 1 100% 
Shanxi 3 8 11 73% 
Sichuan 0 18 18 100% 
Tianjin 0 1 1 100% 
Tibet 1 0 1 0% 
Xinjiang 0 2 2 100% 
Yunnan 6 2 8 25% 
Zhejiang 5 6 11 55% 
Total 112 173 285 61% 
 
Independent Variables  
 
For my independent variables, I used government statistics from the China City 
Statistical Yearbook 2011 and the China Statistical Yearbook For Regional Economy 
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2011. The China City Statistical Yearbook provides city level data on population and 
employment, economic and social development, environment and basic facility.  The 
China Yearbook for Regional Economy also provides city level data on major socio-
economic statistical indicators, covering population and employment, domestic trade, 
foreign trade, tourism, finance, insurance, and education.  China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics publishes both yearbooks.  I accessed these two statistical yearbooks from 
Renmin University’s School of Economics online forum (bbs.pinggu.org).   
Overall, official Chinese statistics suffer from problems of missing data and the 
manipulation of data by the local governments that gather the data and then pass it up to 
the National Bureau of Statistics.  However, local statistics bureaus do have to follow 
guidelines and classifications set out by the National Bureau of Statistics. For my key 
explanatory variables, the Percent of High Skilled Service Labor, the Percent of 
Heavy Industry and Government Balance, these limitations do not majorly affect my 
results.   
Main Explanatory Variables 
 
To examine H1, the relationship between high value added service sector and a 
city’s likelihood to offer medical insurance to migrant workers, I constructed a variable, 
Percent of High Skilled Service Labor. Ideally, this variable will be based on the 
economic output of the tertiary sector, but a detailed breakdown of this sector is not 
available for most cities.   Thus, I created this variable using employment data from the 
China City Statistical Yearbook.  This variable is calculated as the sum of workers 
engaged in the banking and insurance, real estate, and scientific research and technical 
research sectors divided by the total workers engaged in the tertiary sector.  The variable 
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is presented in percentage points. The employment data is based on the number of 
registered urban employees. This number does not include part time, temporary, and 
informal (no labor contract) workers.  This data limitation should not have a major 
impact on my results because most high skilled service workers are employed full time in 
the formal sector.    
To examine H2, the relationship between heavy industry and a city’s likelihood to 
offer medical insurance to migrant workers, I created a variable, Percent of Heavy 
Industry, based on the proportion of heavy industry in the gross industrial output value 
of the local economy.  This variable is expressed in percentages.  Heavy industry 
includes, but is not limited to, mining, quarrying and logging, smelting and processing of 
metals, chemical materials, petroleum refining, machine building, and car manufacturing.  
Gross industrial output value is the total volume of industrial products sold or available 
for sale in value terms during a given period (1 year period of 2010).  It includes the 
value of finished products.   Though double counting across enterprises can occur, this 
limitation does not affect my results because cities would have to systematically double 
count for reasons that have to be correlated with the availability of migrant medical 
insurance.  
To examine H3, the relationship between a government’s fiscal balance and its 
likelihood to offer medical insurance to migrants, I created a Government Balance 
variable.  This variable measures the difference between government revenue and 
expenditure.  Some extrabudgetary funds, including social insurance fees, are included in 
the revenue measure, and social insurance payouts are included in the expenditure 
measure. This variable is presented in billions of yuans.  The Government Balance 
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variable is created as the difference between government revenue and expenditure.  This 
variable is presented in billions of yuans. Government revenue includes tax revenue, fees 
and surcharges, inter-government transfers, repayment from capital construction loans 
and social insurance funds.  Government expenditure includes, but is not limited to, 
operating expenses of the government departments, public security, education, cultural 
and media, pensions for the disabled, social assistance programs, public health, and social 
insurance payments.  Since governments are not allowed to borrow to meet their budget 
deficits, I would expect higher revenue and lower expenditure numbers because cities 
would be inclined to show a more balanced local budget to the central government.  All 
local governments would have the same incentive to report these numbers in the same 
way. However, despite this assumed trend, most governments are still running budget 
deficits, thus this data limitation has not affected my results but merely shifted the scaling 
of this variable. 
Control Variables 
 
To isolate the effects of my main explanatory variables, three groups of control 
variables are used, general, labor and firm composition, and globalization.  The first 
group accounts for regional fixed effects, government capacity and demographic features. 
There are seven control variables in this group.  Geographic location of a city is 
important because there are regional effects that we need to take into account.  To control 
for this effect, geographic grouping of provinces are used to construct fixed effect 
variables, East, North, Northeast, Northwest, South central, and Southwest.  East 
includes Anhui, Fujian, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Shandong, Zhejiang, and Shanghai. North 
includes Beijing, Hebei, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Tianjin.  Northeast includes 
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Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning.  Northwest includes Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, 
and Xinjiang. South Central includes Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Henan, Hubei, 
Hunan.  Southwest includes Chongqing, Guizhou, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Tibet.  In my 
analysis, Southwest is excluded due to its perfectly collinearity with the other five 
regional categories.  
Provincial Capital is a dummy variable for provincial capitals because these 
cities usually have more economic and political leverage than other cities within a 
province.  In the social welfare literature, there is an emphasis on the relationship 
between the level of urbanization and the expansion of social programs; hence 
urbanization is included in this analysis.  Urbanization is measured as the ratio of 
completed construction area in city districts to the total district area in a city.  Since we 
also expect wealthier city to be able to offer more social services, GDP per capita is 
included in the model.  It is the local GDP over the total permanent population, which 
includes the migrant population.  This variable is expressed in ten thousands of yuans.  
Unemployment Rate captures the registered urban unemployment rate.  The level of 
unemployment is important to migrant insurance adoption because a city will not want to 
attract outside workers if a large proportion of its residents are unemployed.  Percent of 
Migrant captures the proportion of migrants in a city.  The migrant population is 
calculated as the difference between total permanent population and total hukou 
population.  This migrant population is then divided over the total permanent population.  
Some cities are experiencing depopulation because there are more hukou residents living 
outside of their city.  In these cases, their migrant population is set to 0.  Government 
Social Security Expenditure is included to capture the effect of government capacity in 
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a city.  This variable includes personnel and management fees pertaining to social 
security programs, welfare payments and government subsidies to disadvantaged groups 
such as the disabled, destitute and laid off SOE workers.  Social security fund payouts are 
not included in this variable. The variable is expressed in billions of yuans. 
The second group of controls includes four variables measuring labor and firm 
composition.  In the Shanghai case study, labor and firm composition matters because 
they affect a local government’s ability to bargain and collect social insurance fees from 
firms. Percent of Collective Sector Labor captures the proportion of urban workers 
engaged in the collective sector.  Traditionally, the collective sector has employed 
migrant workers; hence this is a good proxy measure for migrant public sector 
employment.  Percent of Private Sector Labor is the proportion of urban workers 
engaged in the private sector, and many migrants work in the private sector.  Percent of 
Large Enterprises captures the proportion of industrial output that is created by large 
enterprises.  Percent of Foreign Enterprises captures the proportion of industrial output 
created by foreign enterprises that are not from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao.   
The third group of controls is for globalization.  In the welfare literature, 
globalization has been touted as having a large positive effect on social welfare programs.  
In China’s case, cities with higher level of export and foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
more likely to have and need large migrant population to fuel their economy, thus 
adopting medical insurance for this population will be appropriate.  Export is the total 
value of exports, expressed in units of $1 billion.  FDI is the total value of foreign direct 
investment, expressed in units of $1 billion.  All variables are summarized in Table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Medical Insurance Adoption 285 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Percent High Skilled Service 
Labor  
281 3.15 1.70 0.74 13.62 
Percent Heavy Industry 285 0.71 0.17 0.00 1.00 
Government Balance (¥1B) 285 -7.99 6.36 -64.80 7.49 
East 285 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
North 285 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Northeast 285 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 
Northwest 285 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Southcentral 285 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Provincial Capital 285 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Urbanization 284 9.04 11.14 0.13 95.31 
GDP per capita (¥10000) 285 3.29 2.12 0.55 13.81 
Unemployment Rate 283 3.37 0.75 1.00 5.70 
Government Social Security 
Expenditure (¥1B) 
285 2.25 3.09 0.16 36.26 
Percent Migrants  285 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.78 
Percent Collectives Sector 
Labor 
283 0.94 1.02 0.08 8.10 
Percent Private Sector Labor 283 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.49 
Percent Large Enterprises 285 0.26 0.23 0.00 0.92 
Percent Foreign Enterprises 285 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.84 
FDI ($1B) 271 0.66 1.51 0.00 11.12 




Since my dependent variable is a binary variable, I test my hypotheses using a 
logistic regression model.  Support for my high skilled labor demand argument comes 
from the Percent of High Skilled Service Labor and Percent of Heavy Industry 
variables, and support for my fiscal incentive argument comes from the Government 
Balance variable.  I first tested my key variables in a model without any control 
variables.  In this preliminary analysis, two key variables are statistically significant. As 
shown in Table 5.3, the coefficient on Percent of High Skilled Service Labor is positive 
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and highly significant, indicating that a city is more likely to adopt medical insurance for 
migrants when a greater proportion of tertiary labor is engaged in high skilled services.   
The Government Balance variable is negative and significant, which suggests that local 
governments with higher balances are less likely to adopt medical insurance for migrants. 
In this preliminary analysis, Percent of Heavy Industry, is not significant, but I have not 
controlled for factors such as regional fixed effects and labor and firm composition that 
could affect the adoption of medical insurance. Moreover, this preliminary model can 
only explain 7% of the variation in the local adoption of medical insurance for migrants.   
A fully specified model (Table 5.4) can explain 16% of the variation, and the three main 
explanatory variables are statistically significant with the expected relationships.  
Table 5.3 Adoption of Medical Insurance for Migrants (Main Variables Only) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Percent High Skilled Service Labor 0.42*** (0.11) 1.53*** 
Percent Heavy Industry 0.44 (0.74) 1.55 
Government Balance -0.05* (0.03) 0.95* 
Constant -1.50** (0.64) 0.22** 
    
N  281  
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  
Log Likelihood  -175.48  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As reported in fully specified model (Table 5.4), the coefficient on Percent of 
High Skilled Service Labor is again positive and highly significant at the 5% level.  
Based on this analysis, a 1% increase in the proportion of workers engaged in high skilled 
services is associated with a 37% increase in the odds of medical insurance adoption for 
migrants in that city.  Similarly, Percent of Heavy Industry is positive and significant, 
demonstrating that a city is more likely to adopt medical insurance for migrants when 
there is a greater proportion of heavy industry.  Substantively, for every 10% increase in 
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the proportion of heavy industry increases the odds of a city adopting migrant medical 
insurance by 52%.  Combined, these results confirm my argument that a city is likely to 
adopt migrant medical insurance programs as a result of a greater demand for high skilled 
workers.   As such, medical insurance programs are used as a strategy to attract high 
skilled migrant workers.  
 My results also show that fiscal incentives are at work here.  In the fully specified 
model, Government Balance has increased in significance.  As indicated by the negative 
coefficient on the Government Balance variable, cities with smaller government 
balances are more likely to expand medical insurance programs to migrants.  Moreover, 
for an one billion yuan increase in government balance, the odds that a given city will 
adopt medical insurance for migrants decrease by 13%.  In other words, governments 
with healthy fiscal budgets are less likely to adopt medical insurance programs for 
migrants, but those governments with larger deficits are expanding medical insurance to 
migrants.  Thus, this analysis strongly supports my argument that local governments are 
looking at migrant medical insurance funds as a way to raise revenue, which could be 
used to meet fiscal shortfalls or other purposes. 
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Table 5.4 Adoption of Medical Insurance for Migrants (Fully Specified Model) 
Variables Coefficient Standard Error Odds Ratio 
Percent High Skilled Service Labor 0.32** (0.16) 1.37** 
Percent Heavy Industry 1.65* (0.99) 5.20* 
Government Balance -0.14** (0.06) 0.87** 
 
Controls 
   
Provincial Capital 1.57 (0.97) 4.80 
Urbanization 0.05*** (0.02) 1.06*** 
GDP Per Capita 0.05 (0.11) 1.05 
Unemployment Rate -0.47** (0.23) 0.62** 
Government Social Security Expenditure -0.34 (0.22) 0.71 
Percent Migrant -3.95 (3.44) 0.02 
 
Labor and Firm Composition 
   
Percent Collective Sector Labor 0.25 (0.18) 1.28 
Percent Private Sector Labor -2.74 (3.42) 0.06 
Percent Large Enterprises -0.87 (0.84) 0.42 
Percent Foreign Enterprises 0.19 (1.82) 1.21 
 
Globalization 
   
FDI 0.25 (0.35) 1.28 
Export 0.06 (0.04) 1.06 
    
Constant 0.36 (1.16) 1.43 
    
N  269  
Pseudo R-squared  0.161  
Log Likelihood  -150.6  
Model includes regional fixed effects 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
My control variables behave largely as expected.  Regional fixed effects are 
significant in medical insurance adoption.  As expected, urbanization is highly significant 
and increases the likelihood of medical insurance adoption.   Moreover, since local 
governments would not want to upset local constituents by offering social programs to 
outsiders when there is high unemployment.  Thus, higher unemployment rate is 
correlated with a decreased likelihood that a city will offer medical insurance programs to 
migrants.   
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While variables on labor and firm composition and globalization largely exhibit 
the expected effects, they are not statistically significant.  Percent of collective labor, 
percent of foreign enterprises, FDI and export have positive coefficients, which indicate 
that there is an associated increase in the likelihood of medical insurance adoption with 
their presence.  However, the percent of large enterprises has a negative effect on medical 
insurance adoption.  While my Shanghai and Guangzhou case studies indicate that large 
firms can increase the likelihood of a city adopting medical insurance programs for 
migrants, testing this across other prefecture level cities, the effect is actually negative. A 
plausible explanation is that large firms can have more bargaining power with the local 
government and thus are more able to avoid social insurance contributions and prevent 
the adoption of migrant medical insurance programs.   
Contrary to the social welfare literature arguing that economic growth and 
resources are necessary to the development of social policies, this analysis shows that the 
economic resources of a city has little association with a city’s probability of offering 
medical insurance to migrants. Many scholars have argued that economic performance is 
crucial for social policy adoption because it affect the fiscal capacity of the state 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2008, Carnes and Mares 2009).  A richer city will offer migrant 
medical insurance because it has the fiscal capacity to do so.  However, my analysis 
indicates that GDP per capita is not significant in determining a city’s likelihood to adopt 
medical insurance for migrants.   
Although not shown here, similar analyses have been run with GDP and GDP 
growth yielding similar results.  Hence, although GDP has an overall importance to any 
city, it is not the driving factor in the adoption of medical insurance for migrants in a city.  
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Moreover, as illuminated by my case studies, both Shanghai and Guangzhou are rich 
cities with large GDP and high GDP per capita, but one is a leader and other is a laggard 
in migrant medical insurance adoption.  It is not to say that economic development and 
wealth are not important but that economic development is a result and not the cause of 
medical insurance adoption.  I argue that economic development is the goal of local 
leaders. To achieve higher level of economic growth, local governments need to reshape 
their labor force to fit local labor demand using medical insurance programs.   
Additionally, as presented in Chapter 3, while a minority of migrants, those with 
high skilled and/or high socio-economic status, are concerned about medical insurance 
and are attracted to cities with better social insurance benefits, the majority of migrant 
workers, especially low skilled workers, have limited demand for medical insurance.  In 
migrants’ list of concerns, medical insurance is not their primary concern.  Moreover, the 
combination of their youth, health and mobility make them more willing to forgo medical 
insurance for higher wages.  Thus, the power resource theory’s assertions that bottom up 
demands are necessary for social policies are not relevant in the Chinese migrant case. A 
further affirmation of this finding is made with this data analysis where the proportion of 
migrants in a city is not statistically significant.   
Different Types of Medical Insurance 
 
There are four types of medical insurance plans that a city can offer.  Currently, 
my dependent variable is set to 1 if a city offers any of them.  To check the robustness of 
my findings, I constructed two alternative dependent variables.  One is UEMI, where it is 
set to 1 if the city offers Urban Employee Medical Insurance (UEMI) to migrants. If 
UEMI is offered in combination with any other plans, it is still coded as 1. Two is Major 
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Illness where it is set to 1 if the city offers migrant major illness medical insurance.  If 
this plan is offered in combination with any other plans, it is still coded as 1.  
In the UEMI model (Table 5.5), the Percent of Heavy Industry and 
Government Balance variables are still statistically significant, and the Percent of High 
Skilled Service Labor variable is no longer significant.  However, the substantive effect 
of heavy industry is much larger, the coefficient has increased 96% from 1.65 to 3.23.   In 
this model, we find that the coefficient on the Percent of Collective Sector Labor 
variable is positive and significant, which indicates that a higher proportion of collective 
labor increases the probability of a city to adopt UEMI for migrants.   The coefficients on 
the Percent of Private Sector Labor and Percent of Large Enterprises variables are 
negative and significant, which signal that a higher proportion of private sector labor and 
a higher proportion of large enterprises are associated with a decrease likelihood of that 
city to adopt UEMI.   
The results are not unexpected because UEMI is the more inclusive and expensive 
medical insurance plan where both migrant workers and employers need to contribute to 
this fund.   A high proportion of heavy industrial firms are in the public sector.  In my 
fieldwork, these workers are more likely to have labor contracts and the associated social 
insurance programs.  As a result, to attract workers for this sector, the local government 
will need to expand the existing UEMI to migrants because these jobs are generally 
associated with better benefits.  Plus heavy industrial firms are typically capital intensive 
and have more difficulty relocating, so the government will have an easier time extracting 
larger contributions from this sector.  At the same time, because UEMI is more 
expensive, we will expect a bigger pushback from large enterprises and the private sector, 
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hence it is expected that these variables have negative effects on the likelihood of medical 
insurance adoption.  
It is also reasonable to expect that government balance will be important in the 
offering UEMI because these plans automatically pool the new contributions with the 
existing urban employee medical insurance funds. Thus, it will be very easy for a city 
government to use migrant contributions in the UEMI for other populations and for other 
funding purposes.  
In the Major Illness model, the coefficient on the Percent of High Skilled 
Service Labor variable is highly significant and positive, and the Percent of Heavy 
Industry and Government Balance variables are no longer significant.  Urbanization 
continues to exert a positive and significant effect on the adoption of medical insurance.  
Government social security expenditure is significant and negative, which suggests there 
are administrative costs to running this program that could decrease the likelihood of 
adopting such program.  
In contrast to UEMI, the Percent of High Skilled Service Labor variable is 
important in the offering of major illness insurance, a cheaper insurance package, because 
firms engaged in the tertiary sector are typically smaller firms and in the private sector.  
Since big capital investments are not necessary for these firms, they are more open to 
relocation; hence local governments are more inclined to offer a cheaper insurance to 
these companies.  Moreover, the highest skilled workers in any city will most likely be 
offered an urban hukou, thus the offering of a lesser medical insurance scheme will not 
detract the best workers from coming to that city.  
In sum, it is reasonable that the significance level of my key explanatory variables 
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fluctuates between these insurance types because my original dependent variable (any 
type) has more variation.  The alternative coding of the dependent variable reduces the 
variation in my dependent variable because each rendition places more observations into 
the 0 category.  For my original dependent variable in offering any type of insurance, the 
mean is 0.61.  With UEMI, the mean is reduced to 0.26. With major illness, the mean is 
0.44.  Given that I have a small dataset of 269 observations, it is important to note that 
my key variables are still significant with the expected directional effects, though 
fluctuating in significance level between these alternate models.  Overall, the story 
remains that the demand for high skilled workers and government revenue are important 
to the local adoption of medical insurance for migrant workers. 
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Table 5.5 Likelihood of Offering Different Types of Medical Insurance to Migrants 





Percent High Skilled Service Labor 0.11 0.34** 
 (0.14) (0.14) 
Percent Heavy Industry 3.23** 0.02 
 (1.33) (0.98) 
Government Balance -0.06* -0.02 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
Controls   
Provincial Capital 0.91 -0.19 
 (0.63) (0.62) 
Urbanization -0.00 0.03** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
GDP Per Capita 0.12 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.11) 
Unemployment Rate -0.34 -0.23 
 (0.22) (0.21) 
Government Social Security 
Expenditure 
-0.14 -0.23* 
 (0.11) (0.13) 
Percent Migrant -0.82 -3.71 
 (2.44) (2.71) 
Labor and Firm Composition   
Percent Collective Sector Labor 0.33** -0.05 
 (0.16) (0.18) 
Percent Private Sector Labor -7.19** 4.93 
 (3.30) (3.17) 
Percent Large Enterprises -2.70** 0.47 
 (1.16) (0.88) 
Percent Foreign Enterprises 2.51 -0.62 
 (1.96) (1.74) 
Globalization   
FDI 0.29 0.19 
 (0.22) (0.20) 
Export 0.01 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant -3.59** 0.47 
 (1.41) (1.08) 
   
N 269 269 
Pseudo R-squared 0.131 0.139 
Log Likelihood -136.6 -158.7 
Model includes regional fixed effects 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 195 
 
Alternative Hypothesis: Policy Diffusion  
 
Thus far, my analysis has only considered internal factors relevant to the city. 
However, the pressure for policy adoption can come from the outside, where policy 
innovation spreads from one government to another (Shipan and Volden 2008).  In 
Collier and Messick’s (1975) study of social welfare programs, they show that policy 
adoption can be influenced by actions of other governments.  In Weyland’s study (2005), 
he finds that pension privatization has spread through nine Latin American countries 
following Chile’s pension policy.  Researchers have identified four causal factors for this 
occurrence: coercion, competition, emulation, and learning (Simmons et al 2006).  In 
Shipan and Volden’s (2008) antismoking policy study, they discover that conditional on 
internal city characteristics, some diffusion mechanisms are more important than others.   
In my interviews with scholars and officials, Chinese cities do study and learn 
from policies adopted by nearby or important cities.  To test whether or not external 
factors play a role in the expansion of medical insurance to migrant workers, I focus on 
the learning and imitation diffusion mechanisms.  In the learning hypothesis, policy 
makers learn from experiences of other governments because given a problem, it is much 
easier to choose an alternative that has been tested and proven successful elsewhere than 
to create a new solution (Shipan and Volden 2008).  So when policy makers see that 
multiple governments have tried a policy, they are more likely to adopt such policy.   To 
see whether or not there is a learning process occurring between cities, I created a 
Learning Over Time by Population variable. This variable is calculated by identifying 
the cities that have adopted migrant medical insurance programs prior to 2006, summing 
up the populations of those cities, and dividing by the overall city population within the 
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province.   This variable allows us to look at the learning process as a horizontal diffusion 
process because in 2006, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security issued an 
order requiring local governments to expand medical insurance to migrant workers. Thus, 
policy adoptions post-2006 could be seen as a vertical diffusion process.    
Additionally, imitation can also happen between cities.  In the literature, larger, 
wealthier and more cosmopolitan cities are looked upon as leaders, and smaller 
communities may aspire to imitate these leaders (Shipan and Volden 2008).  In China, 
provincial capitals are considered the regional leaders because they are more developed 
and urbanized.  So to examine the imitation effect, I created an Imitation variable.  It is 
set to 1 if the provincial capital in their province has adopted medical insurance programs 
for migrants.   
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Table 5.6 Diffusion Effect on Migrant Medical Insurance Adoption 
  No Diffusion Imitation Learning 






Diffusion Learning Over Time By Population   2.50** 
    (1.21) 
 Imitation (Provincial Capital)  0.74  
   (0.63)  
Labor and Fiscal Percent High Skilled Service Labor 0.32** 0.30* 0.30* 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
 Percent Heavy Industry 1.65* 1.55 2.10** 
  (0.99) (0.99) (1.03) 
 Government Balance -0.14** -0.13** -0.14** 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Controls Provincial Capital 1.57 1.56 1.85* 
  (0.97) (0.98) (1.03) 
 Urbanization 0.05*** 0.05** 0.05** 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 GDP Per Capita 0.05 0.10 0.06 
  (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
 Unemployment Rate -0.47** -0.38 -0.35 
  (0.23) (0.25) (0.24) 
 Gov’t Social Security Expenditure -0.34 -0.28 -0.39 
  (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) 
 Percent Migrant -3.95 -3.79 -3.99 
  (3.44) (3.40) (3.46) 
Labor and Firm Percent Collective Sector Labor 0.25 0.24 0.32* 
Composition  (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) 
 Percent Private Sector Labor -2.74 -2.66 -3.24 
  (3.42) (3.42) (3.45) 
 Percent Large Enterprises -0.87 -1.01 -1.03 
  (0.84) (0.87) (0.88) 
 Percent Foreign Enterprises 0.19 -0.22 0.41 
  (1.82) (1.87) (1.87) 
Globalization FDI 0.25 0.21 0.32 
  (0.35) (0.36) (0.36) 
 Export 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 Constant 0.36 -0.71 -0.48 
  (1.16) (1.48) (1.23) 
     
 N 269 269 269 
 Pseudo R-squared 0.161 0.165 0.173 
 Log Likelihood -150.6 -149.9 -148.3 
Models include regional fixed effects 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
As shown in Table 5.6, Imitation does not have a significant effect on the 
adoption of medical insurance policy, and my main explanatory variables, the Percent of 
High Skilled Service Labor and Government Balance remain statistically significant. 
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But these results do support the hypothesis on diffusion through learning.  The positive 
and significant coefficient on Learning Over Time by Population indicates that the 
adoption of migrant medical insurance is more likely when a greater proportion of people 
in other cities within the province are covered by similar programs.  At the same time, my 
key explanatory variables, Percent of High Skilled Service Labor, Percent of Heavy 
Industry and Government Balance remain statistically significant.  Moreover, the 
coefficient on the Percent of Heavy Industry variable increases by 27%, from 1.65 to 
2.10, which indicates that there is a larger effect on the likelihood of a given city adopting 
migrant medical insurance with an one unit increase in the proportion of heavy industry.   
In sum, there is evidence that horizontal diffusion through learning is happening 
across Chinese cities in migrant medical insurance adoption.  This is not unexpected as 
Chinese policymakers do look at what the next city is doing to find solutions to their own 
problems. In my interviews with policymakers and scholars, when asked the question 
why they chose a particular medical insurance plan for adoption, in Guangzhou, they 
mentioned studying the medical insurance models in Shenzhen and Zhuhai because they 
were nearby and were early adopters of migrant medical insurance.  In Shanghai, 
researchers and policymakers mentioned studying the Singaporean insurance model prior 
to creating their own comprehensive insurance program for migrant workers.  Although 
there is support that external factors can effect policy adoption, internal characteristics of 
a city remain important in determining the adoption of migrant medical insurance.  
Moreover, the city’s need for high skilled workers and extra funding are still the key 
factors affecting the expansion of migrant medical insurance.  
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Additional Explanations for the Adoption of Medical Insurance for Migrants 
 
Besides the demand for migrant workers, two alternative explanations could also 
exist to explain the relationship between high skilled workers and the adoption of medical 
insurance for migrants:  demands from firms and the accidental consequence of the types 
of firms located in the region.   In the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Sockice 
2001, Mares 2003, Quadagno 1987, Estevez-Abe et al 1999, Swenson 1999, Thelen 
2001), firms that require specific skilled and high skilled workers have a big incentive to 
favor social protection because they want trained workers to remain at their firm for a 
long time.  Since firms in heavy industry and high value service sector require specific 
skilled and highly skilled workers, they are more likely to value low turnover and formal 
labor relations.  Thus, firms in these sectors may be pushing local governments to adopt 
medical insurance policy to attract and retain migrant workers in their locality.  Hence 
medical insurance policy is adopted because local governments want to attract high value 
firms that are demanding better social policy for migrant workers.  
 Another explanation for the relationship between high skilled workers and the 
adoption of medical insurance for migrants is one of accidental consequence.  Under 
Chinese labor law, formal labor relations is required between employer and employees 
through a written labor contract.  The labor contract requires the provision of social 
insurance.  As a result, the adoption of medical insurance exists because firms operating 
in the heavy industry and high value service sectors are more likely to have formal labor 
relations and thereby have provisions for social insurance.  So the causal mechanism is 
not a demand for migrants nor firms, but a phenomenon that exists through the 
compliance with the existing labor law.   
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 My explanation on the demand for high skilled migrant workers and these two 
additional explanations on the demand from firms and the accidental consequence are not 
mutually exclusive.  All three mechanisms could be at work at the same time.  In a 
locality, high skilled workers could be in short supply, so local governments would need 
to put in social policy to attract more workers.  Since high skilled workers are most likely 
to be employed by firms that value low turnover and formal labor relations, these firms 
could be lobbying the local government to provide social protection to attract and retain 
these workers.  Thus, to attract firms in high value sector, local governments are putting 
in social insurance programs for migrant workers.  Also, firms in heavy industry and high 
skilled service sector are more likely to provide social insurance because it is part of their 
legal compliance.  So, the relationship between high skilled workers and the adoption of 
medical insurance for migrants could potentially be a happy accident.  In my future 
research, I will delve more deeply into these two alternative explanations.  
Data Limitations 
 
Due to data limitations, an implication that is not tested in this analysis is the 
effect of the aging population on migrant medical insurance adoption. Cities are more 
likely to offer migrant medical insurance when it needs outside workers.  As described in 
Chapter 4, Shanghai needs outside workers because it has an aging native population and 
a declining birth rate.  If internal migration did not happen, Shanghai would not have had 
enough native workers to fuel its industries and grow its economy.  Thus, a city would 
need to attract outside workers if its native demographic structure signals an impending 
labor shortage.  Moreover, an aging native population also means that the city has a 
growing fiscal obligation because as this population ages, they will need more social 
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benefits from the state.  Thus, the age structure of the city would be a good additional 
measure on the demand for outside workers.   
Although not shown in this analysis, I have tested this implication using the 
natural growth rate of the hukou population as a proxy variable for outside labor demand.  
The variable is the ratio of natural increases in the local hukou population (number of 
births minus number of deaths during one year) to the average population for the same 
period.  But this variable is not statistically significant, and it also reduces the 
significance of my key variables. The reason for this may be that this is not a good 
measure because the relative number of births and deaths do not have any effect on the 
number of workers for a long time, at least not until those newborns enter the workforce 
16 years from now.    
Ideally, the number of retirees, the percentage of age 65 and older, and the 
percentage of working age population (age 16-64) would be good measures of the need 
for outside workers. Due to data limitations, I have not included these measures in this 
analysis. The 2010 census has these statistics available at the provincial level and for 
provincial level cities, but this data is not available for all prefecture level cities.  When 
this city level data becomes available in the future, this research will be augmented. 
Conclusion 
 
In Chapter 4, the Shanghai and Guangzhou cases suggest that having a big 
economy, high economic growth, a wealthy populace, and a large migrant population do 
not result in the adoption of medical insurance for migrant workers.  In testing this across 
other prefecture-level and provincial level cities, wealth and migrant population are not 
found to be significant in affecting the adoption of migrant insurance.  Instead, cities are 
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more likely to offer medical insurance to migrants as a response to local labor needs and 
fiscal incentives.  Hence, a high proportion of high skilled service labor and a high 
proportion of heavy industry are correlated with an increased likelihood of a city having 
medical insurance for migrants.  
Additionally, cities have a higher likelihood of adopting medical insurance for 
migrants when they are running budget deficits because medical insurance funds can be a 
way to meet their fiscal shortfalls.  Medical insurance funds for migrant workers are cash 
generating programs for local governments because very few migrants access these funds 
because most migrants are young and healthy.  Moreover, if migrants are injured at the 
worksite, occupational injury insurance, another insurance fund, will pay the claims.  
Thus cities with high budget deficits are more likely to offer medical insurance to migrant 
workers.  
In checking for external factors affecting the adoption of medical insurance, I do 
find some evidence that learning is happening across cities, which is not surprising given 
that these cities do not make decision entirely independently of each other.  Cities in a 
province with more people with migrant insurance programs are more likely to offer an 
insurance plan.  At the same time, my key argument on labor demand and fiscal needs 
remain important in this analysis.  Thus, while policy diffusion does exist, internal 
characteristics of the city are still the main drivers of medical insurance expansion.  
In sum, while this investigation does not rule out the possibility that the demands 
from firm and the need for legal compliance from high value firms are at work in 
determining the adoption of medical insurance for migrant workers, my analysis has 
shown that local governments have been using social policy as a development strategy to 
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attract the necessary workers for local economic development and raise extra revenue. 
Empirically, both mechanisms are at work here because local leaders are incentivized to 
grow the local economy through reshaping their labor force and to look for alternative 
ways to meet fiscal commitments.  
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This dissertation examines the adoption of medical insurance for migrant workers 
in Chinese cities.  Given that migrants are generally considered a politically 
inconsequential group to urban governments, what accounts for the expansion of medical 
insurance to this group in some localities and not others?  Using an inductive approach to 
derive theory from case studies in Shanghai and Guangzhou, I argue that policy legacies 
matter a great deal because past policies of the command economy, the danwei system 
and hukou system, have created a social welfare system based on employer contributions 
where there are only two options for expanding social welfare to migrant workers, hukou 
conversion and ad hoc social program expansion.  Moreover, the political structure, 
characterized by bureaucratic negotiation between central and local governments, has 
created a space for variation in local policy and promoted competition between local 
governments.  More importantly, I argue that the cadre evaluation system and the fiscal 
system have created political and fiscal incentives that motivated the expansion of 
medical insurance to migrants as a development and revenue raising strategy.    
More specifically, I argue that Shanghai and Guangzhou have taken different 
paths to provide medical insurance to migrants as a result of labor competition and fiscal 
generation.  For Shanghai, the emphasis on heavy industry and financial services has 
created a need for high skilled workers, which is in short supply in Shanghai. This labor 
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demand has generated a need to attract outside workers.  Moreover, given its growing 
yearly budget deficit, partly driven by a rapidly aging population, an alternative revenue 
source, through social insurance funds, is required.  Under this environment, medical 
insurance for migrants may be both a strategy used to attract high skilled workers and a 
way to generate additional revenue to plug the fiscal gap because migrants are considered 
a relatively low risk, low cost population (young, healthy and mobile) to include in the 
insurance pool.  And, Shanghai had implemented a comprehensive insurance for migrants 
that encompassed pension, medical and occupational injury insurance since 2002.  In 
contrast, Guangzhou’s economy has focused on light industry and retail services, which 
requires low skilled workers.  For the most part, migrant workers are generally low 
skilled, thus there has been a lesser need to attract this type of workers (however, this is 
changing in Guangzhou as labor shortages among low skilled workers is appearing given 
the rapid development of inland cities).  Finally, though Guangzhou is also running a 
budget deficit, it is less severe in absolute amount and in terms of proportion of local 
GDP, thereby signaling less pressure to raise additional funds.  Also, Guangzhou did not 
adopt medical insurance for migrants until 2009, three years after the 2006 central 
government order on migrant medical insurance.  
These findings were tested in a dataset on migrant medical insurance adoption 
between 1997 and 2010 across 285 prefectural-level and provincial level cities.  My 
results show that cities are more likely to adopt migrant medical insurance as a response 
to local labor needs and fiscal incentives.  A higher proportion of high skilled service 
labor and a higher proportion of heavy industry are correlated with an increased 
likelihood of a city having medical insurance for migrants.  Additionally, cities have a 
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higher likelihood of adopting medical insurance for migrants when they are running 
budget deficits. 
Overall, my findings suggest that economic wealth and migrant demands are not 
driving the adoption of migrant medical insurance in Chinese cities.  As the Shanghai and 
Guangzhou cases illuminate, having a big economy, high economic growth, a wealthy 
populace, and a large migrant population do not necessarily result in the adoption of 
medical insurance for migrant workers.  In testing this across other prefecture-level and 
provincial level cities, wealth and a large migrant population are not found to be 
significant in effecting the adoption of migrant insurance. Instead, cities are more likely 
to offer medical insurance to migrants as a response to local labor needs and fiscal 
incentives.  Thus, migrant social programs are really about the state building and not 
about the migrants.    
Contributions to Existing Literature 
 
My research expands our current understanding of welfare state development in 
developing and authoritarian states.  While we understand a great deal about the causes 
and effects of social policies in developed countries, that are also most often, 
democracies, our knowledge of social policies in developing countries, and more 
specifically authoritarian countries, is limited (Skocpol 1992; Skocpol and Ikenberry 
1983; Pierson 1994; Wilensky 1975; Al et al 1996; Collier & Messick 1975; Flora and 
Alber 1981; Immergut 1992; Derthick 1979; Esping-Andersen 1990).  While there are 
plenty of evidence that democracies is highly associated with increased social spending 
(Przeworski et al 2000; Lake & Baum 20001; Avelino et al 2005; Haggard & Kaufman 
2008) due to the need to cater to a broader electoral base in democracies, there is a 
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historical oddity that Esping-Andersen (1990, 15) notes, “the first major welfare states 
initiatives occurred prior to democracy.” In Europe, non-democratic regimes, namely 
Bismarck in Germany and von Taaffe in Austria, were the ones that pioneered social 
insurance legislations (Carnes & Mares 2009).  Moreover, in studying the origins of 
social programs in developing countries, researchers find that a large number of social 
insurance programs were initially adopted under non-democratic governments, with twice 
as many social insurance programs adopted by authoritarian regimes than democratic 
regimes (Carnes & Mares 2009).  This is particularly important because only 12% of the 
world’s population lives in full democracies, and over 36% of the world’s population 
lives under authoritarian rule (Economist Intelligence Unit 2010).  Moreover, 82% of the 
world’s population lives in developing countries. Thus, by understanding the variation 
and factors leading to social insurance provision in China, I am expanding our knowledge 
in a relatively undeveloped area of research.  Moreover, this dissertation adds to our 
understanding of how social welfare is being delivered to a fifth of the world’s population 
in a rapidly developing economy under an authoritarian political system.  
Since much of our understanding on welfare state is based on democratic regimes, 
the most important proponent for the development of social programs is heralded as 
societal pressures (Korpi 1983; Esping Andersen 1990; Stephens 1979; Therborn 1984; 
Garrett 1998).  But in authoritarian regimes, citizens lack the right to vote and cannot 
press their interests with the state easily.  Hence societal pressure is limited.  Moreover, 
in contrast to other East Asian and Eastern European countries where democratization 
was touted as the factor driving the expansion of social programs (Peng and Wong 2010; 
Calder 1986) , democratization has yet to take place in China.  In my investigation, I find 
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that demands from social groups have not been necessary for the development of social 
programs in authoritarian regimes.  Rather, it is the political logic of the state that is more 
important.  Political and fiscal incentives of local leaders drive the adoption of medical 
insurance programs for migrant workers. While social pressures are important because 
local governments are concerned about social instability, demands from the targeted 
group are not necessary. In the case of Chinese migrants, local governments may be using 
funds designated for this population to buy off another, more important, segment of the 
population.  The state may be providing medical insurance for migrants as a way to raise 
money for the general social insurance funds.  This money can be used for current 
pensioners and for other purposes. In China, social policy is expanding to outside groups 
without political liberalization and with limited social pressure. 
When we look at the literature on authoritarian governments, cooptation through 
social policies and programs is offered as main explanation for the expansion of social 
welfare states because autocratic leaders face threat to political survival (Wintrobe 2000; 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix 2003; Olson 1993; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003; Svolik 2012).  But this explanation is too simplistic 
because the state is assumed to be an unitary actor fighting over political challenges from 
the masses and within the ruling elite.  Though Svolik (2012) places the infighting among 
ruling elites as the most dangerous threat to an autocratic leader’s political survival, he 
still perceives the ruling elite as a unitary unit.  Similarly, the selectorate theory treats the 
winning coalition as an unitary actor with a single preference.  In exploring the expansion 
of medical insurance for migrants, we see that the authoritarian government is not an 
single actor, but a collection of actors with competing agendas and incentives within the 
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system.  So social policy can arise for a number of reasons that are not the direct 
outgrowth of cooptation.  But rather, social policy concession could be a compromise 
between the central government and local governments over political control or a 
development and fiscal strategy pursued by local governments (as postulated in this 
dissertation).    
Besides expanding our understanding of the authoritarian state as a collective 
rather than an individual, my research also informs our view on the discussion of public 
goods versus private goods.   In the selectorate theory (Bueno de Mesequita et al 2003), 
the authors argue that public goods are used to coopt the masses and the private goods are 
used to coopt the ruling elite.  In this case, public goods and private goods are clearly 
divided and separated.  However, in authoritarian regimes, public goods can be private 
goods.  In China, social insurance, commonly viewed as a public good, can also be a 
private good because this is considered extrabudgetary revenue that can be accrued to 
public officials within the system.  Extrabudgetary funds can be diverted into 
infrastructure projects, can be used as collaterals for bank loans, and can also be used to 
fill the pockets of officials (Frazier 2010; Jia and Zhao 2008; Oi & Zhao 2007). While it 
is unclear that migrant medical insurance fund has been used as a private good, other 
social insurance funds in Shanghai and elsewhere have been used a private good.  So it is 
reasonable to assume that this fund can be used in the same way, especially since 
migrants is a population that has the least political leverage in any city.  Thus, the 
development of medical insurance for migrants can simultaneously be a public good, 
where the fund is used on migrant workers and/or another social group, and a private 
good for corrupt purposes.  
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Furthermore, my analysis of the local variation in policy expansion in China 
allows us to better understand the linkages between economic development and social 
policy (Wilensky 1975; Flora & Alber 1981; Cameron 1978; Katzenstein 1985; Collier & 
Messick 1975; Adsera & Boix 2002; Haggard & Kaufman 2008).  In my case studies, I 
find that two Chinese cities that had similar levels of economic growth and development 
differed in their provision of medical insurance to migrants. Thus, I hypothesize that 
economic factors alone do not explain the development of social welfare programs in 
China.  Instead of economic growth being the driver of social programs, I argue that 
social programs may be used as a means to accelerate economic development.  Chinese 
local governments may be using social policies, as a way to attract much needed skilled 
labor to develop their local economies because government officials are evaluated on 
their ability to generate economic growth.  Moreover, fiscal deficit, not fiscal surplus, 
could be a key factor in social policy extension because overstretched local governments 
could use migrant insurance funds as extrabudgetary revenue to meet current fiscal 
commitments. 
Finally, many quantitative studies in the welfare literature have been conducted. 
These studies are flawed because they undertake cross-country comparisons but do not 
sufficiently control for differences between systems (Castles 1993; Flora and Alber 1981; 
Couglin 1979; Jackman 1975; Collier and Messick 1975; Hewitt 1977; Myles 1984; 
Cutright 1965; Wilensky 1975; Schneider 1982; Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Mares 
2003; Weyland 2005).  It is necessary to control for the diversity in political, economic, 
and social structures between countries, but large measurement problems prevent these 
studies from doing so.  Since there is significant variation in urban migrant medical 
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insurance adoption within China, this project can study the factors that drive social policy 
expansion, while keeping these structures constant because the cities under examination 
operate under the same political, economic and social system.    
Limitations and Future Research 
 
New Social Insurance Law 
 
 Due to time and resource constraints, my dissertation only covers medical 
insurance policy adoption to the end of 2010.  In this section, I briefly review the Social 
Insurance Law as it pertains to medical insurance, pensions, and migrants.  I also outline 
Shanghai and Guangzhou’s response to this law, and theorize the general adoption of this 
law across Chinese cities.  
In October 2010, China adopted the Social Insurance Law, which came into effect 
in July 2011. The new law specifies five social insurance, pension, medical, occupational 
injury, maternity, as a common right for all citizens (including migrants).  More 
importantly, this law clarifies that these insurance funds can be transferred between 
localities.  In the past, if an employee changed his work location, the person generally 
could not transfer his social insurance accounts to the new location. Under the law, the 
individual portion of pension and medical insurance contributions can be transferred 
between different locations if he moves from one location to another. Additionally, 12% 
of employer pension contributions can be transferred to the new location.  The employer 
portion of medical insurance does not transfer.  Furthermore, the social insurance 
contributions years, which determine entitlement benefits, will accumulate despite the 
change in the individual’s work location. The worker also has the option to transfer his 
urban retirement account into the rural retirement system. The medical insurance operates 
 212 
in a similar manner, allowing for the transfer of a worker’s individual account between 
different urban areas as well as transfers into the rural medical scheme.  Additionally, the 
law also requires social insurance and public health agencies to establish a medical 
expense settlement system.  In this new system, an individual no longer has to pay for 
medical costs upfront and request for reimbursement later.  This allows people to enjoy 
basic medical insurance coverage across localities.  
Despite these provisions, the law still functions mainly as broad principles 
because most of the implementation details are left to provincial and local governments.  
While the law requires the inclusion of migrants in these social insurance schemes, the 
law makes no specification on how migrants are to be covered in these insurance plans. 
To implement this new law, local governments need to reform their current social 
insurance schemes to fully incorporate migrants into their system.  Not surprisingly, the 
pace at which Shanghai and Guangzhou have moved to implement this law differs, with 
Shanghai again being the leader.  To date, no specific plans have been adopted in 
Guangzhou to incorporate migrants into their social insurance plans. 
In Shanghai, detailed plans were drawn to implement this social insurance law. 
By June 2011, several notices were issued with procedures to merge the comprehensive 
insurance into urban employee medical insurance over a five-year transitional period.  By 
April 2015, all migrant workers will be fully incorporated into Shanghai’s social 
insurance system.  
Table 6.1 Adjustments to Comprehensive Insurance 
Year Contribution 
Base 
Pension  Medical  Occupational 
Injury 
  Employer Individual Employer Individual Employer 
July 2011-March 
2012 
40% 22% 8% 6% 1% 0.5% 
April 2012 – March 45% 
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2013 
April 2013 – March 
2014 
50% 
April 2014 – March 
2015 
55% 
April 2015 onward Same as UEMI  
 
With the new social insurance law, I am expecting more uniformity in the 
structure of insurance schemes, but the adoption rate will vary because the fundamental 
structure of the political and fiscal system has not changed. The law is an additional 
responsibility given to local governments. I expect to see push back from different 
governments depending on other incentives.  Overall, I expect my theory on labor 
demand and fiscal balance to still hold despite the passage of this new law because the 
economic incentives in this system remain the same.  Despite recent reforms to the cadre 
evaluation to emphasize balanced growth (Wang 2011, Cai 2012), officials are still 
evaluated by a system that places economic development before social welfare. Thus, 
local government will continue to use medical insurance for development as they see fit, 
though we may see more cities adopting insurance for migrants as a result of coercion 
through vertical diffusion (Shipan and Volden 2008).  Moreover, local budget deficits 
and debt are growing rapidly, which will further increase the importance of 
extrabudgetary funds.   
Moreover, the law still holds local government responsible for setting up, 
managing and delivering social welfare. Although 42 out of the 98 clauses in the law are 
related to methods of collection and management of these funds, an outside audit has not 
been set up to monitor these funds.  Moreover, the punitive damage for organizations or 
individual making fraudulent claims is restricted to 200-500% of the amount of the claim.  
Thus, as long as it is in the interest of local governments to misuse these funds, they will 
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continue to do so.  Despite some improved management and oversight since the Shanghai 
pension scandal in 2006, the National Audit Office in 2012 discovered that local 
governments had misused ¥1.7 billion ($272 billion) in social insurance funds (China 
Labor Bulletin 2012).  The office revealed that local governments had spent ¥595 million 
($95 million) on government operating fees, ¥114 million ($18 million) to balance 
official books, and ¥294 million ($47 million) to build training centers and stadiums.  In 
addition, ¥86 million ($14 million) was used to build offices, and ¥30 million ($5 
million) was used to purchase cars (China Labor Bulletin 2012). Nearly a third of the 
money was used for unauthorized financial investments (China Labor Bulletin 2012).  In 
sum, these insurance funds have been used as discretionary slush funds for local 
governments.  
With the social insurance law, we may see more hukou reforms.  Under this law, 
health insurance funds do not transfer.   More linkages are established between hospital 
systems and social insurance bureaus so that a worker can receive medical treatment in 
another locality, but these funds are still held by the respective local government.  
Pensions are another story. Prior to the law, when a worker leaves, only his contribution 
follows him, the employer contribution component, which is the majority of the 
premium, stays at the original local government. With this new law, 12% of employer 
contributions get transferred to the new locality.  Currently, some provinces (Guangdong 
and Fujian) are reforming their hukou policy to make it easier for migrants within the 
province to convert to urban hukou, thereby slowing the outflow of migrants (and pension 




 One limitation of this dissertation is that it only covers medical insurance.  Similar 
to other countries, China’s pension funds account for the largest portion of the social 
insurance funds.  In 2010, pension revenue constituted 70% of the social insurance funds.  
To date, the government had spent ¥1.05 trillion ($168 billion) in pension payout to 63 
million retirees (MHRSS 2011).  The national coverage rate for rural and urban pension 
schemes was 55% in 2011 (Economist 2012).  The pension program has rapidly 
expanded to cover migrant workers.  In 2010, 32 million migrants were covered under the 
different urban pension schemes, which was about 15% of the migrant population 
(MHRSS and Economist 2012). 
For local governments, the expansion of pension funds to migrants is about 
revenue generation.  In Frazier’s study (2010), he finds that local governments have been 
establishing and enlarging urban pension schemes to raise extrabudgetary revenue.  
Pension funds, more than other funds, are susceptible to diversion to more pressing 
needs, especially towards today’s pensioners, which include workers who were made to 
retire in their 40s from SOEs in the 1990s (Selden and You 1997).  As reported by the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, individual pension accounts are only worth ¥270 
billion ($43 billion) even though over ¥2.5 trillion ($400 billion) has been paid into them 
(Economist 2012).  Since employer contributions for migrants are pooled into the general 
account, this money can be easily used by the government towards paying off today’s 
pensioners or future pensioners in the city, and not necessarily migrants.  
Moreover, an increasing number of retirees will also drive the expansion of 
pension insurance to migrants. As the population in a city ages, the local government will 
be under additional fiscal pressure to provide social benefits.  Since the current Chinese 
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system has been made into a pay as you go system because the government has diverted 
the current funds to other usage, the city will want to expand the pension fund to cover 
migrants because they are young and mobile.  Migrants’ youth means that local 
governments will not need to pay benefits to this population for several decades.  
Migrants’ mobility means that the original city may not be responsible for this 
population’s retirement.  Despite the New Social Insurance Law, 85% of employer 
contributions still remain with the original local government when the worker moves.  As 
a result, local governments still have a huge incentive to expand pension coverage to 
migrant workers.   
At the same time, I do not expect the demand for skilled labor to drive the 
adoption of pension insurance.  Migrants are resistant towards pension insurance 
programs.  Given their youth, migrants are less concerned about retirement, and they do 
not trust local governments with this fund.  We see this sentiment in the wave of “tui 
bao,” where large number of migrants reclaims their pension contributions from local 
governments in the mid-2000s.  As a result, local governments will have a hard time 
attracting migrants through pension insurance programs.   
Data Limitations   
 
 Due to data limitations, the effect of the aging population on migrant medical 
insurance adoption in Chinese cities is not included in this study. In Shanghai, the 
implications from an aging population have played an important role in the development 
of the city’s social insurance programs.  An aging population entails a contraction in the 
working age population, which affects the supply of native workers and the demand for 
outside workers.  An aging population also increases the budgetary pressure of local 
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governments because these people will need additional social benefits in the future.  
Ideally, I would like to include the age structure of these cities in this study.  The 2010 
census has these measures at the provincial level, but currently, this data is not available 
at the city level.  When this city level data becomes available, I hope to augment my 
current research findings on migrant medical insurance adoption.   
In conclusion, China has made significant progress towards expanding social 
welfare, albeit driven by political and fiscal incentives rather through the benevolence of 
the state.  Building a social safety net will become even more important in the future. 
Though migrants are currently exerting little pressure on local governments to expand 
medical insurance because they are young, healthy and poor, this phenomenon may 
change in the near future.  Currently, 61% of cities are offering this insurance to 
migrants.  The New Social Insurance Law will add pressure on local governments to 
expand social insurance programs to migrants.  Though many of these insurance schemes 
provide only shallow coverage, this can potentially lower the cost of living for migrants 
in host cities.  Plus as more migrants learn about this insurance, they will press for 
additional benefits.  Thus, we can envision a scenario where this new medical insurance 
system creates a new consciousness regarding social benefits among migrants.    
Moreover, we are already seeing a cohort effect in the first generation of migrants 
and the new generation of migrants.  The first generation of migrants migrated to the 
cities in the early 1980s. They are now in their mid-40s.  Though they still have ties to the 
countryside, they have lived most of their adult lives in urban areas and may want to 
retire at their host cities.  Also, these people are beginning to think about medical care 
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and retirement issues.  Thus, we should see increasing demands from these older 
migrants on urban governments for social welfare benefits.   
Additionally, the new generation of migrants has little to no farming experience 
and wants to stay at their host cities.  These migrants were born in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and they see little difference between themselves and urban residents.  Some have spent 
part of their childhood in their host city with their parents who were first generation 
migrants.  These young migrants are generally better educated and earn higher incomes 
than their parents in the city.  To them, moving to the city is less about economic 
opportunities and more about experiences and aspirations.  They want to move to the  city 
to “experience life and realize their dreams” (体验生活，实现梦想) (ACFTU Labor 
Relations Research Center 2011, 7).  Compared with older migrants, these migrants have 
a stronger rights consciousness and are more willing to push for their social rights. Thus, 
they are more likely to make demands on the government for medical insurance and other 
social insurance programs.  Hence, this population’s lack of social demands may be a 
temporary phenomenon.  As migrants become more vocal and press their demands with 
the state, they will become a social group that can pose a threat to the regime.  In addition 
to the political and fiscal incentives, the government will need to expand social welfare as 
a way to coopt this population into the system.  Thus, expanding the social welfare 










My dissertation uses a mixed method approach in which a historical analysis of 
China’s social welfare system as well as two city case studies are used to inductively 
develop theory and hypotheses to explain subnational variation in medical insurance 
provision for migrant workers.  My argument is then tested on a dataset of 285 Chinese 
prefecture level and above cities, covering medical insurance policies for migrants 
between 1997 and 2010.  I conducted this research between February 2009 and July 
2010.  My case studies rely on data from interviews as well as published statistical 
yearbooks, national and local government reports on migrant workers, social insurance 
policy (focusing on medical insurance), and population management, government policy 
documents (internal and publicly available) concerning migrant workers and social 
insurance, surveys on migrant workers, and reports from academic organizations and 
non-government organizations (NGOs).   
Interviews 
To understand the local scholarly debate and context on migrant workers and 
medical insurance policy, I interviewed researchers at Peking University, Tsinghua 
University, Renmin University and the China Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, the 
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, Fudan University, and East China Normal 
University in Shanghai, the Guangzhou Academy of Social Sciences and Zhongshan 
University in Guangzhou, and Hong Kong Polytechnic University in Hong Kong.     
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In terms of elite interviews, in Shanghai, I interviewed officials at the municipal 
health insurance bureau, municipal health bureau, and the Huangpu district level health 
insurance center.  In these interviews, I asked questions about the origins and 
implementation of Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance policy, the rationale behind the 
changes to this policy, views on migrants in Shanghai, and future trends in medical 
insurance policy for migrants.   In Guangzhou, I interviewed officials at the municipal 
human resources and social insurance bureau, the municipal reform and development 
bureau, and the municipal public security bureau.  In these interviews, I asked questions 
about their views on migrant workers, impetus and rationale behind providing medical 
insurance for migrants, and their thoughts on Shanghai’s comprehensive insurance. 
To understand the employers’ perspective on social insurance policy, I conducted 
several firm level interviews.  In Shanghai and Guangzhou, I interviewed human resource 
managers at two labor subcontracting companies, a packaging company, a glass 
manufacturing company, a home furnishing company, two clothing retail companies, a 
property management firm, a printing company, and an accessory-manufacturing firm.  
Additionally, I interviewed a labor lawyer at a domestic electronic retailer and the owner 
of a small labor consulting company.  With the exception of the labor consulting 
company, migrants make up between 10-80% of these firms’ workforce.  Although the 
labor consulting company did not directly employ any migrant workers, the owner was 
able to offer insights into labor and social welfare issues across a number of firms.  These 
firms were not randomly selected, but I was introduced to these firms though personal 
acquaintances.  I asked to be introduced to firms that employed some migrants in their 
workforce.  Interviewees were asked the general structure of the firm, its products and 
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services, characteristics of the workforce, labor contract implementation and labor 
disputes, and social insurance benefits. These interviews were mostly conducted in the 
human resource managers’ offices and lasted between 1-2 hours.   I conducted all my 
interviews in Mandarin or Cantonese.  
 I also visited a number of migrant communities and migrant NGOs in Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou.  I visited and interviewed five migrant NGOs in Beijing, four 
NGOs in Shanghai, and two NGOs in Guangzhou.  In these interviews, I asked about 
their organization’s objective and activities, the statistics of the migrant community they 
serve, their assessment of migrant needs and concerns, and the health situation and 
insurance coverage of migrants. 
I also interviewed more than sixty migrants about their lives in their host cities 
(Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou) and their experiences and expectations of the healthcare 
system.   I did not conduct additional migrant interviews after these sixty plus interviews 
because my interviewees’ answers were converging into the same story.  The interviews 
were semi-structured, covering their employment, personal assessments of their health, 
medical insurance coverage, treatment for illness, attitudes toward the health care system, 
major concerns in their livelihoods, and attitudes toward urban citizenship.  Depending 
on the interviewee, the interview lasted between half hour to one hour.  Over 70% have 
their spouse and children living with them at their host city.  They work in services, 
manufacturing, and construction.  Most of them are between the ages of 18-45.  63% of 
them are women because I mostly visited these communities during the day when the 
men were working. I try to include more men in my study by interviewing some migrants 
outside their worksites during their lunch breaks.  While my interview sample is not 
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representative of the migrant population, trends can still be drawn from these interviews. 
More importantly, these interviews allow me to tease out migrants’ needs and 
expectations from the healthcare system.     
To understand the health care situation from the health care professional 
perspective, I also interviewed a number of physicians and hospital administrators at a 
third tier hospital, two secondary tier hospitals, a first tier hospital, a rural community 
clinic, a private first tier hospital and six private migrant clinics in Shanghai.  To 
professionals working at hospitals, I asked questions regarding general hospital statistics, 
types of insurance accepted, procedures for reimbursements, protocols for the insured and 
uninsured, and any special health programs for migrants. To private migrant clinics, I 
asked questions about the doctor’s certification, typical migrant illnesses, procedures 
performed and cost of treatment.   
These interviews are used to provide contextual background to my case studies 
and guide me towards formulating potential hypothesis on medical insurance for migrant 
workers in Chinese cities.  Understanding the limitation of interviews in making 
generalization in my cases studies, I also employed other kinds of data to support my 
general theory.   The data compiled from my interviews were compared with information 
found in published statistical yearbooks, government surveys, reports and policy 
documents, scholarly research in English and Chinese, and articles in the Chinese media.  
Examples of these include China Statistical Yearbooks 2008-2012, State Council’s China 
Rural Migrant Worker Research Report 2006, China National Population and Planning 
Commission’s Report on China’s Migrant Population Development 2010 and 2011, 
Ministry of Health’s Research on Health Reform Issues in China, 2003, Ministry of 
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Human Resources and Social Security’s “Notice Concerning the Development of Rural 
Migrant Workers Participating in the Medical Insurance,” Shanghai Academy of Social 
Sciences’ The Reconstruction of Shanghai People, and Green Book of Population and 
Labor (2011): Challenges during the 12th Five Year Plan Period: Population, 
Employment and Income Distribution.       
Multi-City Dataset 
For my multi-city dataset, the unit of analysis is prefecture level and above cities. 
This is the total number of prefectural level and above cities (283 prefecture cities plus 2 
prefectures in Tibet and Xinjiang) as designated by the National Bureau Statistics found 
in China City Statistical Yearbook 2011.  This is the appropriate administrative unit to 
use in this study because medical insurance policies are made at the prefectural level and 
above.  While medical insurance can be pooled at the county level, the policy is unified at 
the prefectural level.  A county level city also cannot deviate from the official policy set 
by a prefectural level city because a county level city is usually ranked below a 
prefectural level city.  Moreover, a county level city governs sub-districts and towns, 
which are non-urban areas.  In my research, I am concerned about urban governments’ 
inclusion of migrant workers in their medical insurance programs because the majority of 
migrant workers move to urban areas, and not to another rural area. 
For my dependent variable on a city’s adoption of medical insurance program for 
migrant workers, I did a thorough search for policy documents, government press 
releases and announcements, media reports, and local researchers’ reports regarding the 
existence of a medical insurance program to include migrant workers (i.e. the expansion 
of urban employee medical insurance, flexible employee medical insurance, migrant 
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worker major illness insurance and/or urban basic resident insurance).  I also recruited the 
help from five local graduate students from Shanghai’s JiaoTong University to gather this 
data because they had more access and knowledge to conduct document research in 
China.  Examples of this search and coding process are: Shanghai has a policy document 
on migrant comprehensive insurance. This document, “The Measure on Shanghai’s 
Outside Workers Comprehensive Insurance 2002,” is coded in the dataset as 1 for 
Shanghai, with a starting year of 2002.  In contrast, most cities in Sichuan Province do 
not have policy documents readily available online or in Shanghai libraries. However, a 
local researcher has written extensively about the types of medical insurance programs 
available to migrant workers in those cities. For those cities, this article is used to code 
the dependent variable on the adoption of medical insurance.  For other cities where there 
are no researcher reports and policy documents available, media reports are used to code 
the supply of medical insurance for migrant workers. Tianshui City, Gansu Province, is 
an example of this type of city.  For this city, an article was published in Tianshui Daily 
on August 30, 2006 regarding migrant workers and medical insurance. The details 
provided on Tianshui’s provisional measure on the medical insurance for migrant 
workers is used to code for this city.   Cities with no policy documents, media reports, 
press releases or research reports available are coded as 0 for having no medical 
insurance for migrant workers.  There may be cases where some cities with medical 
insurance for migrants are coded 0 (having no insurance programs), but this exhaustive 
and expansive search should result in a very small number of cities in this category.  
Since my search and coding only deals with the existence of policy/programs to include 
migrant workers in medical insurance, this is not an assessment on the successful 
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implementation and enrollment of rural migrants in these programs. Whereas Shanghai 
publishes yearly statistics on rural migrants enrollment in their comprehensive insurance 
programs, many governments do not publish nor mention this statistics in their 
government reports. However, I do not believe this is a big limitation in my data because 
I am interested in the supply of the medical insurance programs to migrant workers.  The 
successful implementation of these programs is a separate issue, which I have not 
explored in the dissertation.  However, in future research, I may explore the link the 
between successful implementation of these programs and fiscal deficits.  Some cities 
have strengthened the government’s oversight over social insurance in order to collect 
more funds into these programs (Frazier 2010).  However, these funds are usually used to 
pay out to current urban retirees, while pay out to migrants remains low (Zhou and Gao 
2009; China Labor Bulletin 2012; Economist 2012). 
For my independent variables, I used government statistics from the China City 
Statistical Yearbook 2011 and the China Statistical Yearbook For Regional Economy 
2011. The China City Statistical Yearbook provides city level data on population and 
employment, economic and social development, environment and basic facility.  The 
China Yearbook for Regional Economy also provides city level data on major socio-
economic statistical indicators, covering population and employment, domestic trade, 
foreign trade, tourism, finance, insurance, education.  China’s National Bureau of 
Statistics publishes both yearbooks.  I accessed these two statistical yearbooks from 
Renmin University’s School of Economics online forum (bbs.pinggu.org).   
Overall, official Chinese statistics suffer from problems of missing data and the 
manipulation of data by the local governments that gather the data and then pass it up to 
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the National Bureau of Statistics.  However, local statistics bureaus do have to follow 
guidelines and classifications set out by the National Bureau of Statistics. For my key 
explanatory variables, the percent of high skilled service workers, the percent of heavy 
industry and government balance, these limitations do not majorly affect my results.  I 
created a variable of the proportion of high skilled service labor using employment data 
from the City Statistical Yearbook.  This variable is calculated as the sum of workers 
engaged in the banking and insurance, real estate, and scientific research and technical 
research sectors divided by the total workers engaged in the tertiary sector.  The variable 
is presented in percentage points. The employment data is based on the number of 
registered urban employees. This number does not include part time, temporary, and 
informal (no labor contract) workers.  This data limitation should not have a major 
impact on my results because most high skilled service workers are employed full time in 
the formal sector.    
I created a variable of the proportion of heavy industry based on the proportion of 
heavy industry in the gross industrial output value of the local economy.  This variable is 
expressed in percentages.  Heavy industry includes, but is not limited to, mining, 
quarrying and logging, smelting and processing of metals, chemical materials, petroleum 
refining, machine building, and car manufacturing.  Gross industrial output value is the 
total volume of industrial products sold or available for sale in value terms during a given 
period (1 year period of 2010).  It includes the value of finished products.   Though 
double counting across enterprises can occur, this limitation does not affect my results 
because cities would have to systematically double count for reasons that have to be 
correlated with the availability of migrant medical insurance.  
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The government budget balance variable is created as the difference between 
government revenue and expenditure.  This variable is presented in billions of yuan. 
Government revenue includes tax revenue, fees and surcharges, inter-government 
transfers, repayment from capital construction loans and social insurance funds.  
Government expenditure includes, but is not limited to, operating expenses of the 
government departments, public security, education, cultural and media, pensions for the 
disabled, social assistance programs, public health, and social insurance payments.  Since 
governments are not allowed to borrow to meet their budget deficits, I would expect 
higher revenue and lower expenditure numbers because cities would be inclined to show 
a more balanced local budget to the central government.  All local governments would 
have the same incentive to report these numbers in the same way. However, despite this 
assumed trend, most governments are still running budget deficits, thus this data 
limitation has not affected my results. If anything, this trend in the data would suggest 
that the magnitudinal effect of my government balance is larger than it appears in the 
analysis.   
In sum, given the limited access and availability of data in China, I used a mixed 
method approach to answer my research question on the provision of medical insurance 
for migrant workers.  My analysis uses interviews, primary and secondary source 
material, and an original city dataset. While there are limitations in using interviews to 
make generalization, the interview data is compared with other sources. Though 




APPENDIX B  
 
DATA SOURCE FOR DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 
Below are the sources used to construct the dependent variable in the multi-city dataset 
on the adoption of migrant medical insurance.  
 
 
Beijing’s “Provisional Notice On Outside Workers Participating In Basic Medical 
Insurance, ”September 1, 2004. (北京市外地农民工参加基本医疗保险暂行办法). 
 
Beijing’s “Basic Medical Insurance Policy,” April 1, 2001. (北京市基本医疗保险规定) 
 
“Beijing ‘S Migrant Workers Medical Insurance Benefits To Align With Urban 




“Towards A Unified Medical Insurance For Migrant Workers.”Baoding Yingcai Wang. 
April 12, 2012. “农民工入职工医保有待全国统一, 保定英才网
Http://0312.Job1001.Com/Viewarticle.Php?Id=43014 
 
Tianjin’s Urban Employee Medical Insurance Policy. November 1, 2001. (城镇职工基本
医疗保险规定) Http://Www.Med66.Com/Html/2005/1/Dl0375434281711500268.Html 
 
“Tianjin Migrant Workers Medical Insurance Policy.” No. 71. September 1, 2006. (天津
市农民工医疗保险办法, 津政发〔2006〕71号) 
 
“Tianjin To Launch An Integrated Policy On Medical And Occupational Injury Insurance 





Chongqing’s “Provisional Notice On  Flexible Workers Medical Insurance Pooling.” 




Chongqing’s “Provisional Notice On Urban Employee Medical Insurance Pooling.” 





Chonqqing’s “Provisional Notice On Migrant Workers Major Illness Insurance Pooling.” 
October 1, 2007. 重庆市农民工大病医疗保险市级统筹试行办法(渝办发〔2007〕146
号) . Http://Djmzjz.Blog.163.Com/Blog/Static/916004020078610244346/ 
 
“Shanghai Outside Workers Comprehensive Insurance Provisional Policy.” No. 123. 
September 1, 2002. (上海市外来从业人员综合保险暂行办法) 
 
 “Regarding The Changes To Shanghai Outside Workers Comprehensive Insurance 
Provisional Policy.” No. 34. August 30, 2004. (上海市人民政府关于修改上海市外来从
业人员综合保险暂行办法的决定修正) 
 
Shanghai’s Notice Regarding Outside Workers Comprehensive Insurance Inpatient 
Procedures.” No. 27. March 30, 2009. (关于本市外来从业人员综合保险住院医疗有关
事项的通知) 
 
Anhui Province Labor And Social Security Bureau’s Notice On Migrant Workers 
Participating In Medical Insurance. August 30, 2006. (安徽省勞動和社會保障廳關于農
民工參加醫療保險有關問題的通知) 
 
Anqing’s (Anhui Province) “Notice Regarding Migrant Workers Participating In Medical 
Insurance,” August 30, 2006 (安庆市关于民工参加医疗保险有关问题的通知),  
Www.Aqjyw.Gov.Cn/News/Shownews.Asp?ID=3290 
 
“Bengfu’s (Anhui Province) Migrant Workers Can Participate In Medical Insurance.” 
Jiang Huai Morning News, April 4, 2004.  (蚌埠农民工可办医保，合肥报业网--江淮
晨报) Http://Www.Sina.Com.Cn 
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